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In the general opinion, Asia as a whole tends to be represented (and more often than not, to
represent  itself)  as  devoid  of  violence:  look  at  Indian  “non-violence”,  Chinese  Taoist  “non-
action”, Confucian “harmony”, Buddhist “love for peace” or Japanese “Zen philosophy”… This
may fill the shelves of “Oriental wisdom” sections in our bookshops, but most historians do not
buy into this kind of “feel good” projections and are acutely aware that any society whatsoever,
wherever it is located, teems with violence, and that violence is part and parcel of any kind of
polity. Furthermore, the political violence which is the topic of this volume is not just about war,
it can take on very diverse forms, including, as will be shown by some of the articles presented
here, iconic vandalism, distorted modes of interpretation, warped forms of ideological discourse,
collective amnesia and negationism.
The present volume is the second of the “Myriades d’Asies” series inaugurated with India-China:
Intersecting Universalities. Just as the preceding one, it is a collection of articles resulting from an
international conference organised by the Chair of Chinese Intellectual History in June 2019. As a
reflection of the Collège de France spirit of public service intent on making knowledge available
to all for free, all the volumes of the series are published online and in open access. Our hope is
that these articles,  written by eminent historians of Asia and from very different viewpoints
which cut across vast expanses of  time and space,  will  lead readers and researchers alike to
reflect further on the multiple faces of political violence, as well as their infinite complexities, so
as to avoid giving in to ideological and judgmental binaries that are the common junk food for
non-thought. This seems to be increasingly essential today since the 21st century is supposed to
be the century of Asia.
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EDITOR'S NOTE
Cover illustration: group of headless statues at the Qianling Mausoleum dedicated to
Emperor Gaozong (d. 683) of the Tang Dynasty and located about 80 kilometers east of
Xi’an.
Illustration de couverture : groupe de statues sans tête au mausolée de Qianling dédié à
l’Empereur Gaozong (mort en 683) de la dynastie Tang et situé à environ 80 kilomètres
à l’est de Xi’an.
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Foreword
Historians of Asia on political violence
Anne Cheng and Sanchit Kumar
1 In the general opinion, Asia as a whole tends to be represented (and more often than
not, to represent itself) as devoid of violence: look at Indian “non-violence”, Chinese
Taoist “non-action”, Confucian “harmony”, Buddhist “love for peace” or Japanese “Zen
philosophy”. This may fill the shelves of “Oriental wisdom” sections in our bookshops,
but  most  historians  do not  buy into this  kind of  “chicken broth for  the soul”  (the
expression  has  been  used  to  describe  Yu  Dan’s  politically  correct  and  best-selling
interpretation  of  Confucius’  Analects),  and  are  acutely  aware  that  any  society
whatsoever, wherever it is located, teems with violence, and that violence is part and
parcel of any kind of polity. Furthermore, the political violence which is the topic of
this volume is not just about war, it can take on very diverse forms, including, as will be
shown  by  some  articles  presented  here,  iconic  vandalism,  distorted  modes  of
interpretation,  warped  forms  of  ideological  discourse,  collective  amnesia  and
negationism.
2 The illustration chosen for the cover speaks for itself: the rows of over sixty statues still
standing while nearly all of them are headless tell of some act of violence perpetrated
against them. They can be seen in central China, at the Qianling Mausoleum dedicated
to Emperor Gaozong of the Tang Dynasty and located about 80 kilometers east of Xi’an,
the former imperial  capital  in modern day Shaanxi Province,  which has been made
famous  by  the  terracotta  army  excavated  from  the  tumulus  of  the  First  Emperor.
Although, strangely enough, the time when and the reason why these statues actually
lost  their  heads  are  still  very  much  of  a  mystery,  they  have  been  identified  as
representing foreign envoys  and officers  originating from the Western regions  and
Central Asia. But one thing is certain, the picture was chosen precisely to be reminded
that there is no easy and simplistic explanation to political violence.
3 The present volume is the second of the “Myriades d’Asies” collection inaugurated in
April  2020,  during  the  initial  phase  of  the  Covid  19  pandemic,  with  India-China:
Intersecting Universalities. Just as the preceding one, it is a collection of articles resulting
from an international conference organised by the Chair of Chinese Intellectual History
at  the  Collège  de  France  in  June  2019,  which  has  once  more  benefited  from  the
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technical  contribution  of  Jean-Michel  Roynard,  and  the  financial  support  of  the
Fondation Hugot.  As  a  reflection of  the Collège de France spirit  of  “public  service”
intent on making knowledge available to all  for free,  we decided to publish all  the
volumes of the collection online and in open access.
4 Another  founding  principle  of  the  Collège  de  France  is  to  teach  and  disseminate
scientific  knowledge  or  research  “in  the  making”.  Let  us  recall  that  “enseigner  la
science en train de se faire” is the motto of this unique institution dating back to 1530.
Our volumes are therefore part of this effort to make broadly accessible working papers
in a formalised (but not necessarily formal in the usual academic definition) state of
advancement.  Consequently,  while  some  articles  are  presented  in  the  form  of
considerably  detailed  developments,  with  a  highly  elaborate  and  sophisticated
apparatus of bibliographical references, some others have chosen to remain closer to
their oral delivery, with few references or even none at all. It must be pointed out that
the authors in the volume, who are all eminent scholars in their respective fields, have
been allowed total  freedom as to the form and format of their contributions which
therefore offer a great variety in terms of aspect and length.
5 Although the 2019 conference, unlike the 2017 one on “India-China”, was focused on
the topic of political violence, it too gathered a number of historians working on India
and China, with the addition of some others working on Japan. It should be noted in
particular that the three scholars writing on ancient India are among the best known in
their  field  and  we  are  proud  to  have  assembled  their  contributions  in  one  single
volume,  and  that  the  fourth  Indian  scholar  is  actually  a  specialist  of  Japan,  thus
creating an interesting intersection of viewpoints on Asia.
6 The concept of the conference was initially inspired by Upinder Singh’s book, Political
violence  in  ancient  India,  published by Harvard University Press  in 2017.  Such a title
cannot fail to attract attention, if not to raise an eyebrow, since there is a persistent
commonplace idea that India is the country of non-violence par excellence. As the author
makes a point of specifying, “what is distinctive about ancient India is not that Indians
were especially nonviolent people but that ancient Indian political thought displays a
unique,  intense  and prolonged engagement  with  the  tension  between violence  and
nonviolence”. As an authoritative historian of ancient India, Upinder Singh is in the
best  possible  position  to  tackle  the  subject  with  the  necessary  depth  of  historical
knowledge and expound what the wielding of political power might involve.
7 In her 2017 book, Upinder Singh pointed out the necessity of looking beyond India and
embracing a comparative perspective,  remarking that “the history of ideas requires
crossing not only spatial boundaries but also temporal ones […] The fact that ancient
ideas and symbols continue to be invoked in modern India makes an understanding of
those  ideas  and  symbols  extremely  relevant,  indeed  essential.  Another  reason  for
connecting the seemingly remote past with the more immediate present is the hope
that a critical engagement with ancient Indian political thought can perhaps help us
reflect on the problem of escalating violence in our own time, whichever part of the
world we may live in.” In such a perspective, the tension between the non-violence
asserted by the explicit references to Buddhism in the modern Indian national emblems
of the Sarnath Ashokan pillar on the one hand,  and the extreme violence found in
ancient textual sources of the Indian tradition like the Mahabharata or the Arthasastra 
on the other, appears to be central in Upinder Singh’s historical reflection in her book
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as well as in her contribution to the present volume. Both come to the conclusion that
“Violence lies at the heart of the state”.
8 While  referring  to  some  of  the  same  sources  from  ancient  Indian  literature  and
inherited tradition,  as  an art  historian and museum curator,  Naman Ahuja offers  a
somewhat different viewpoint. As he himself describes, his focus “is to reveal the many
types of political violence communicated by ancient and medieval Indian sculptures”.
Moving beyond the purely aesthetic sensation and emotion usually produced by these
sculptures  and/or  the  reductive  ideological  or  religious  explanations  adduced
whenever they have undergone defacement or mutilation, Naman Ahuja delves deep
into the anthropology and sociology of the various and often unexpected uses made of
these sculptures in their local context. As he aptly remarks: “Objects in Indian museum
collections raise questions and the museum has a role and a responsibility to play in
articulating the many narratives that these questions provoke. For all the intentions
that exist on paper on the interpretative role museum displays can play in fulfilling
their mandate of contributing to the development of a responsible, even enlightened
public, few Indian museum curators have demonstrated their capacity to exhibit this in
the  permanent  displays  of  Indian history,  except  to  use  them,  largely,  as  tools  for
telling a history of religion or metaphysical ideas. There are several reasons for taking
the museum from being storehouses of objects to communicators of ideas and diverse,
or even divergent, histories.”
9 Naman Ahuja consequently offers to “study some examples that were either made in
order to normalise political violence in society, or have ended up having that effect.
Deliberately mutilated sculptures, similar to those so amply seen at archaeological sites
and in museums across India, reveal the requirement to make public statements about
conflict and victory of course, but they reveal many other things too which we are not
told about: how the conflict was not only one between the usually imagined upholders
of  iconoclastic  Islam  on  the  one  side  and  myriad  others  on  the  other  side,  but
sometimes  between  different  Hindus  or  in  contexts  where  there  were  no  Muslims
involved,  driven at  times  not  by conflict  at  all,  but  by  the  re-use  of  old  stones  on
account of economic necessity.”
10 Naman Ahuja thus lets us partake of his experience as a curator of major exhibitions
such as “The Body in Indian Art and Thought” (2013) and “India and the World:  A
History in Nine Stories” (2017), observing that “the problem that seems to afflict the
presentation  of  Indian  art  in  galleries  across  the  world  is  its  stereotyping  on  the
grounds  of  its  religious  identification.  The  division  and  presentation  of  museum
galleries of Hindu art, Buddhist art and Islamic art, has a long colonial legacy, when
history  used  to  be  taught  in  that  manner.”  His  in-depth  argument  and  richly
documented collection of case studies, culled all over India and throughout different
periods of its history, comes at the right time when debates in this vast and diversified
country  tend  to  narrow  down  on  so-called  “religious”  issues  which  usually  find
themselves reduced to a nefarious frontal opposition between Hindus and Muslims.
11 In  a  vigorous  essay  which  deliberately  chooses  to  privilege  argumentation  over
erudition,  Romila  Thapar  brings  up  one  central  issue  in  this  volume,  namely  the
interface  between  past  and  present,  and  more  precisely  how  the  past  is  used  to
legitimise the present,  thus addressing a common issue also formulated by Upinder
Singh and Naman Ahuja, but from a different viewpoint: “The right to dissent has come
to be recognised in modern times, but its practice goes back many centuries. To deny
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its earlier existence comes from the preference to project Indian society as having been
a seamless harmonious unity where dissent was hardly to be found”. As a renowned
historian, Romila Thapar never loses sight of the specifically social context in which
conceptions of culture are developed: “In the last two centuries, Indian religions have
been reconstructed largely along the lines suggested by colonial scholarship. This was
seldom challenged and therefore came to be accepted. The focus has been on belief,
ritual and religious texts with little space being given to analysing the social concerns
of  these  religions.”  In  an  effort  to  counter  the  predominantly  theological  –and
ultimately  Christian–  approach  to  religion  and  the  colonial  tendency  to  reduce  all
religions into homogeneous and monolithic “-isms” (such as Hinduism, with the result
that “in colonial times almost all non-Muslim sects were labeled as Hindu, even those
that  were  not”),  the  historian  endeavours  to  investigate  religious  practices  and
interactions which are often contradictory and certainly open to argument and dissent.
She thus traces the genealogy of the Gandhian principle of ahimsa/non-violence not to
some religious dogma, but to a practice of dissent which takes the paradoxical form of
renunciation or breaking free from the ties and constraints of social norms.
12 Moving  from  India  to  Japan,  while  keeping  India  very  much  in  mind,  Brij  Tankha
presents a nuanced and diversified view of the oft discussed concept of Asianism, “a set
of  ideas defining Japan’s  relations with Asia [which] has been used as a  concept to
organise the narrative of modern Japanese history. This set of ideas was deployed both
to  explain  Japan’s  exceptional  past  and  chart  its  future  as  the  liberator  of  Asian
countries from Western domination, set to help them develop into modern states. […]
Japan would remake Asia on an Asian universalism inspired by Japan’s past. The basis
of  an  Asian  community,  sometimes  seen  as  united  by  ancient  philosophies  and
traditions, at other times justified because of Japan’s advanced level of development,
was variously  conceived and debated in Japan,  but  Asianism as  a concept  provided
legitimacy and became the organising principle for Japan’s colonial control in Asia.”
13 Brij Tankha traces the emergence of Asianism through Japan’s growing consciousness
of being endowed with a destiny distinct from that of China, and of the necessity of
moving away from the Chinese centuries-old influence, thus opening up to Asia and the
world.  This  emerging awareness,  eminently  represented in the writings  of  Okakura
Tenshin which have been hastily reduced to the famous opening sentence of The Ideals
of the East, “Asia is one”, is largely based on the common ground provided by Buddhism,
but with a new emphasis on the direct link between India as the source and Japan as
the acme of development, therefore implicitly bypassing China. In this respect, the trip
to India taken in 1883 by the Japanese monk Kitabatake Dōryū is quite symbolic, and
finds an architectural expression in constructions like the Nirakuso Villa near Kobe. A
more resolute political subversiveness is to be found in the works of the poet Kaneko
Mitsuharu whose deliberate cosmopolitanism leads him to be overtly critical of Japan’s
militaristic version of “Pan-Asianism”, as he engaged with the increasingly aggressive
nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s through his observations of life of the colonised in
the colonies, whether in China or in Southeast Asia.
14 To  carry  on  with  the  task  of  debunking  myths  about  the  Japanese  identity,  Eddy
Dufourmont chooses to tackle the question through the violence wrought on historical
facts and the forceful distortion applied on them to make them fit into a political and
ideological agenda or a national identity narrative. It seems that the Japanese obsession
of a continuous line of imperial succession going back to at least the 7th century B.C. is
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in fact a modern construction, and that the smooth idea of the Meiji “restoration” is a
contrived view with regard to the civil war which started it and the actual revolution
that some historians analyse it to be.
15 During  the  imperial  regime,  historians  played  a  central  role  in  the  formation  of
national  identity by defining Japan as a  land of  harmony,  in contrast  to China and
Europe characterised as lands of revolutions marked by political violence. Since such a
representation is replete with contradictions,  the question is to show how Japanese
historians faced the reality of political violence in their own country and how they
dealt  in  general  with  the  phenomenon of  revolution (kakumei)  in  world  history,  in
particular with respect to the French and the Chinese revolutionary traditions. In many
ways,  the  Japanese  two-fold  obsession  with  continuity  and  harmony  is  strangely
reminiscent of the similar obsession which is to be observed in today’s China. Could it
be that there is  a  recurrent mechanism at  work whenever a sociopolitical  entity is
submitted  to  great  pressure  by  the  imposition  of  “modernity”,  which  involves  an
acceleration of time and a fast-changing environment, creating a need to take refuge in
an idealised past, as was diagnosed by Eric Howbsbawm in The invention of tradition?
16 As an investigation into an even more radical expression of political violence than the
Pan-Asian ideology or the idea of revolution, Arnaud Nanta’s meticulously researched
article has the courage of tackling one of the most controversial events in the whole
Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), namely the so-called Nanking Massacre, which
many Japanese historians still refer to by an understatement as the “Nanking Incident”,
just as they refer to the Japanese occupation of China as “the China Incident” (this is
somewhat reminiscent of the then French National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen’s
1987 description of the Holocaust gas chambers as a “point of detail in the history of
the  Second World  War”).  In  fact,  Arnaud  Nanta  at  this  point  draws  an  interesting
parallel  with the French colonial  occupation of  Algeria:  “like France during the so-
called ‘Algerian events’– Japan did not consider itself to be at war and thus did not feel
bound  by  any  treaties  during  what  it  termed  the  ‘China  incident’.”  One  initial
observation is that the violence lies not only in the facts themselves, but also and even
more so in the words used to describe them, in the way they are chosen to minimise, if
not to negate the facts. One can sense that even the most genuine goodwill may find it
difficult to name reality, as is witnessed by the title of the 1967 article written by Hora
Tomio, one of the foremost historians of the Nanking massacre, which for lack of an
appropriate word in Japanese had to resort to the transliteration of an English word:
“Nankin atoroshitī” 南京アトロシティイ (The Nanking Atrocity).
17 Arnaud Nanta’s  article  also  shows interestingly  how collective  amnesia  manages  to
erase a major traumatic event, and how long it takes for such an event to surface again
in public  consciousness.  Significantly  enough,  the Nanking Massacre perpetrated in
1937 was still a non-event to Japanese historians of the early 1970s who simply ignored
it  in their  narrative of  the Sino-Japanese war.  It  was actually the analogy with the
Vietnam war brought to light by a Japanese journalist which triggered off a surge of
retrospective  interest  in  the  atrocities  committed  in  Nanking  over  three  decades
earlier, together with a simultaneous salvo of reactions ranging from revisionism to
downright negationism.
18 Finally, our volume closes with a text by Michel Bonnin which has been voluntarily
kept short and devoid of bibliography in order to keep to the format of an essay, or
more precisely, a pamphlet directed at one of the most striking periods of the 20th
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century in terms of political violence, although it has not always been perceived as such
by everyone,  and even quite  to  the contrary.  Michel  Bonnin deals  with the Maoist
period which lasted three decades –from the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in 1949 (or even before that, as early as the Long March and the Yan’an years in
the 1940s) to the end of the so-called Cultural Revolution with the death of Mao in 1976.
He recalls and reviews the paroxystic violence wielded and unleashed by the Maoist
regime through successive and relentless campaigns and “movements” of destruction
of human and material resources: the anti-rightist campaign as early as the 1950s, the
Great  Leap  forward  which  was  the  direct  cause  of  the  Great  Famine  of  the  1960s,
immediately followed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1970s which
finished destroying whatever there remained to be destroyed of the cultural heritage,
leaving  behind  a  heap  of  ruins  on  which  Deng  Xiaoping  started  building  the  new
economical order of a capitalistic, while ever more dictatorial China. Meanwhile, the
question of the responsibility of the political leaders has remained mired in an ocean of
eternal amnesia.
19 Our hope is that this collection of articles, written by various historians of Asia and
from very different viewpoints, which cut across vast expanses of time and space, will
lead readers and researchers alike to reflect further on the multiple faces of political
violence, as well as their infinite complexities, so as to avoid giving in to ideological and
judgmental binaries that are the common junk food for non-thought. This seems to be
increasingly essential today since the 21st century is supposed to be the century of
Asia, and as many would have it, even more specifically of China.
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The state and violence: perspectives
from ancient India
Upinder Singh
1 The  instant  we  recognise  violence  as  an  important  and  intimate  part  of  human
experience, the way we look at history, the questions we ask, the answers we seek, all
change dramatically. In my recent book on the subject, I examined political violence in
ancient  India  between c.  600  BCE and 600  CE,  with  special  reference  to  the  state’s
punitive role, war, and interactions with the forest. I pointed out that all traditions,
including the religions of nonviolence, Jainism and Buddhism, accepted that a certain
amount of violence was necessary for kings.  I  argued for a connection between the
growth and systemisation of state violence and the increasingly sophisticated attempts
to mask, invisibilise, justify and aestheticise this violence in various ways. At the same
time, I  pointed out that ancient Indian political discourse consistently distinguished
legitimate force from illegitimate force and kept open a window for interrogating the
state’s violence. I also argued that what is distinctive about ancient India is not that
Indians  were especially  nonviolent  people  but  that  ancient  Indian political  thought
displays  a  unique,  intense  and  prolonged  engagement  with  the  tension  between
violence and nonviolence. In this paper, I would like to take some of the arguments
further.
2 It is difficult to draw a dividing line between the threat or use of coercive power or
force  that  is  necessary,  and that  which  is  illegitimate  or  disproportionate  –that  is,
violence. Assessments will differ, depending on perspective. So the words “force” and
“violence” are fluid categories, difficult to define in absolute terms.
3 Over the centuries, political theorists have justified the state’s coercive, punitive and
military powers, and have argued that it is these powers that stand between order and
anarchy. In terms of their perspective, almost all the sources available for the history of
political ideas and practice in ancient India are statist and centrist. The theories of the
origins  of  kingship  emphasise  the  king’s  responsibilities  towards  his  people  and
describe taxes as his wages for the protection of his subjects, preservation of the social
order, and prevention of crime and violence. The king’s just punishment prevents a
descent into “the law of the fish” (matsya-nyaya), an anarchy where the mighty devour
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the weak.  My paper has three parts:  the justification of the use of force in ancient
Indian theories of the origins of kingship; the assertion of the state’s right to punish,
torture and kill;  the anxieties of  political  theorists about the problematic nature of
kingship and violence against the state.1 In my conclusion I raise some general issues,
including the relationship between political theory and practice and the possibility of a
global comparative history of political violence.
 
I. Theories of the birth of kingship
4 Let us look first at the implications of three accounts of the origins of kingship –two
from the Mahabharata, one from the Buddhist Tipitaka.
5 The Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata (the great Sanskrit epic composed between c. 400
BCE and 400 CE) offers two accounts of the origins of kingship. The first account takes
us back to an age of perfection when kingship and punishment did not exist because
they were not required.2 However, men fell prey to error, confusion and greed and they
approached the gods Brahma and Vishnu to intervene. Vishnu produced a mind-born
son Virajas,  who was followed by his son and grandson Kirtiman and Kardama. But
these three chosen men did not want to rule; they were inclined towards renunciation.
Ananga was next  in line and he ruled well,  protecting his  subjects  and meting out
justice. He was followed by his son Atibala who learnt the art of governance but did not
have control over his senses. The next ruler was Vena, who was dominated by passion
and hate, and was unlawful in his behaviour towards his subjects. The sages decided to
get rid of this evil king and stabbed him to death with blades of sacred kusha grass.
They churned his right thigh, and out of it emerged an ugly man named Nishada (a
forest tribal), who was told to go away because he was not fit to be king. Then they
churned Vena’s right hand and therefrom emerged Prithu, a man with a refined mind
and an acute understanding of the Vedas, the auxiliary texts, dharma, artha, the military
arts and politics. Prithu was consecrated king by the gods and sages and he proved to
be a good, exemplary king.
6 The second account of the origin of kingship in the Shanti Parva describes kingship as
the result of both divine intervention and a social contract.3 Oppressed by anarchy,
violence and insecurity, people came together and made agreements among themselves
to get rid of the violent,  aggressive men who stole,  violated women and performed
other such evil acts. However, this arrangement did not work. So they went to the god
Brahma and begged him to appoint a king who could protect them and whom they
would honour in return. Brahma chose Manu, but Manu refused. He was afraid of cruel
acts,  because  kingship  was  a  very  difficult  task,  especially  among  men,  who  are
perpetually prone to improper behaviour. The people urged Manu not to be afraid and
reassured  him  that  the  sin  incurred  by  his  cruel  deeds  would  go  away.  They  also
promised to give him 1/50th of their cattle and gold, and 1/10th of their grain; soldiers
skilled in war would follow him everywhere; and one-fourth of the merit earned by the
people  would  go  to  him.  Manu  accepted  this  pact  and  went  around  the  earth,
suppressing the wicked and making them perform their duties.
7 Let us now turn to a Buddhist account of the origins of kingship –the Aggañña Sutta of
the Digha Nikaya, a Pali text which is part of the Tipitaka.4 This begins in a primordial
age of perfection when beings were undifferentiated, luminous, made of mind, feeding
on rapture. At some point of time, a process of decline set in, primarily due to greed.
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Theft, accusation, lying and punishment appeared, and the last straw was when one
violated the private property of  another by stealing rice from his  field.  The beings
assembled and lamented this situation; they approached the one among them who was
the best-looking, charismatic and authoritative and asked him to protect property and
punish those who deserved punishment; in return they would give him a portion of
their rice.5 This ruler was given the designation “Mahasammata,” which means “the
Great Elect” or “one who has been elected or appointed by the people.”
8 In all three accounts I have discussed, kingship originates in violence and disorder. It
emerges  as  a  critical  institution,  the  only  option,  essential  to  bring  violence  and
disorder  to  an  end.  All  three  emphasise  the  king’s  duties  towards  his  people,  the
maintenance  of  social  order,  protection  of  private  property,  and  preventing  and
dealing with crime through the imposition of punishment. It is not just the origins of
kingship, but the continued existence of this institution, that is considered essential to
maintain  order  and  prevent  anarchy.  But  there  are  some  interesting  differences
between the accounts. The Buddhist text talks about a straight social contract between
the people and the king. In the first Shanti Parva account, the gods and sages play key
roles  and  in  the  second account,  it  is  the  gods  and  the  people.  In  contrast  to  the
Aggañña  Sutta,  the  beginnings  of  kingship  in  the  Mahabharata are  less  smooth;  the
institution has a bad start and there are various problems before it  receives a firm
foundation. There is an acknowledgement of the possibility that kings may have serious
flaws, that there is something inherently problematic or negative about the institution
of kingship; that those who inherit it may turn their back on it and may not want to
rule.  In  the  first  Shanti  Parva account,  kingship  is  born  in  the  midst  of  regicide,
renunciation and evil; in the second, it requires the king overcoming his own fears of
the cruelty and sin that are inherent in the discharge of his duties.
 
II. The king’s right to torture, punish and kill
9 Theories of the origins of kingship describe punishment as a primary duty of the king
but also assume that this punishment must be just. In the Mahabharata, Bhishma tells
Yudhishthira that the royal rod of force was created by Brahma for the protection of
the world so that people performed their duties; everything depends on it. Describing
daṇḍa as a terrifying monster with many arms, legs, tusks and eyes, Bhishma states that
it inspires fear in people and it is this fear that prevents them from killing one other.
10 The nature of transgressions in which the king is obliged to intervene are of two types:
a more general transgression of the prevailing status quo; more specific crimes of a
civil or criminal nature. The most direct and poignant example from ancient texts of a
ruler killing a subject in the first kind of transgression comes from the Uttarakanda of
the Sanskrit epic the Ramayana (c. 400 BCE-400 CE), where the otherwise compassionate
Rama kills the Shudra Shambuka6. The epic gives a moral justification for Rama’s action:
an  innocent  Brahmana  child  in  Rama’s  kingdom  had  died  and  the  reason  for  this
unfortunate event was traced to Shambuka who had violated the norms of the social
order by performing austerities. Such a violation could not be tolerated, and Rama had
no hesitation in killing Shambuka for the sake of the greater good.
11 The text that discusses the role of the state in intervening in specific types of civil and
criminal  offences  and  the  state’s  right  to  impose  retribution,  pain  and  torture  on
subjects in the administration of justice is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (composed between c.
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50-300 CE), which contains the first detailed prescriptive law code in India. Here too,
the  idea  of  the  four-fold  varṇa order  is  extremely  important  –punishments  vary,
depending on the varṇa status of the individuals involved. The types of punishment
mentioned  by  Kautilya  include  fines,  confiscation  of  property,  exile,  corporeal
punishment, mutilation, branding, torture, forced labour and death. Kautilya accepts
torture as a means of acquiring information during interrogation as well as a part of
punishment,  and the types of torture include those that involve striking, whipping,
caning, suspension from a rope and inserting needles under the nails.
12 The Arthashastra also asserts the state’s right to take life on the grounds of justice. It
distinguishes  between  simple  death  and  death  by  torture.7 The  latter  refers  to
especially painful deaths, which may also have involved public spectacle. The varieties
of death by torture are the following: burning on a pyre, drowning in water, cooking in
a big jar, impaling on a stake, setting fire to different parts of the body, and tearing
apart by bullocks.
13 However,  all  texts  emphasise  that  the  king’s  punishment  must  be  measured,  in
accordance  with  proper  judicial  principles,  proportionate  to  the  crime  and  utterly
impartial. Bhishma tells Yudhishthira that like the spring sun, the king should be both
gentle  (mṛidu)  and harsh (tikshna),  especially  in  matters  related to  punishment and
taxation.8 The Mahabharata connects the king’s proper administration of justice with
his afterlife –a just king goes to heaven; an unjust one goes to hell.
 
III. Resistance and rebellion against the state
14 The Mahabharata is a text that ultimately upholds the institution of kingship and the
use of necessary force. At the same time, it warns that excessive cruelty and violence of
the king and his neglect of his duties can lead to justified violence against him. We have
already seen that regicide is built into one of the Mahabharata accounts of the early
history of the institution of kingship –remember the evil king Vena who was stabbed to
death with kusha grass by the sages. Further, the epic tells us that a cruel king, who
does  not  protect  his  people,  who  robs  them  in  the  name  of  levying  taxes,  is  evil
incarnate and should be killed by his subjects. A king who, after promising to protect
his subjects does not do so, should be killed by them, as though he were a mad dog.9 So
if  the king does not perform his duties and is  cruel  to his  people,  the Mahabharata
sanctions regicide.
15 There  are  several  references  in  ancient  Indian  texts  to  evil  kings  –most  of  them
mythical or of uncertain historicity– who were justifiably killed.10 The reasons for their
being killed include their moral failings such as greed, injustice, lust and evil deeds.11
Should such stories be read as a warning to kings against transgressions, or were they
endorsements of rebellion? Notwithstanding the references to the killing of kings, the
overall political discourse of the Mahabharata upholds the king’s position and punitive
powers.  However,  there  are  several  other  indications  that  the  upper  class  male
composers of our texts recognised the possibility of critique, resistance or rebellion
against the state. The fears and anxieties of the upper classes are writ large in the idea
of  Kali  age,  a  world  turned horribly  upside  down,  where  people  violate  their  class
duties and farmers do not pay taxes.
16 The Arthashastra is unsentimental and sanctions all the killing, mutilation, torture and
capital punishment necessary for the administration of justice and for the protection,
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maintenance and enhancement  of  the  king’s  power.  It  is  also  acutely  aware of  the
potential sources of violence against the king. The text is obsessed with the danger of
assassination, especially through poison, and advises elaborate arrangements for the
king’s personal  protection.  Queens  and princes  head the list  of  sources  of  violence
against the king. Queens are singled out for special attention, and Kautilya lists several
specific instances of kings who were killed by their consorts. Kautilya identifies many
other  potential  sources  of  violence  against  the  king  –for  instance,  enemy  kings;
neighbouring  kings;  disaffected,  angry  subjects;  forest tribes;  robbers;  mlechchhas
(foreigners and tribals);  and mutinous troops.  He talks  about the dangers posed by
conspiracies, traitors and enemies. He discusses revolts in the interior and exterior,
and describes the former as more dangerous. He discusses how internal and external
enemies can be killed, many of the strategies involving secret agents in disguise. He
also advocates secret killing –silent punishment in the case of those who cannot be
killed openly– for instance, treasonous high-ranking officers.  Silent punishment can
also be used against hostile subjects.12
17 The Arthashastra prescribes violent punishments for violent crimes against the king.
The punishment for one who reviles the king, reveals secret counsel, or who spreads
evil news about the king is that his tongue should be rooted out.13 More serious crimes
against the king invite more severe punishments. Death by setting fire to the hands and
head is the punishment for one who covets the kingdom, who attacks the king’s palace,
who incites forest people or enemies or who causes rebellion in the fortified city, the
countryside, or the army.14 In many instances, punishments can be commuted to a fine.
But unless there is some crucial mitigating circumstance, no commutation is possible
where the crime merits the death penalty, especially in cases of treason or loss to the
state. Although varṇa is central to Kautilya’s understanding of society and law, capital
crimes against king or state, for instance treason, are often discussed without reference
to the varṇa of the parties involved, except for the occasional concessions being made
to Brahmanas, who stood at the apex of the varṇa hierarchy.
18 Kautilya’s emphasis on subjecting officials to stringent and frequent tests of loyalty
indicates an awareness that loyalty cannot be taken for granted. This can be connected
with the king’s constant fear of assassination; his need to use “silent punishment”; for
constant  surveillance  to  keep  track  of  non-compliance,  rebellion  and  treason;
references to those who are enraged and frightened; the fear of deceit and betrayal; the
worry  about  dangers  posed  by  mlechchhas  and  forest  people;  and  the  importance
attached to conciliation and outwitting. The references to the “anger of the people”
(prakṛiti-kopa)  are  especially  interesting.  In  ancient  Indian  texts,  there  are  few
references to kings being killed by their people and these occur mainly in the Buddhist
Jatakas.15 But the Arthashastra’s references to the anger of the people, indicates that
although there is no record of rampant mass rebellion of the people in ancient Indian
history, the political theorists were able to visualise such an event.
19 In fact, Kautilya understood the importance of hidden transcripts –trying to find out
what people were saying about the king behind his back. 16He recommends that spies in
disguise should fan out to all  parts of the kingdom, engage in provocative talk and
ferret out people who were saying negative things about the king, so that the king
could kill them, crushing disaffection before it became revolt.
20 Although the Arthashastra is usually seen as a text upholding the idea of totalitarian
state, its discussion is premised on a recognition of the fragility of the king’s power and
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the  constant  threats  to  his  life  and  position  from  many  quarters.  It  is  a  graphic
acknowledgement that the ruler was constantly the potential target of the violence of
others. Kautilya advocates the ruthless, carefully calculated and effective use of pre-
emptive and post-facto violence by the state in order to prevent and counter violence
against the state. Ethical issues are subordinated, in fact are irrelevant, in the face of
pragmatic political calculation. So a text which describes the dizzying heights of power
to which a ruler could aspire also presents him as an insecure, vulnerable figure who
lives in constant danger of being undermined or killed. In this respect, the discussions
of general issues in normative texts may actually give us better insights into political
realities and processes than the enumeration of “factual details”, which in any case
reach us after they have been censored and sanitised of violence and resistance, and
only  after  the  panegyrists  had  converted  the  tumult  and  violence  that  must  have
marked many a king’s reign into a smooth, aestheticised narrative that was in tune
with  the  discourse  of  normative  dharmic  kingship,  in  a  language  which  sought  to
normalise and justify the violence inherent in kingship.
21 When  the  cracks  in  the  normative  views  become  visible,  a  more  fractured  and
contested picture of ancient Indian politics emerges, one where the onward march of
the state and empire-building is accompanied by a recognition of their fragility.
 
IV. Theory and practice and a long-term comparative
history of violence
22 I would like to end my paper by raising a few general questions related to the study of
political violence. The first question is: what impact did the political ideas discussed in
normative texts, including theories about the origins, nature and functions of kingship
have on political practice? How effectively did these theories bolster political and social
hierarchies? What was their political and social impact in a context where multiple
theories existed, and where the issue of dharma itself was fraught with complexity and
confusion?
23 Royal inscriptions allude to the textual theories of kingship. The idea of the king as
protector  of  the  people  and  of  the social  order  consisting  of  the  varṇas  (the  four
hereditary  social  classes)  and  ashramas (the  four  stages  of  life) 17 is  frequently
mentioned in rulers’ epigraphic eulogies. There are also a few interesting references to
the  people  intervening  in  matters  related  to  succession.  Rather  than  taking  them
literally, these sorts of references can be seen as echoes of the contractual theories of
kingship that the texts elaborate.
24 There is no direct evidence that the latent sanction of regicide in the Mahabharata was
ever  invoked  to  sanction  rebellion  against  the  state.  In  fact,  recorded  instances  of
violent  rebellion  against  the  state  involving  players  beyond  the  circle  of  political
contenders  or  subordinate rulers  are practically  non-existent  in ancient  India.  This
could be because of the effective concealment of such incidents by our statist/centrist
sources;  the effectiveness of the state’s coercive machinery, the effectiveness of the
legitimising, hegemonic discourse; and/or the lack of a collective consciousness and
organisation that would enable the individual victims of state violence or oppression to
make common cause and effectively raise the banner of revolt.
16
25 We should note that royal inscriptions deliberately try to conceal the violence that
must have marked dynastic succession, in fact, this masking was one of their functions.
While  inter-dynastic  violence  in  the  form of  war  was  advertised  and  celebrated  in
ancient  Indian  inscriptions,  intra-dynastic  violence  was  masked  in  the  royal
genealogies that usually presented a smooth story of succession, occasionally referring
obliquely to more troubled circumstances.
26 The second general issue concerns the factors that define violence and the normalising
processes that make some kinds of harming or killing by the state or against the state
seem  justified.  These  are  deeply  embedded  in  social  and  political  structures,
institutions and ideologies, as well as in moral and religious values. Debates on violence
in  ideologies  or  movements  associated  with  nonviolence  deserve  especially  close
attention. My investigation of early Buddhist and Jaina texts indicates that the religions
of non-violence recognised the necessity of the use of a certain amount of force in the
political domain. But the existence, embeddedness and strength of these renunciatory
traditions did provide an important philosophical and ethical resource that political
practitioners had to acknowledge and could not completely ignore; they made violence
and nonviolence issues that had to addressed, even if there was a general consensus
that absolute nonviolence was impossible in the political sphere.
27 The third issue arises due to our heightened sensitivity towards political violence in
our own times:  this  lends a  great  urgency to  investigations of  violence,  but  it  also
presents us with a problem: should the past be examined on its own terms or should it
be used as a resource to deal with our troubled and violent times? This is an old sort of
question, but an exploration of violence in history undertaken in our violent world
urges us to engage with it yet again.
28 Finally, without essentialising cultures and without falling into the traps of cultural
bias or chauvinism, there is the interesting possibility of having a comparative history
of the ideas and practice of violence and nonviolence, one which identifies qualitative
differences in forms, structures, intensity, ideologies and attitudes related to political
violence across cultures and across time.
NOTES
1. Of course, when it is justified, it is justified force, and not unjustified violence.
2. Mahabharata. 12.59.1-140 (Fitzgerald, pp. 305-312).
3. Mahabharata. 12.67.17-31.
4. See Steven Collins Aggañña Sutta: The Discourse on What is Primary (An Annotated Translation from
Pali), Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2001.
5. Ibid., 46.
6. Ancient Brahmanical texts have the idea of a hierarchy of four hereditary social  classes –
Brahmanas,  Kshatriyas,  Vaishyas and  Shudras.  Brahmanas were  associated  with  studying  and
teaching the Veda and performing sacrifices; Kshatriyas with war and governance; Vaishyas with
farming, rearing animals and trade; and Shudras with serving the upper three varṇas.
17
7. Arthashastra 4. 11.
8. See especially Mahabharata. 12.70; 12.121.
9. Mahabharata. 13.60.19-20.
10. There are other references to the killing of kings in ancient Indian texts. See Walter Ruben,
“Fighting  against  despots  in  old  Indian  literature,”  Annals  of  the  Bhandarkar  Oriental  Research
Institute, vol. 48/48, Golden Jubilee Volume, 1917-1961 (1968): 111-118.
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16. On public  and hidden transcripts,  see  Scott’s  Domination  and  the  Arts  of  Resistance:  Hidden
Transcripts (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990), especially pp. 2, 4, 183, 191.
17. The classical model of the four ashramas, which was supposed to be applicable to the upper
three varṇas, comprised the stage of celibate studenthood (brahmacharya), the householder stage
(grihastha), partial renunciation (vanaprastha) and complete renunciation (sannyasa). Like varṇa,
the ashrama scheme should be understood as part of the normative Brahmanical view of society,
not as a description of actual practice.
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Discourse on a label: exposing
narratives of violence
Naman P. Ahuja
1 Provenance studies have emerged as one of the most important disciplinary aspects of
art history which is directly concerned with politics and seek to redress histories of
political  violence.  Contained  in  the  narratives  that  emerge  when  we  study  the
provenance of objects are a variety of significant contexts; for instance, in our world of
migrations,  a pertinent one worth examining is  the circumstances under which the
owner of an object fled with the object now displayed in a museum. Was it an object of
faith, a memento or a much-needed financial asset? And then of course there are the
many complex debates linked to questions around repatriation as a means to redress
the political violence of the past. Each context makes us judge its current ownership
differently. Other questions also emerge: in repatriation claims does war booty belong
to the usurper or the vanquished? How far back in time can we go with provenance and
what is the right thing to do once we know the history: bringing cases of historical
wrongs of four or five generations back is one matter, but can things that were done
twenty or more generations ago still be brought to a court today? After all, at some
point,  the  deracinated  or  uprooted  also  becomes  naturalised;  it  lives  on  in  a  new
context. The responsibility for the maintenance of the site and material artefact has
often been undertaken by a community different from the one who lost it, and that
maintenance may be taking place now in a manner that is perhaps differently from
how it was originally conceived. Can we be so impervious to change that that new home
and context  can be  disregarded? What  does  depriving current  owners  of  an object
achieve  –does  it  actually  bring  a  museum  visiting,  conservation  and  museum
maintaining habit to the country to which the object has been repatriated? None of
these  questions  can  be  answered  without  acknowledging  the  role  propaganda  and
perception  play.  In  this  essay,  we  examine  one  field  of  disinformation  (or  at  least
misinformation) that remains unaddressed when viewing antique sculptures in public
museums in India.
2 In the past few years, demands for restitution or repatriation have started intensifying
because of the delay in admitting a narrative of decolonisation in western museums. In
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2020, the Black Lives Matter movement brought long-standing histories of racial and
colonial violence into sharper focus with the destruction of public statuary in some
places, and even the creation of new statues to replace those where colonisers once
stood. If provenance histories of many objects and the biographies of the collectors had
been openly exposed for a few decades, perhaps the honest rationale for the western
museum to continue to act as custodians of objects that told complex histories may
have been justified. Now, however, in an age of hyper-nationalism a parallel question
arises about what is driving the desire for repatriation in countries like India: whose
benefit  is  the  narrative  or  propaganda  of  restitution  serving  now?  The  narrative
accompanying  Indian  sculptures  is  one  of  the  restitution  of  a  sacred object  to  the
country to which it once belonged, even if that object is now no longer capable of being
brought back into worship. In times when religion is being used to bolster nationalism,
the  return  of  historical  artefacts  serves  a  very  different  propaganda  rather  than
communicate the many other, diverse histories.
3 Repatriation  can  bolster  India’s  national  pride  today,  as  a  reaction  to  how  the
possession of objects from diverse parts of the world once encouraged colonial pride
and empire building in Europe and Britain. Some have argued that in the UK, public
institutions and school  curricula could have done more to stem the rising national
chauvinism  in  the  past  two  decades,  much  of  which  has  been  associated  with  a
nostalgia for the empire. Large proportions of the citizens of the West have roots in
countries  that  were  formerly  colonised,  whose  histories  of  how  they  came  to  be
uprooted, or why the objects of their previous countries are now in European countries
are seldom told in public institutions. The delay in a decolonising narrative has cost
western institutions by alienating their public. The decolonisation narrative is thus not
just for India’s benefit anymore, but one that the US, Britain and European countries
need for maintaining their own cosmopolitanism.
4 In India, decolonisation may have been an issue that was important from the 1930s
until  the  1970s  for  righting  colonial  wrongs,  but  there  are  now many other,  more
pressing matters that affect Indian art in terms of what markets and museums need by
understanding better what museums can enable, and how they need to be protected.
Colonial wrongs and inequities may remain, but issues around violence perpetrated on
the basis of caste, religion or gender, climate and biodiversity, individual rights and the
right to knowledge and the freedom to speak are pressing concerns in India that cannot
be addressed only through a narrative of decolonisation or repatriation.
5 My focus is to reveal the many types of political violence communicated by ancient and
medieval Indian sculptures. Objects in Indian museum collections raise questions and
the museum has a role and a responsibility to play in articulating the many narratives
that  these  questions  provoke.  For  all  the  intentions  that  exist  on  paper  on  the
interpretative role museum displays can play in fulfilling their mandate of contributing
to the development of  a  responsible,  even enlightened public,1 few Indian museum
curators have demonstrated their capacity to exhibit this in the permanent displays of
Indian history, except to use them, largely, as tools for telling a history of religion or
metaphysical  ideas.  There  are  several  reasons  for  taking  the  museum  from  being
storehouses  of  objects  to  communicators  of  ideas  and  diverse,  or  even  divergent,
histories.2
6 The first  part of  this essay examines how telling stories of  political  violence in the
public sphere has a long history in Indian culture; so much so that it was debated as to
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how artfully  it  should  be  done  and what  aesthetic  effect  it  should  lead  to.  Having
established that this spirit of communication is part of a long-standing Indian tradition,
the second part of the paper looks at some case studies of how museums, which are the
aesthetic communicators of history and cultural identity nowadays, can perform this
role in the Indian public sphere. In the last part of this paper, it is necessary, then, to
conclude with a few observations on what cautions need to be employed to safeguard
such a space and, equally, what limits may be advisable on our expectations of what
museums can achieve.
 
I. Toward an aesthetic rationale
7 Will the telling of a historical narrative of many sides of a conflict be seen as moving
away from the aesthetic function of a museum space? That aesthetic pleasure is only
possible  in avoiding any exposure of  conflict  was certainly not the view of  ancient
Indian aestheticians,  and nor is  it  the view of those who work on the aesthetics of
theatre and performance art today. Besides, even with collections of contemporary art
and anthropology, “transitional justice” and “memorialisation” are the new terms by
which the public role of contemporary museums is enhanced nowadays3 which rely on
making the history of political conflict explicit. A history of conflicts of old, which have
gone to shape identity politics in India, will inevitably also have to be told.
8 It is well known that Aristotle’s interpretation of the aesthetic effect of rousing tragedy
and violence in art/theatre allows for a therapeutic purging of these emotions from the
audience; a question has equally been asked if Indian aesthetics gives a similar role of
catharsis to Indian art. The short answer to that is yes.4 It has been thought about at
some  length  by  the  9th  century  scholar  of  aesthetics,  Ānandavardhana,  when  he
considered the public use of narrating the gory tales of bloodshed in the Mahābhārata.
As  we shall  see,  he  argued that  these  violent  tales  ultimately  lead the  audience to
experience śānta-rasa, a feeling of peace and equanimity.
9 From  an  early  period  in  its  history,  India’s  philosophers  honed  their  skill  in
argumentation and participated in court-sanctioned public debates. Entire schools of
thought were created and developed by vigorous clashes of opinion. The tradition of
publicly  voicing  dissent  in  philosophical  debate  has  a  long  history,  and  the  first
codification of the rules of debate is in the Nyāya sutras. Debate was so important that
manuals were written by many schools of philosophy to codify the rules of argument.
The 5th century Vādavidhi (A Method for Argumentation) of Vasubandhu,  and the 7th
century  manual  of  Dharmakīrti,  the  Vādanyāya  (Reasoning  for  Debate),  attest  to  the
importance  of  public  debate  or  vāda.  The  expression  of  divergent  opinions  was
considered a necessary step in the determination of truth.5
10 Returning to Ānandavardhana, the great aesthetician of the 9th century: he elaborates
in  the  Dhvanyāloka on  the  constituents  required  for  communicating  śānta-rasa.
Surprisingly, he took the Mahābhārata as his example. At first glance one would imagine
that given the focus on heroism and even gratuitous nature of the violence in that text,
hearing the story would render the audience violent and heroic, or as a consequence,
perhaps compassionate at the sight of so much pain, but to claim that they are left
śānta, or peaceful, is rather curious. Gary Tubb explains how Ānandavardhana built his
argument on the Mahābhārata, noting that the repeated performances and re-telling of
blood-soaked battle after battle caused by lust, ego, greed and avarice all, eventually,
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helped  lead  the  audience  to  śānta-rasa.6 Exposing  the  vanity  of  struggle,
Ānandavardhana argued, leads to the removal of craving of ego and lust for power, and
renders the heroism of battle (vīra-rasa) into a reminder of the hollowness of victory
before the eventuality of death. “The more the insubstantial workings of this world are
seen to turn out badly,  the more a feeling of dispassion is produced.” [Mahābhārata
12.168.4]
11 This  reading  of  the  Mahābhārata finds  a  parallel  in  the  writings  of  the  historian
Kalhana, the author of the 12th century Rājataranginī, the history of Kashmir. Kalhana
makes a similar claim for his work, saying his selection of episodes to put down in his
history also imparts śānta-rasa to his readers.7 Since generations of writers have agreed
that itihāsa (history), the category to which both the Mahābhārata and the Rājataranginī 
belong as a genre, can claim to be producers of experiences that are aesthetic, this role
of the history museum is not one that would be antithetical to the Indian tradition.
12 Applying the lessons of Ānandavardhana and Kalhana to museums today, it is clear that
telling history in a museum need not detract from aesthetic experience. A museum of
historical  artefacts,  with  its  encyclopaedic  range  of  objects  made  for  and  used  by
different  people,  and  used  for  different  purposes,  in  different  epochs,  enables  the
telling of rich narratives. As another scholar of the Mahābhārata , James Hegarty has
suggested,  “Within  public  imagination,  narrative  is  […]  the  chief  means  of  evoking
counter-factual situations –be they of past, present or future (or even wholly fictive).”8
13 One is making a case to bring not opinions, but research-based tellings of history [back]
into museum spaces. Hiding from this responsibility has left the field open to hijack the
civic  discourse,  construed  by  propagandists  in  service  of  an  ideology,  justifying
pogroms. Misinformation runs rife, and the effort to polarise society succeeds, creating
new  collective  memories,  without  sufficient  opportunity  for  the  presentation  of  a
corrective.  However,  in  countries  where  history  textbooks  can  be  meddled  with
frequently,9 what then will offer safeguards and correctives? I do not profess to come
up with a mechanism to stem “fake-news”, but certainly,  institutions that have the
opportunity to tell those histories can no longer abrogate their role to do so.
14 Ideology  and  perceived  historical  identity  shape  contemporary  politics,  and  as
museums are  preservers  of  the evidence of  history,  how they perform their  public
function  of  communicating  histories  that  go  into  shaping  identity  and  ideology  is
increasingly important. The museums of modern and contemporary art have shown
beyond doubt that the consumption of politically relevant discourses is aesthetically
done,  and  done  quite  commonly,  in  fact.10 This  seldom  extends  to  museums  of
antiquities.  Antiquities hold a more potent aura:  hallowed images of gods are more
visible, even more stable markers of peoples’ identities. Is there a way to use these very
artefacts to provoke difficult  questions on how war and violence were condoned in
society,  reveal  the  terms dictated  by  those  in  power  to  forge  social  compliance  or
equally, the means achieved by those at the margins to protect their culture? Can we
not interpret  the evidence for  the suppression of  women,  which often enough also
demonstrates a conflict over the affiliation of religious shrines? When these narratives
are observed in gallery after gallery, some interesting patterns begin to emerge about
how  the  language  of  visual  culture  was  used  to  perpetuate  violence  and  fear.  The
patterns reveal that there were established ways of making that violence visible, and
the same methods were used to create new public enemies in each age. This visual
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lexicon of  violence  is  as  much a  part  of  the  aesthetics  of  communication  as  other
emotive powers of art.
15 In the next part of this essay we will study some examples that were either made in
order to normalise political violence in society, or have ended up having that effect.
Deliberately mutilated sculptures, similar to those so amply seen at archaeological sites
and in museums across India, reveal the requirement to make public statements about
conflict and victory of course, but they reveal many other things too which we are not
told about: how the conflict was not only one between the usually imagined upholders
of  iconoclastic  Islam  on  the  one  side  and  myriad  others  on  the  other  side,  but
sometimes  between  different  Hindus  or  in  contexts  where  there  were  no  Muslims
involved,  driven at  times  not  by conflict  at  all,  but  by  the  re-use  of  old  stones  on
account of economic necessity.
 
II. Art historical evidence complicates the public
imagination on conflict
16 Art history can look upon its facts to construct many rich narratives of history. And
although the facts that accompany broken statuary may be few, and although broken
statues  themselves  may  not  be  as  many  as  pristine  ones  –they  still  do  require
explanation. For hundreds of years these statues have, after all, communicated both
things to us: who or what they once were, and what fate they met. The decapitations,
fractures  and  injuries  suffered  by  public  statues  also  brand  themselves  onto  our
memories and when shown broken, unmended for centuries, the breakage becomes a
statement that is either normalised –which is a very frightening case in most violent
societies,  or  –a  wound  that  serves  to  caution  public  memory.  These  are  powerful
breakages capable of being aesthetically communicated, performing their role that is
vivid and yet also practical.
17 The vitriolic tone against historians who sought to write more reasoned arguments
explaining why a richer context is needed to explain the desecration of temples comes
from the lack of upholding a space for scholarly debate. It is fuelled by an urgency in
acknowledging in public spaces the history of “Islamic iconoclasm” in the first place,
before a revision of  it  can be offered.  The revisions are,  needless to say,  far better
argued and researched and they have, as a result, only riled their opposition to greater
emotive outbursts. A more reasoned manner of presenting the material would be to
start,  first,  by  allowing  those  so  keen  to  prove  that  indeed,  historic  buildings  and
images do bear testimony to a strong history of violence perpetrated in India in the
name  of  Islam.  This  then  can  be  contextualised  against  other  acts  of  violence
perpetrated  by  other  kingdoms.  It  can  also  be  shown  against  other  narratives  of
political violence which may have less to do with religious conflict than they do with
matters of caste, gender, sexuality, immigration, language, and so on.
 
II.a. Disturb the peace
18 Several Jain sculptures in the Bhubaneshwar Museum (Orissa) including a Mahāvīra
[Fig. 1], Ajītnātha [Fig. 2] and Śāntinātha [Fig. 3] are often mistaken by the public as
images of starving Buddhas. Close inspection reveals that what have emerged as rib-
like protrusions on their torsos are in fact irregular grooves created subsequent to the
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carving of the statues. Ironically, where Jain images exemplify ahiṁsā,  non-violence,
the torsos of these Jain seers appear to have been used to grind tools and probably even
sharpen knives. Violence against Jains in the region is known to have been perpetrated
by Hindus,11 and there is equally a history of the occupation of the region by a Muslim
population. Figuring out the causes of violence apart, there are questions to be asked
about who abandoned these images and who appropriated them?
 
Fig. 1. Mahavira




Fig. 2. Ajitnatha, 2nd Tirthankara









Fig. 3. Shantinatha, 16th Tirthankara







19 The labels in the museum are anodyne. They do not inform the public about anything,
except their iconography, find-spot and date. The strange grinding on the sculptures in
the museum, is also to be found at others still lying in the Charampa and Barala Pokhari
villages of Bhadrak district as well as within Bhadrak town. [Figs. 4 – 6] Some of these
sculptures were retrieved from the river and turned into the focus of either temporary
shrines or new concrete temples. The priests who belong to the region still pray at one
of two temples by the river which are functional and modern spaces. The really active
of the two temples does not contain such mutilated old (or previously abandoned) idols.
Elsewhere in the village however, comparable sculptures that were once abandoned
have been brought back into worship in new shrines and it turned out that the most
significant of the abandoned old idols was stolen from the site three years ago. One
family in the village complained rather movingly about their loss. They turned out to
be a relatively recent family in the region that had migrated from Bengal, who had
fashioned  themselves  as  priests  in  Orissa  and  had  taken  in  their  care  a  forgotten
sculpture and turned their premises into a living temple. Their emotional testimony of
its loss was ripe for a journalistic investigation of the loss of a community’s god at the
hands of an unscrupulous group of antique hunters. Behind that, however, lay a more
complicated story about the claim of their ownership if the sculptures were ever to be
retrieved. What was emerging here was a narrative of how spolia long abandoned at a
site  were  being  gathered  by  some  people  who  appeared  to  be  recent immigrants
seeking a cultural foothold by their claim to be the upholders of tradition and culture
that the residents themselves had forsaken. As one investigated further, it transpired














The river Salandi that flows through Bhadrak, from where several of the damaged statues have been
retrieved and collected either for the museum or placed in new shrines.
Naman P. Ahuja
20 It is clear that a variety of Jain and Śākta (goddess) statues dateable, approximately, to
the 8th to 10th centuries were once removed from worship in this region. They were
not  high  quality  exceptional  carvings  to  begin  with,  but  of  course  that  is  not  an
indicator  of  their  sacrality.  No causative  agent  for  the despoliation is  known to  us
today, but as is often the case, when sculptures are relieved of their ritual function,
they are either ritually buried, or immersed in water. Temples let go of old sculptures if
they are desecrated, broken or if they become polluted if a lower-caste person comes
near them, or if the temple receives a new one at a festival or from an important donor
–a new political head, for instance.12 The material fits with the idea of loss of sacred
status and the use of the stone for another purpose. 13The question that arises with an
examination of the sculptures at Bhadrak, however, is what happened to them after
they were abandoned,  why do so  many of  them bear marks of  grinding over  their
finished surfaces? A statue of  Chamunda [Fig. 4] and another of  Surya [Fig. 5] that
have recently been brought back into worship at the site also bear the same type of
grinding on their  surfaces and it  became clear that the grinding is  not just  of  Jain
statues but “Hindu” ones too. A question also arises when the ritual discarding into the
river would have taken place, and how long after its deposition in the river would such
valuable stones have been reutilised for grinding? [Fig. 6] The curving nature of the
grooves indicates that something circular has been used to make those impressions. It
would not have been sickles as they are sharp on their inner curvature, but it could
have been chopping axes,  arrows or swords perhaps.  It  is  ironic that the bodies of
sculptures were used in this way, but this is far from the only instance when sacred
material has been used for such purposes.14 Were they driven by economic necessity,
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reusing the stones to grind tools? Were no other stones available? The point here is
that by raising several possible narratives: of economic necessity, of ritual discarding,
of iconoclasm and the opportunistic reappropriation of the sculptures, the labels in the
museum would raise significant and necessary questions for the public,  rather than
leave the field open to a singular, unsaid assumption of Islamic iconoclasm.
 
II.b. Narratives of assimilation, renovation and destruction
21 James Fergusson and Ananda Coomaraswamy both laid the foundations for studies on
how the imagery of pre-existing cults of yakshas, tree and serpent worshippers were
demonised  and  either  rejected,  and  when  that  was  not  possible,  incorporated  into
Buddhism.15 The terms of incorporation were stipulated by stories of the cult figure
being  blessed  by  the  greater  force  of  the  Buddha.  Then,  for  decades,  histories
referenced the process of Sanskritisation, by which autochthonous cultures of India
were  brought  into  a  Brahmanical  fold.16 Chastisement  of  some  turned  them  into
demons  (Mahiśāsura,  the nāgas and  others  at  the  hands  of  Krishna;  Rāvana)  while
others  were  co-opted  as  spouses,  avatars  and  emanations  of  a  Brahmanical  divine
figure  (Mīnākṣī,  Jagannātha,  or  the  tendency  to  give  many  epithets  or  names  that
derive from diverse communities or regions to the same figure, for instance).
22 Iconoclasm as a phenomenon extends well beyond the shores of India, and research in
South  Asia  has  amply  shown  how  Muslim  iconoclasm  in  the  region  needs  to  be
contextualised  within  the  long  narratives  of  political  conflict  in  which  temples,
Mauryan pillars, and sacred sculptures have been repeatedly targeted.17 There are too
many examples that reveal the theft of temple icons by one Hindu king from the lands
of another between the 7th and 11th century in a bid to show how the power of one
kingdom was usurped by another.  However,  Richard M. Eaton18 provides a series of
examples  of  internecine  warfare  amongst  various  Hindu  kings  that  also  saw  the
desecration  of  Hindu  temples,  apart  from  the  looting  of  each  other’s  images;  two
paragraphs of Eaton alone provide an all too important and succinct list that is worth
quoting:
In 642 AD, according to local tradition, the Pallava king Narasimhavarman I looted
the image of Ganesha from the Chalukyan capital of Vatapi. Fifty years later armies
of those same Chalukyas invaded north India and brought back to the Deccan what
appear to be images of Ganga and Yamuna, looted from defeated powers there. In
the eighth century Bengali troops sought revenge on king Lalitaditya by destroying
what  they  thought  was  the  image  of  Vishnu  Vaikuntha,  the  state-deity  of
Lalitaditya’s kingdom in Kashmir.
In  the  early  ninth  century,  Rashtrakuta  king  Govinda  III  invaded  and  occupied
Kanchipuram,  which so intimidated the king of  Sri  Lanka that  he sent  Govinda
several (probably Buddhist) images that represented the Sinhala state, and which
the Rashtrakuta king then installed in a Saiva temple in his capital. About the same
time, the Pandyan king Srimara Srivallabha also invaded Sri Lanka and took back to
his capital a golden Buddha image that had been installed in the kingdom’s Jewel
Palace. In the early tenth century, the Pratihara king Herambapala seized a solid
gold image of Vishnu Vaikuntha when he defeated the Sahi king of Kangra. By the
mid-tenth century, the same image was seized from the Pratiharas by the Candella
king Yasovarman and installed in the Lakshmana temple of Khajuraho.
23 He continues,
Although the dominant pattern here was one of looting royal temples and carrying
off images of state-deities, we also hear of Hindu kings engaging in the destruction
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of the royal temples of their political adversaries. In the early tenth century, the
Rashtrakuta monarch Indra III not only destroyed the temple of Kalapriya (at Kalpa
near  the  Yamuna  river),  patronised  by  the  Rashtrakutas’  deadly  enemies,  the
Pratiharas, but also took special delight in recording the fact.19
24 The narrative that Hindu kings stole each other’s idols has not been told enough in the
public arena. Returning to Kashmir, Kalhana wrote the Rājataranginī in AD 1148-49 in
which he details how Hindu kings of Kashmir, like Harshadeva, destroyed the temples
of other Hindu and Buddhist kings. Harshadeva even created a post of a devotpātana
nāyaka for  the  job.  Another  well-known  example  is  of  the  conflicts  in  South  India
between Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas. The disparaging attitude by Hindu kings in South India
towards  Jains,  and  even  the  destruction  of  Buddhist  sites  by  Hindus  are  also
documented aplenty.20 And the exaggeration and even falsehood of the usual claim that
broken idols  in  India  are  largely a  result  of  Islamic invasions has  been exposed by
several scholars.21 Further, time and again, it has been shown that the practice was not
limited to Muslim or Hindu kings alone.
25 Mauryan  pillars  make  for  a  valuable  case-study.  [Fig. 7] Several  scholars  have
remarked that the Buddhist Ashoka may have perpetrated extreme political violence
himself  and,  centuries  later,  Ashokan  pillars  were  later  broken  and  reshaped  at
different places by different people. For instance, we do not know when the one now at
the fort in Allahabad was originally brought there, although it is generally thought that
it  must have been brought from Kaushambi.  It  was inscribed on by many over the
millennia: first by the Mauryas, then by the Guptas, followed by the Mughal Jahangir
who even gave it a new capital. Portions of the column found in Varanasi could have
been destroyed by many different people, at different times, for different reasons. What
function did it serve in Varanasi in the first place, when the major Buddhist site is
nearby at Sarnath? Was the pillar brought to Varanasi from elsewhere, just as other
Mauryan pillars were shifted about in medieval times? Judging the fate of the other
pillars gives no clear answers: the one in Bhubaneshwar, Orissa, became a Śiva-linga,
the one in Sugh in Haryana became a victory pillar in Delhi’s Firoz Shah Kotla, the one
at Hisar was commandeered by the Tughlaqs and reinscribed in Fārsi, while the capital
of the one at Bodh Gaya was never found. The temple at Bodh Gaya was, after all, burnt
down, demolished and rebuilt several times.22 The pillar could have been razed to the
ground by a rival group of Buddhists or Hindus and if any remnants were there over a
millennium later, perhaps they were subject to further changes by armies that were
Muslim. Sometimes the pillars were repaired or copied, in a way to be able to invoke
their political or religious symbolism in subsequent ages. Both renovation and copying
are  important  approaches  to  history  as  they  help  us  understand  how  ancient  and
medieval  Indians  themselves  valued  historical  artefacts,  what  they  thought  of
jīrṇoddhāra or repair/conservation.23 The site museums and interpretation centres at
these  places  can  therefore  very  justifiably  start  telling  a  richer  discourse,  a  more
layered history, but this has much wider implications for the very construction of the




The Mauryan pillar relocated to the Allahabad Fort was originally inscribed during the reign of Ashoka,
appropriated and re-inscribed in the time of the Guptas, and then again, reappropriated and re-







II.c. Giving iconoclasm a context
26 By contrast let us look at examples of how a history of conflict has been declared at one
of the most contentious sites in India, the Qutub Minar. Visits from tourists, Indian and
international, keep the numbers at the site at amongst the highest in the world.24 The
presence of  pillars from older Hindu temples is  often spoken about at  the site;  the
presence of spolia from Jain and/or Hindu temples is evident to the public and the
discourse on the site has kept alive the narrative of destruction. However, the tone of
the writing adopted by the state’s own publications is incendiary,25 and opportunities
to tell a more informed history, long available through reliable publications, remain
staved  off.  Unavailable  also  to  the  visitor  is  a  translation  of  the  richness  of  the
inscriptions at the site which are a clear statement of imperial power that can be read
alongside fascinating insights that can be gleaned from the inscriptions of the Hindu
craftsmen who worked at the site. Further, two sculptures,26 retrieved from the vicinity
of the Qutub Minar itself, are kept at the much less-visited National Museum in Delhi
and are not presently talked about in the general public discourse at all. One is a red-
sandstone vertical strut of a vedika [Fig. 8] which is exactly of the type found around
the ancient  stupas of  pre-Kushan Mathura,  broadly,  and generally  dated to  the 1st
century BC. These vedika pillars came mostly from Buddhist sites, very rarely from Jain
ones and it has been argued on the basis of depictions on some sculptural reliefs that
they may have also surrounded lingas at the base of tree-shrines. Given that prominent
Jain temples still survive in this region (such as the one at Dadabari), it can be argued
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that the beautiful yakshi on this vedika pillar once surrounded an ancient Jain shrine.
Nothing else is yet reported to have survived from that ancient stupa in Delhi.
 
Fig. 8. Fragment of a railing pillar showing a shalabhanjika
Buff sandstone. C. 2nd-1st century BC. Qutub Minar, Mehrauli, Delhi. 77.5 x 25.5 cm. National
Museum, Delhi (59.539)
National Museum, Delhi
27 The second sculpture [Fig. 9] found southeast of the Qutub Minat is of Viṣṇu and is
dated  by  its  inscription  to  1147,  of  Chauhan  (Cāhamāna)/Gāhadvāla  rule,  i.e.  four
decades before the creation of the Minar and the despoliation of Hindu temples to build
the mosque.27 For all the rhetoric on destruction and defacement at the site, it stands
perfectly  intact,  extraordinarily  well-preserved.  It  helps  understand  that  what  was
broken  was  not  actually  to  reflect  a  destruction  of  someone  else’s  faith  but  an
appropriation.  It  confirms what  scholars  have been saying about  the very selective
defacement that was undertaken at the site so that only what was inside the mosque
did  not  carry  anthropomorphic  imagery,  but  what  was  outside  its  boundary,  was
probably left alone. Just as Dadabari is an ancient Jain site of Mehrauli, the Yogmāyā
temple in Mehrauli continues to serve a Hindu public, and is an example that reveals
the continuing patronage of Hindus in the area immediately after the construction of
the Minar.28 This fits so much better within our researches on the opportunistic politics
behind the vandalism of temples and the use of their wealth for political expediency
rather than being guided by religious zeal. In fact, they all become examples of showing
how religion became instrumentalised for the sake of political gain. What can be more





Found southeast of the Qutub Minar. Dated 1147, during the period of Chauhan/Gahadavala rule. H:






28 The examples that can be cited are many, and if done consistently, the art-historical
interpretations of despoliation and reuse can be greatly enriched. Then, a longue durée
narrative emerges, revealing patterns of economic necessity and the propagandist use
to  which  visual  culture  is  put  through  the  vicissitudes  of  history.  After  the  2017
refurbishment  of  the  Hotung  Gallery  at  the  British  Museum,  a  changed  label
accompanies a double-sided stone artefact in its South Asia galleries. [Fig. 10a & 10b]
Their label now reads: “The Buddha and the Mihrāb: one side of the panel shows the
Buddha flanked by Bodhisattvas. The figures have been damaged. The other shows an
Islamic  mihrāb surrounded  by  floral  scrolls,  indicating  the  direction  of  Mecca  and
therefore the direction for prayer. The sculpture of the Buddha was made in the AD
900s. The back of the stone slab was carved as a mihrāb in the 1400s, when the Bengal
Sultanate was in power. The re-use in mosques of architectural elements of Hindu and
Buddhist sites is politically charged, and also shows creative adaptation. Traditional
Indian motifs, such as lotuses and vegetal scrolls have been used to decorate the mihrāb
indicating that these designs still had a desirable sacred function.”
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Fig. 10a. A panel with a carved Buddha and a mihrab on the reverse
Black basalt. Obverse: Eastern India, Pala period, c. 10th century. Reverse: Gaur, West Bengal, c. 15th




Fig. 10b. A panel with a carved Buddha and a mihrab on the reverse
Black basalt. Obverse: Eastern India, Pala period, c. 10th century. Reverse: Gaur, West Bengal, c. 15th
century. H: 84.1 cm. British Museum (1880.145)
The British Museum
29 Such a frank display of facts is rarely encountered in an Indian museum. This is despite
the fact that many an example can be used to tell such a history in Indian collections to
great effect. A rare example of a rich context, with a label and audio guide to explain
such reuse  and violence,  is  on  show at  the  ASI’s  museum in  the  compound of  the
Basilica of Bom Jesus in Goa, a case-study to which we now turn.
 
II.d. Iconography that normalises violence
30 At the  ASI  museum linked to  Bom Jesus  in  Goa lies  a  dramatic  statue of  Vetal,  an
attendant to Śiva, which was a well-known village deity in the Konkan region around
Goa.  [Fig. 11] (The  type  harks  back  to  the  many images  of  Bhairava  and ferocious
dvārapālas, which are found at Śiva temples across India.) The ASI’s label text informs
us that trucks and buses plying the roads in Goa are inscribed:
Shri  Sateri  Vetal  Prassanna,  Shri  Paikdev  Prassanna…  These  reflect  a  tradition  of
worship  of  the  ghost  deity,  popularly  known  as  Vetal  or  Betal,  which  is  very
popular in the coastal districts of the western coast or the Malabar coast. It is a folk
deity and enjoys the position of a village deity (gramdevata) in the coastal region.
The well-known historian of Goa, Dr. D.D. Kosambi, described Vetal as the prince of
ghosts and also a God… It remained a deity of the common people throughout the











31 The text continues to explain…
In  order  to  appease  the  deity,  fowl,  goats,  and  even  buffaloes  were  offered  as
sacrifice in addition to liquor. The food of Vetal is considered as mostly meat and
liquor.  This practice of  offering animals as sacrifice is  now out of  vogue due to
rationalisation. …According to Dr. V.R. Mitragotri, a Goan historian, the rise of the
Kapalikas and Pashupatas, who believed in Tantric practices, provided favourable
conditions  for  the evolution of  Vetal  worship.  The inscriptions  of  the  Chalukya
dynasty  of  Badami  in  Karnataka  point  to  the  presence  of  the  Kapalikas  in  the
Deccan plateau. The inscriptions of the Silahara dynasty indicate the presence of
Pashupatas  in  the  south  Konkan  region.  Both  these  sects  believed  in  Tantric
practices which were meant for the acquisition of siddhis (supernatural powers) by
which  one  would  possess  the  power  to  get  whatever  one  desired.  So  it  can  be
inferred that such practices were in vogue at the Vetal shrines around 6th century
CE.
32 And a paragraph later, lest the visitor is left imagining that the Hindu practices were all
blood curdlingly occult, we are told that Vetal is also a guardian deity:
Vetal is considered as the king of spirits, a village deity and not an evil spirit. He
bestows blessings. It enters into the body and drives away evil spirits. Vetal always
leads  a  procession  of  other  ghosts  and  spirits.  According  to  Hindu  mythology,
Vetals were in the army of the goddess Chamunda when she annihilated Chanda
and  Munda,  the  demons.  Since  Vetal  is  the  guardian  deity  of  the  village,  it  is
believed that he goes around in the surrounding villages throughout the night on
foot (Paikadev). Hence people offer pairs of sandals to the deity. It is said that when
some  devotees,  mostly  peasants  and  fishermen,  have  dreams  in  which  Vetal
appears… a sacrifice is made and rituals are performed to escape any misfortune
that may befall them.
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33 A richer context is provided with references to Bhoota Aradhana:
The practice of “Bhuta Aradhana”, the worship of the Bhutas (ghosts) in the coastal
districts of South Karnataka could be similar to the worship of Vetal in the Goa
region. Finely carved wooden images of these bhutas from the South Canara district
of Karnataka, are displayed in the National Handicrafts and Handlooms Museum
(Crafts Museum), Delhi.
34 And finally, the ASI museum comes to the specific context of this particular statue:
The displayed basalt stone image of Vetal is collected from the Betalbatim South
Goa.  …Rope  marks  can  be  seen  on  his  left  side  as  until  it  was  discovered,  this
particular stone was being used as a platform to draw water from the well.
35 Here  comes  the  final  and  most  visibly  shocking  act  of  violence  perpetrated  on  a
sculpture, of a deity who was himself known to be a violent ghoul. It has been used as a
slab over a well, the ropes of the buckets of water that have rubbed against his body for
centuries have cut deep into the sculpture. The image was taken from a Hindu temple
during  the  Portuguese  Inquisition  in  Goa.  However,  rather  than  just  mention  the
violent conflict during the Portuguese Inquisition, the museum also finds it necessary
to spend more words to explain the violent nature of the Hindu iconography. After all,
without an understanding of the gods of India,  they were widely regarded as being
monstrous,  their worship deemed worthy of  punishment by death.31 The Basilica of
Bom Jesus is designated as a World Heritage site by UNESCO, and again, like the Qutub
Minar, remains one of the most highly visited sites of India. What has not regrettably
been addressed in the otherwise excellent (if lengthy) label text is why we are being
told  what  we  are  told.  How  staging  the  problem  of  not  knowing  the  cultural
significance  of  a  horrifying  deity  like  Vetal/Bhairava  leads  to  its  “demonization”,
justifying its vandalism. Further questions need addressing here. This is not the only
Vetal sculpture that has been treated in this way. There are others in the collection of
the State Museum in Goa [Fig 12]. Were the wells where these sculptures were re-used,
located in churches where temples once stood? Did the pre-existing practice of placing
talismans and  gargoyles  around  founts/springs  and  wells  in  Baroque  and  Gothic
churches  allow for  adaptive  re-use  of  these  objects?  When were  the  villages  these
images were located in turned Christian during the long history of the Inquisition in
Goa? None of this is to over-emphasise or decry the history of the political violence at
Goa manifested by the image, but equally, it is necessary to be able to tell its history
better: informing us about the object’s patronage, and the context of its new identity,
which are as much a part of its history as its iconography and moment of spoliation.
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Fig. 12. Sculptures of Vetal




II.e. The long history of violence against Buddhists in India
36 My  own  first  use  of  the  technique  was  in  the  displays,  films  and  catalogues  that
accompanied the exhibition, The Body in Indian Art, at the National Museum in Delhi in
2013.  A  prominent  example,  from  Kannauj  in  Uttar  Pradesh,  was  a  sculpture  of  a
Buddhist  goddess  Tārā  that  was  turned around and the  slab  was  used to  carve  an
Ardhanārīśvara,  the androgynous form of Śiva,  on its  reverse. [Fig. 13a  & 13b]  The
famed capital  city of  Kannauj  was subject  in the 8th and 9th centuries to repeated
attacks to control it by the Pala kings who were known to support Buddhism and the
more Brahmanical Gurjara Pratiharas. There is a substantial bibliography on Hindu-
Buddhist  image  rivalries  from  this  period  that  discusses  how  iconographies  were
developed of deities of one faith trampling over those of another, and on the takeover
of Buddhist shrines by Śaivite groups on the one hand, and the politics behind the
incorporation of the Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu on the other.32 It was important
to situate this sculpture within this wider history.
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Fig. 13a. Tara and Ardhanarishvara
Double-sided carved relief (front and back). Sandstone. 8th century. Kannauj Museum (79/251)
The Body in Indian Art
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Fig. 13b. Tara and Ardhanarishvara
Double-sided carved relief (front and back). Sandstone. 8th century. Kannauj Museum (79/251)
The Body in Indian Art
37 Metaphors of double meanings seem to be writ all over this image in many ways. Not
only is it a double-sided image, the interesting thing about it was that on the better
preserved side where it is beautifully sculpted, the Ardhanārīśvara, also combines two
gods in one: a metaphor for the cessation of duality shown by combining the masculine
and feminine form. The side which shows Tārā is also complex: for merely a goddess
shown with a lotus could also be the Vaiṣṇava Lakṣmī. This prompted questions about
whether a Vaiṣṇava shrine was turned into a Śaivite one? It is only on close inspection
that we can discern that receiving the goddess’s benefaction below her right hand is a
kneeling preta, the hungry ghoulish spirit of the dead receiving the goddess’s mercy,
which is a known feature of the medieval sculptures of the Buddhist Tārā. The style of
the sculptures on both sides is identical, perhaps made by the same workshop. This
brought to focus problems of chronology, for it  seems that the shift in the shrine’s
allegiance happened within a generation of the commissioning of the Tārā. The modern
museum audience was left questioning if the patron changed her or his mind? Or did s/
he not turn up at the artist’s workshop to claim the sculpture, leaving the artist the
opportunity to reuse the slab for a different patron? The questions the label raised
informed the viewers of the history of the sculpture, but also made them participate,
dynamically, in the difficulties in positing simplistic understandings of iconoclasm and
vandalism by squarely taking the entire discussion away from Islam, and revealing how
others too have desecrated “gods”.
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II.f. Public celebrations of political violence
38 Conflict is not, of course, only religious, and iconoclasm is not the only type of violence
that images can tell a history of. Living in the age of the so-called “Islamic terror”, we
are often alerted to how political conflict is given a religious guise. Many a religion has
made much of their martyrs although mentions of those who commit jihad are given
more attention internationally. Martyrology is an established subject in Christianity,
Sikhism and other religions. Centuries old monuments to the deified dead can be seen
as stone stelae, posts or wooden pillars all over India as well.33 Certain kinds of death,
premature, violent and undeserved, can make a person a worthy object of worship.
Significantly,  the  process  that  transforms  humans  into deities  does  not  depend on
moral considerations here, but on violence. We opened the exhibition at the National
Museum with a display of two graphic sculptures, a Vīrakkal and Vīrasatī from the 13th
century Kākaṭīya period of Telangana [Fig. 14a & 14b]. Hero stones dedicated to men
are called Viragal or Virakkal, while those dedicated to women are called Virasati. Both
sculptures, on public display for more than 700 years, have served to commemorate
and even exonerate  the  violence  they communicate.  These  sculpted stones  are  not
uncommon, such memorials to warriors and sati-stones to women who were cremated
on their husband’s pyres are to be found across the length and breadth of South Asia;
both serve a public purpose, to normalise violent martyrdom in society.34
 
Fig. 14a. Viragal (memorial to a soldier)
Black basalt. Andhra Pradesh. Kakatiya, 13th century. 114 x 61 x 10 cm. State Archaeology Museum,
Hyderabad (P 5499)
The Body in Indian Art
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Fig. 14b. Virasati (memorial to a female warrior)
Black basalt. Andhra Pradesh. Kakatiya, 13th century. 112 x 71 x 13 cm. State Archaeology Museum,
Hyderabad (HM 88-51)
The Body in Indian Art
39 In this example, the male soldier is shown disembowelling himself, his innards spilling
out of his halved body. In return for offering their lives for the greater cause of war for
their king, the promise of heaven was held out to soldiers –a heaven where they would
be received by celestial damsels or apsaras who are visible in the upper corners of the
sculpture. This gift was not the preserve of men alone: women are also commemorated
for their valour and fidelity. Commemoration of women was more commonly done for
those who committed sati,  widows who burned themselves alive on their husband’s
funeral pyres. It is rare to find examples of women warriors commemorated, such as
the one shown here. However, lest the public be mistaken that women soldiers were
being used to convey female empowerment, we highlighted that on the sculpture they
too were shown attended to by heavenly female apsaras.35 Was that because this was
formulaic  and  sculptors  were  oblivious  to  the  requirement  that  women  may  not,
necessarily, want female apsaras waiting on them in heaven? The objects then proffer
another narrative: of a male gaze unable to grasp female desire. Or perhaps, there is
another implication, and that is that the woman warrior becomes a man in heaven. She
gets two rewards –male gender and heaven. Short labels and provocative questions in
the  accompanying  documentary  films  made  the  public  see  how  patriarchy  was
entrenched in society.  Again, the opportunity was used not merely to highlight the
long history of institutionalisation of violence and martyrdom in Indian contexts, but
also examine whom such institutionalisation served.
40 The narrative was stretched further to a modern political environment in the same
exhibition by placing calendar prints of martyrdom and violence as condoned in the
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Indian freedom movement.  A  clear  example  of  this  was  a  print  that  shows Subhas
Chandra Bose, a prominent figure of the Indian freedom movement standing with his
head severed: [Fig. 15] and called Subhāścandra bos ki apūrv bheṅṭ or “Subhas Chandra
Bose’s  Remarkable  Offering”.  He holds  his  own severed head in  his  hand while  his
dripping blood forms the map of India. This allowed us to build a narrative through
another  strategy:  not  by  using  text,  or  words,  but  instead  by  showing  how  visual
narratives  exist  in  civilisation  and  how  these  too  are  manipulated  just  as  textual
language of propaganda and mythology are. Iconography, once established, is capable
of being adapted and used time after time. This is, after all, what a museum can do –
expose the artistic vocabulary of visual communication, and reveals, in this case, the
continuity of the visual language of conflict.
 
Fig. 15. “Subhas Chandra Bose’s Remarkable Offering”
Offset Print “Published by Shyam Sunder Lal, Picture Merchant, Chowk, Cawnpore” c. 1940s. 16.5 x
13.5 inches. From the collection of Priya Paul
Priya Paul
 
II.g. Further gendered violence
41 We examined above how sati stones and memorials to warriors may have normalised
violence, and move here to a ruthlessly decapitated 8th to 10th century image of a
female Jain seer from Unnao in Uttar Pradesh, which still lies in the Lucknow Museum
without any explanatory text despite two major international exhibitions that have
discussed its decapitation. [Fig. 16a & 16b] It can be interpreted in ways that suggest
the beheading may have been done by those opposed to the idea of the canonisation of
a  woman  saint  rather  than  something  perpetrated  by  an  invading  Muslim  army.36
However, to reach such an interpretation required the involvement of the public in the
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Stone. Unnao, Uttar Pradesh. 12th century. 53 x 43 x 15.2 cm. Lucknow State Museum (J885)




Stone. Unnao, Uttar Pradesh. 12th century. 53 x 43 x 15.2 cm. Lucknow State Museum (J885)
The Body in Indian Art
42 With her absolutely straight back, with one plait falling down its middle, breath drawn
into her inflated chest, she sits meditating in padmāsana with just a simple flower held
in her hands. Complete nudity in Indian art is usually linked with the figure of Jain
tirthankaras. This sculpture is also completely nude, which is exceptional. Even when
shown  without  clothes,  Hindu  goddesses  are  adorned,  covered  with  jewellery  and
ornaments. In the Shvetambara tradition of Jainism, some believe that Mallinātha (the
19th Jain tirthankara) was a female and it has thus been suggested that this may be a
sculpture of her.  Supporting this view is also the dark colour of the stone, and the
carving  of  a  damaged  water  pot  in  the  square  niche  on  the  pedestal,  which  are
iconographic attributes of Malli.37
43 The Jains are broadly divided into two sects –the Digambaras and the Shvetambaras.
The Digambaras do not believe that women can achieve mokṣa , a stance that received
its  most  hardened  polemical  explication  by  the  seer  Prabhāchandra  in  the  11th
century. For them, the tirthankara Mallinātha is a male, and they also believe that the
best women can aspire to is to be reborn as men, which will enable them, if they lead an
exemplary virtuous life, to achieve mokṣa. In myths, while the Shvetambaras maintain
that Malli was born a dark blue female who became a renunciate, the Digambaras insist
upon him being born a male.
44 Shvetambara tirthankaras and nuns are clothed, which makes the identification of this
image complicated. Questions were also raised if the Shvetambara image was once clad
and ornamented as many images in worship now are, not allowing us to see it in the
way that  the sculptor  had fashioned the body.  The capacity  for  females  to  achieve
liberation was never doubted in ancient texts, yet after the 5th century, a myth was
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created that Mallinātha’s gender was changed to a man, for only a man can achieve
keval jñāna or mokṣa.38 This sculpture comes from a period when there was a resurgence
of female figures as foci of worship across the bhakti and Tantric traditions. Nudity was
regarded as an essential requirement for Digambara Jain ascetics, which would have
caused social discomfiture when it came to women and several medieval women-saints
spoke out against this. A question was thus posed about whether this female Mallinatha
could have been beheaded by patriarchal Jain forces as much as by anyone else?
 
II.h. The violence of rhetoric and “fake news”
45 Time and again, we have seen that violence perpetrated on bodies needs explanation.
At times, the violence is itself iconographic and used to send out a different type of
message –one that  normalises  the violence,  or  makes the horrific  into a  protective
talisman, or a celebration, like a trophy of a victory. Objects have been used to make
these  statements  in  the  above  examples.  Unlike  sculptures,  drawings  or  paintings,
however,  in  modern  times  we  have  photographs,  and  these  are  not  meant  to  be
idealised or contrived artworks. Instead, they have an aura of authenticity about them,
where they are meant to be documentary in nature, a snapshot of a moment. In the
exhibition on “India & the World: A History in Nine Stories”, we used the opportunity
to show that right from the earliest photographs, we can see, in fact, that they were
carefully  constructed  to  create  not  just  a  desired  artistic  effect,  but  a  dangerous
“documentary fact”.
46 Felice Beato (1832–1909) was a commercial photographer, Venetian by birth but raised
as a British imperial subject in Corfu, a British protectorate at the time. A five-decade
long career took him from Ukraine during the Crimean War (1853-56) to India, China,
Japan,  Korea,  and  Burma,  providing  some  of  the  earliest  photographic  images  of
colonial heroism and the exotic lives of these countries. He arrived in India in February
1858 to record the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857. He worked at Delhi, Kanpur and
Lucknow under  the  guidance  and help  of  military  officers,  where  he  re-staged the
conflicts in order to photograph them. [Fig. 17] In the catalogue that accompanied the
display of one his most (in)famous photographs, I wrote,
Conveying  brutality  was  his  intention,  and  this  involved  the  exhumation  and
restaging of corpses of natives artfully scattered before the shelled building. The
display of the wrecked building reveals to the British press where the image would
have been seen, the extent of Indian outrage, while the corpses, and hangings of
Indians in another picture, their retribution. This served the intention of justifying
of  the wresting of  control  from the East  India  Company to  the crown,  in  1858,
making India a British colony, and Queen Victoria, as empress of India…
Images have always had a fantastic power of enhancing and manipulating truth,
and this has certainly been one of the strongest mediums of communication since




Fig. 17. Aftermath of the Mutiny in Secundrabagh, Lucknow
Photograph by Felice Beato. Albumen Print. AD 1858. H: 25.6 cm; W. 29.1 cm. The Alkazi Foundation
for the Arts, New Delhi (ACP: 94.139.0001a)
The Alkazi Foundation for the Arts
47 Staging  this  in  the  museum  in  2017-18  struck  a  chord  with  the  public.  In  an
environment when no one knows what to believe in the media and multiple versions of
history  are  peddled  as  truths,  when  quickly  edited  images  on  mobile  phones  are
gathered from one scenario but accompanied by persuasive rhetoric on a completely
different matter, the public noted how longstanding the industry of visual propaganda
has  been.  It  brought  home  the  point  about  how  public  opinion  is  swayed  by  the
presentation of evidence, and how dangerously evidence has been created for the past
150 years. If the colonial government used it, so too has the Indian national movement
employed the iconography of martyrdom to its purposes. The examples can easily be
amplified, but that would turn this essay into a book. I have limited myself only to a few
examples  of  how  images  in  museum  settings  hold  potential  for  communicating
histories  of  political  violence  of  many  kinds.  How  seeing  an  image  closely  reveals
perspectives apart from just their iconographic name, or artistic technique which is all
that labels in museums normally concern themselves with.
48 The exclusion of rich histories is symptomatic of something far more insidious. If the
historiography  of  Indian  art  has  shown  something,  it  is that  the  ever-deepening
engagement  with  iconography lures  visitors  (and scholars,  most  certainly)  into  the
richness of psychological meaning inherent in Indian images, who remain blinded to
the overt surface violence that images have been subjected to. Artworks in museum
contexts appeal to both, our religiosity and the sense we make of our world through
history:  a  history,  that  is  based as  much on reason as  it  draws on imagination.  All
images can be used for propaganda, but sacred images, we have seen, are particularly
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powerful communicators of difference. Further, they communicate even in a destroyed
state,  rather  than  just  in  a  living  temple  context.  While  exploring  the  variety  of
political violence communicated in museums in India that house such images, we have
also seen that before Islam took on the propaganda of making spectacles of destroying
images,  different  communities  in  India  used  the  same  strategy.  This  knowledge
compels us to revisit and nuance the generally assumed, singular narrative of Muslim
iconoclasm. This can be done by museums to show the several reasons for the breakage
of sculptures,  and how the reappropriation of sacred sculptures in India has a long
history, which precedes the advent of Islam; that Hindus did it to Jain and Buddhist
images; that Hindus snatched images from rival kingdoms. Other images reveal inter-
religious  conflicts  with  Christian  destructions  of  Hindu  shrines,  or  Hindu  anxieties
about  the  popularity  of  Jains  and  Buddhists.  Other  factors  too  emerge:  the  apathy
toward and collusion of upper castes in the removal or reappropriations of lower caste
or “tribal” shrines, as well as the requirements of patriarchal keepers of religions to
remove feminist threats. In addition to the rich histories of the Muslim destruction of
Buddhist, Hindu or Sikh spaces, we also need to speak of Sanskritisation, the absorption
of  yakshas,  inter-sectarian  rivalries  and  caste  exclusion.  Where  many  speak  of  the
brutality suffered by images, we must also remind Hindus (and others) that it was only
in the 20th century that lower caste Hindus won the legal right to enter Hindu temples
to see many of those images at all. Opening the museum’s space up to tell narratives
will  allow it  to cause offence to all,  rather than some, fulfilling the intention of no
longer apportioning blame to one causative agent for the vandalism of sculptures in
India, but focus on the larger narrative of the instruments of violence instead.
49 Recycling  images  is  not  merely  a  sign  of  conflict  or  violence.  The  passage  of  time
allowed Vishnu sculptures to be read as Buddhas in South East Asia, while many stupas
have been reinvented as lingas in India. The provenance-history and biography of an
object takes it,  it  is  well  known, through diverse contexts.  Tracing several  of  those
contexts helps stage the ones on violence and conflict along with others; our attention
thus comes on the history of an object rather than only on the history of the political
context –and this is key for the museum if it wishes to stay located in the disciplines of
art history and aesthetics rather than be located in a department of politics.
50 Each case must be read against the backdrop of the varied kinds of interests that would
have seen to their restaging in new contexts or outright removal from public view in
some  other  contexts.  These  case  studies  point  at  more  complex  historical
circumstances under which the theft of images and iconoclasm are perpetrated. In each
case,  they  reveal  how  these  acts  are  performed  for  the  sake  of  a  certain  public
propaganda  that  seeks  demonstration  of  the  usurping  of  someone  else’s  source  of
power.  Staging  this  in  a  museum  and  openly  talking  about  a  long  history  of  how
violence is communicated, may seek to unmask the strategies of violence.
 
III. Communicating subjectivities: will the loudest
heckle the others into silence?
51 “I don’t know what to believe anymore” is a common enough plea heard in the wake of
fake news by the public, a public which certainly needs to mature. For too long have
eloquent services of pre-modern art history writing in India served a singular cause,
making  the  public  follow  their  didactic  command  like  sheep  without  raising  their
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pupils to try and question or think critically. Tabling varied “facts” together may, put
rather poetically, mirror the fissures of the sculptures themselves: teaching the public,
eventually, to see the same artwork from many perspectives. Certainly, the perspective
on the history of propaganda and political violence cannot be kept hidden. Unlike ever
before, the rise of internet-based new media has made it a given that everyone now has
an opportunity to articulate their position. This rise (and manipulation) of social media
has allowed an articulation of divergent narratives that, when fuelled, create a more
polarised society.  As  much as  it  has  enabled opinions to  emerge,  its  protections of
anonymity  and  virtual  identities  leave  speakers  without  responsibility  for  their
comments, and with trolls paid to command the volume of opinions voiced, it has also
become not  merely  an  instrument  of  heckling,  but  equally,  now,  an  instrument  of
violence. Fake news comes along with fake identities and fake sources, algorithmically
programmed  to  communicate  to  its  own  echo-chambers,  strengthening  their
conviction  in  their  falsehoods.  In  the  past  two  decades  we  have  encountered
interference in history textbooks of India which is more pernicious.
52 Equally, silencing histories and people is also a violence. Vast swathes of the histories
of South Asians, for instance, are relegated to ethnographic and crafts museums simply
because  they did  not  come from temple-worshipping cities,  castes  or  communities.
Often, objects that do not conform to the standard distinguishable stylistic markers of a
period or iconography confuse museum staff to such degree that they are relegated to
reserve collections –as the only format or narrative within which they can be brought
on display is as a specimen of a period or religion at the exclusion of admitting them as
evidence of  other ways of  telling different  types  of  histories.  It  is  better  to  say no
known  sources  are  available  to  tell  us,  rather  than  leave  the  field  open  to
misrepresentation,  and  in  the  case  of  a  damaged  sculpture  state  what  caused  the
damage to it when known, and again, when not known, to say that too.
53 The grouping of objects is normally done because they are “specimens” of a particular
taxonomical framework, and galleries of Indian art have been particularly moribund in
their capacities to show things outside the religiously defined frameworks set up over a
century ago. A wider pool of curatorial narratives allows for greater inclusion, and this
will involve broken and damaged sculptures as well as other forms of material culture –
utensils,  scientific instruments, textiles,  talismans and expressions of “folk” culture,
along with the growing reserves of oral histories. There has been a move in the past
few decades to revive the pedagogical  function of  the museums with the attendant
anxieties of globalisation. In a world characterised by mass-migrations of populations
living in diaspora, the major museums of historical objects of the world have found a
new purpose as universal museums.
54 This revised mandate seeks to explain one culture to visitors from another and thereby
perform a social function. Worthy as that is, implicit in the exercise is a presentation of
that culture in the language of, or terms set by the culture in which it is being staged.
Often, this has resulted in an oversimplification and driven by a requirement to tell
children “the facts”, we prevent them from learning to live with differences of opinion.
Sometimes,  the  mere  act  of  using  someone  else’s  language  can  create  terms  of
assimilating the different culture even if that was not what was intended. At times,
through translation, the terms of the cultural difference are lost or forgotten. Where
20th century advances in Chaos Theory in “arts” like mathematics has proved beyond
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doubt  that  other  orders  and  harmonies  also  exist,  the  social  “sciences”  still  find
difference disconsonant.40
55 At the same time, not comparing objects can also be problematic. Patterns of how we
allow difference to be recorded today need not be how people dealt with difference in
times past.  Cultures clashed and that sometimes led to efforts  to accommodate the
other, or assimilate them in a dominant culture.41 The same inscriptions or public texts
can be understood differently depending on the worldview the reader comes from.
That history also needs to be staged and told. In order to create a dialogue between
contrasting positions, opposing views have to be brought to the same space for us to
simply  apprehend  their  difference,  not  achieve  concord,  but  only  to  allow  their
differences to coexist on the same ground.
56 This  means  it  must  be  achieved  both  through the  act  of  translation  as  well  as  by
displaying different  objects/positions together in  a  museum in order to  show their
divergence. This shared ground, therefore, need not provide a space of harmony; in
fact, it must remain a space that can showcase the disharmony and provide a space for
rebellion and divergence rather  than be  a  propagandist  (and even false)  display of
universal harmony, or brush conflict under a carpet.
57 Admitting  a  problem is  of  course  always  the  first  step  to  recovery.  Prejudice  only
remains powerful if it is kept secret –for it allows for secretive solidarities and those
become narratives of victimhood that needs a protector, or to be righted by a saviour.
Describing  the  causes  of  violence,  its  anatomy  and  pathology,  will  expose  the
propaganda machinery’s tools. The museum’s principal roles, then, are the protection
of that evidence which it keeps so that it can be used again and again for each carefully
constructed interpretation. And, evidence ought not to be kept as poorly as the neglect
museums in India often find themselves in.
58 Why has the institution of the museum in India been so suppressed? This is a long
subject which one has written on elsewhere.42 If museums are an important space to
start  displaying the evidence they house with greater care,  then they need greater
protection. In order to more openly tell the history of conflict, or to check the sources
of  [dis]information  and  the  algorithms  and  propaganda  that  perpetuate  each
community’s inherited anxieties, museums will need to preserve their own status as
places of knowledge production, foster research and debate, and above all, be open to
changing their narratives. This certainly expands the definition of the job-profile of
museum professionals. It also poses another question, whether the goal of the museum
is then something evangelical? An aesthetic ennoblement? Social harmony?
59 That may have been the opinion of several 18th and 19th century European pioneers of
the  discourse  on museology.  The terms of  education,  aesthetic  communication and
understanding diverse histories have changed today. In this essay, I have tried to reveal
some of the ways in which we are able to stage the discourse in the public sphere. What
was examined in each case study was not a one-off, but an image that was given a close
reading (or “thick description” if you will) for it to be contextualised within various
types of  research to be able to show how violence is  culturally  constructed.  In the
exhibitions I have curated, as well as in the few other examples I have cited in this
essay, an effort was made to reveal to the public how those conclusions were reached.
Repeated contextualisation reveals the instruments by which society has normalised
political violence through history. In the end, what begins to emerge is that the chief
instrument of violence was not the perpetration of physical damage inflicted on the
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images,  but  the  social  structures  which  encouraged  it,  the  propaganda  that
accompanied it, mobilised and justified the violence. The denial of the long history of
the propaganda itself, and ignorance of how it has been mobilised, allows the public to
remain susceptible to it. Perhaps then, the only solution is to stage and display the
propaganda so that the public can see it for what it is.
60 Apart  from  people,  heritage  sites  and  museums  remain  visible  sites  for  political
violence, precisely because of the kind of media attention they get. It is well known that
this  is  because  destroyed  sites  have  a  long  lasting  impact.  The  destruction  of  the
Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan in 2001 emboldened extremists  to further destroy
more art and heritage. And entire political campaigns in India have fed off the act of
the destruction of a mosque and promised building of a temple in its place in Ayodhya.
Iconoclasm was  revived  at  Nimrud and  Hatra  –the  great  historical  sites  of  ancient
Mesopotamia;  Palmyra  bears  testimony  to  its  devastating  effects.  Brushing  such
violence under the carpet is no solution, but the task then becomes one of how we
achieve the necessary balance in narrating it.
61 Museums of Indian art, and Asian art on the whole, continue to present Indian art in
galleries divided by religions. Many a scholar has noted that the problem that seems to
afflict the presentation of Indian art in galleries across the world is its stereotyping on
the grounds of its religious identification. The division and presentation of museum
galleries of Hindu art, Buddhist art and Islamic art, has a long colonial legacy, when
history used to be taught in that manner. While history books changed so as to deal
with  more  neutral,  chronological  nomenclature,  museums  did  not.  By  identifying
sculpture only by their iconography, museums remain resistant to moving away from
telling anything but a history of religions through their displays of Indian artefacts.43
Thus,  while  it  is  possible  to  pick  up  a  history  book  on  the  diverse  Hindu cultures
patronised by Deccani and Mughal kings, galleries of Hindu art tend to conclude their
presentation  of  Hindu  art  in  the  14th  century  leaving  the  public  with  the
misunderstanding that there was no patronage of Hindu culture under the Sultanates
and Muslim rulers.
62 Within  the  separated  galleries  of  Hindu  and  Islamic  art  too,  there  are  pernicious
stereotypes. Instead of presenting these as historically changing religions, conditioned
by  the  geographic,  economic  and  political  exigencies  of  each  moment  in  time,
Hinduism ends up being presented as some eternal religion while Islam is invariably
essentialised  as  a  culture  that  revelled  in  floral  and  geometric  decorative
ornamentation  and  calligraphy  because  making  images  was  prohibited.  Countless
Indian Muslims who have a diverse range of ritual practices remain excluded from this
narrow, singular definition. Culture and the diversity of narratives which a museum is
capable  of  illuminating  remain  only  marginal  to  the  dominant  presentation  of
iconography:  who is  Shiva  or  Krishna,  identifying  a  few goddesses,  and identifying
some styles and periods of Indian art. What political, social and economic changes came
in that period, what advances in science and technology permitted concomitant shifts
in the perception of culture, how patronage shifted, who controlled the narrative and
how it was adapted to suit that age… These many questions remain unanswered.
63 Inasmuch as a museum romanticises religion such that the aura of spiritual images can
inspire  audiences,  even  give  solace  and  open  windows  to  the  profound  nature  of
ancient thought, it must equally be noted how such noble emotion is taken advantage
of, how this precious but subtle feeling becomes a commodity so easily stolen and used
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for political profiteering by creating sectarian fault lines. Making some space for an
acknowledgement of human fallibility and national shame may bring temperance and
some room to listen rather than use the museum only as a space to instil pride and
allow the public to marvel and boast.
64 Museums of Indian art are, as I stated earlier, spaces that remain neglected, and the
state of  neglect  itself  is  criminal,  not  merely because people have a  claim on their
history, but because the museum is a preserver of evidence. Does that mean it is a law
court? Not exactly. Contrary to the emerging narrative of the museum as a place of
transitional justice, I do not believe the history- or art-museum is a place for conflict
resolution or even catharsis, for that matter. This cannot be its intention. (Rather like
Bharata or even Ānandavardhana) I feel that the simulacra of art can bring us close to
an aesthetic experience of something that is almost indistinguishable from the thing
itself; yet it retains that remove –barrier or enabler– of “almost”. Ānandavardhana and
the aestheticians of yore claimed that it was possible to instil śānta-rasa by retelling the
stories  of  that  violence as  for  example did the Mahābhārata.  Such retellings were a
means  for  people  to  learn  to  abhor  hate  and  conflict,  for  them  to recognise  how
prejudices  (when  left  secret)  are  manipulated  and  instrumentalised.  The  onus  of
interpreting  the  evidence  shifts  onto  the  public,  making  them  complicit  in  the
problematic nature of history. That it happens to achieve a catharsis or rouse empathy
is a bonus we must aim for. And in order to be able to do this, the museum needs to be
relevant to each generation, or constituency that views it.
65 What will protect the historian to be able to tell such narratives? The historian curator
can be perceived as someone who foments violence rather than peace, and this leads,
again, to a suppression of the narrative. The only way forward appears to be able to use
the  museum  to  tell  multiple  sides  of  the  story,  to  have  fuller  narratives,  and  to
understand that the museum label is itself an integral part of the discourse. For the
public,  by  seeing  for  themselves  how  evidence  can  be  approached  from  different
perspectives,  it  becomes  part  of  the  experience  of  the  artwork.  The  instability  of
interpretations in each case will be accompanied by an understanding of the process by
which we know what we do. The museum then encourages people to enter that space of
building a narrative and leaves room for the staff to interpret and teach the audiences
the skills and processes involved in the process of interpretation. To engage with the
material itself, what more can the museum ask for?
I would like to thank Anne Cheng and the Collège de France for the invitation to present this
paper at the conference “Historians of Asia on Political Violence” in June 2019. I remain deeply
grateful to Prof. Phyllis Granoff for her guidance. Several ideas contained in this paper developed
over years of conversation with Belinder Dhanoa. Professors Romila Thapar, Parul Dave
Mukherji, Shadakshari Settar and James Hegarty who kindly supplied me valuable references
which have helped substantiate the arguments contained herein. And Avani Sood, has helped
sort out many of the practicalities that accompany research. Thank you all.
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NOTES
1. Weil,  Stephen  E.,  Rethinking  the  Museum  and  other  Meditations,  Washington  and  London:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990, remains one of the most eloquent pieces on the shifts in the
profession of Museum administration in the 20th century. He says: “To focus museum rhetoric on
the socially beneficial aspects of a museum would ultimately be to invite discussion on a wide
range of political and moral issues that could well pit trustees against staff members and staff
members against one another. By contrast, to focus on function –on the good, seemingly value-
free  work of  collecting,  preserving and displaying– projects  a  sense  of  ideological  neutrality
(albeit, I suspect, a grossly deceptive sense) in which people of diverse social views are able to
work more amiably together.” He continues: “Allied with this is a notion of the museum as a sort
of neutral and transparent medium –a clear, clean, and undistorting lens– through which the
public ought to be able to come face-to-face with an object, pure and fresh… At best, this seems a
wilful naïveté… we must never forget that ideas –and not just things alone– also lie at the heart
of the museum enterprise. Reality is neither objects alone nor simply ideas about objects but,
rather, the two taken together.” Op. Cit. pp. 43-56.
2. A synoptic version of this article was published as Ahuja, Naman P. “Conflict: Can Museums
Tell Us Why?” in Lowry, Glenn D., ed., Art and Conflict, Marg, Vol. 71, No. 4, June 2020, pp. 26-37.
3. In  India,  two  relatively  recent  museums  have  been  created  on  these  lines:  the  Partition
Museum in Amritsar and the Conflictorium in Ahmedabad. On the creation of the Truth and
Reconciliation  Commission  of  South  Africa,  because  of  the  “unearthing”  of  pasts,  and  the
recording of the memory of traumatic experience which allowed the museum space to be used as
a site of forgiveness and the “healing of memories”, see Rassool, Ciraj, “Community Museums,
Memory Politics, and Social Transformation in South Africa: Histories, Possibilities and Limits”,
in Ivan Karp, Corinne A. Kratz, Lynn Szwaja and Tomás Ybarra-Frausto, eds., Museum Frictions:
Public  Cultures/Global  Transformations,  Durham  and  London:  Duke  University  Press,  2006.
Transitional justice is becoming a stated claim of museums of contemporary conflict in many
parts  of  the  world.  It  can  be  seen  across  museums  in  Cambodia,  Germany  (on  the  Jewish
holocaust).  And even in  the  United  States,  which  is  known to  be  pro-Israel,  in  2019,  a  new
museum of oral history called the Museum of the Palestinian People opened in Washington DC.
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4. Choudhury, Pravas Jivan, “Catharsis in the Light of Indian Aesthetics”, The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, Vol 15, No. 2, Dec. 1956, pp. 215-226.
5. Tripathi, Radhavallabh, Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in
Indian Intellectual Discourses, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 2016, pp. 34-35 and pp.
256-259.
6. Tubb, Gary A. “Śāntarasa in the Mahābhārata”, Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 20, No. 1,
Part 1: “Essays on the Mahābhārata”, Winter-Spring 1985, pp. 141-168, discusses what is the final,
lasting  effect  of  art/literature  which  takes  an  audience  through  a  mélange  of  transitory
emotions.  He quotes  Ānandavardhana:  In  the Mahābhārata,  Vyāsa  has  demonstrated that  the
creation of detachment is the principal purport of his work.
7. McCrea,  Lawrence,  “Śāntarasa in  the  Rājatarangiṇī:  History,  epic,  and  moral  decay”,  Indian
Economic and Social History Review, No. 50, 2, 2013, pp. 179-199.
8. Hegarty,  James,  Religion,  Narrative  and  Public  Imagination  in  South  Asia:  Past  and  Place  in  the
Sanskrit Mahabharata, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 14 and further, pp. 73-79. This examination of
the Mahābhārata explores how it justifies its own public intention. The Mahābhārata’s aesthetic
concern is not merely academic as it was used for the education of princes and is a text quoted in
a wide range of historical inscriptions which reveal how it was very much part of public culture.
Similar studies on the affective history of the Ramayana have been built by several scholars. See
Pollock, Sheldon, “Ramayana and Political Imagination in India”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 52,
No. 2, 1993, pp. 261-297.
9. On the controversy around Indian history textbooks, see Communalisation  of  Education:  The
History  Textbooks  Controversy,  Delhi:  Delhi  Historians’  Group,  2001.  The  matter  was  taken  up
extensively  in  Indian  and  international  media,  see  for  example  Ramesh,  Randeep,  “Another
rewrite  for  India’s  history  books”  in  The  Guardian on  26  June  2004:  https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/26/india.schoolsworldwide,  accessed 5  December 2019.
Further, Habib, Irfan, Suvira Jaiswal and Aditya Mukherjee, History in the New NCERT Textbooks,
Kolkata: Indian History Congress, 2003.
10. In 2019, media attention was being given to the creation of a museum of oral histories on
both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict in Washington DC called the Museum of the Palestinian
People. Surely, there can be no greater evidence for the move in museum curation/narratives
towards  the  requirement  to  voice  the  diversity  of  opinion  that  make  a  nation’s  public. See
footnote 1 above. There is a rising parallel scholarship in the field of performance studies that
takes a similar approach, see Hughes, Jenny, Performance in a Time of Terror: Critical Mimesis and the
Age  of  Uncertainty,  Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  2011,  and  Cole,  Catherine,
Performing South Africa’s  Truth Commission:  Stages of  Transition,  Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2010.
11. References to the attacks against Jains may be found across the 13th century Lingayat Vīra-
śaiva Telugu epic poem, the Basava Purāṇa. See Narayana Rao, Velcheru, ed., Siva’s Warriors: The
Basava-Purana of Palkuriki-Somanatha, Princeton University Press, 1990. On the Periya Purāṇa see
Monius, Anne, “Love, Violence and the Aesthetics of Disgust: Śaivas and Jains in Medieval South
India”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol 32, 2004, pp.113-172. The desecration of Jain sites along
with Buddhist ones is amplified further in the recent book by Verardi, Giovanni and Federica
Barba: The Gods and the Heretics: Crisis and Ruin of Indian Buddhism, New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan
and Fundación Bodhiyána, 2018. I am grateful to Prof. Phyllis Granoff and Prof. S. Settar for rich
readings on this matter. On medieval stories of Jains who split the sacred linga of Śiva with their
ascetical power and the Śaivite rebuttal through stories of their own: Granoff, Phyllis, “Telling
Tales: Jains and Śaivaites and their Stories in Medieval South India”, lecture delivered at Harvard
University, April 8, 2009, and University of Wisconsin, Madison, April 30, 2009, (unpublished). She
explores the significance of  the many Jain stories of  the splitting of  a Siva linga such as the
conversion of Kumarapala by Hemacandra and Samantabhadra’s destruction of the linga in the
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creation of a public rhetoric. For Jain Samantabhadra’s story of splitting the linga, see Granoff,
Phyllis, “The Biographies of Siddhasena: A Study in the Texture of Allusion and the Weaving of a
Group Image”,  Journal  of  Indian Philosophy,  17,  1989,  pp.  329-384.  The severe Saiva-Srivasnava
conflict at Srirangam in the 13th-14th century is testified by both inscriptions and the temple
chronicle, Koil Olugu. Prof. Settar supplied me the following list of inscriptional references for
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over Bodhgayā and its Buddha Image”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol 66, No. 4,
Winter 1998, pp. 817-839.
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Renunciation, dissent, and 
satyagraha
Romila Thapar
1 I shall be dealing with a subject that was of general interest in the past but although the
interest may have declined, the theme is of crucial importance to the present. I am
referring to the right of the citizen to dissent as part of the right to free speech. The
right to dissent has come to be recognised in modern times, but its practice goes back
many centuries.  To deny its  earlier existence comes from the preference to project
Indian society as having been a seamless harmonious unity where dissent was hardly to
be found. Its presence is conceded for philosophical discourse as there would not be
any philosophy without dissenting opinions. I would like to argue that it was a much
wider articulation more prevalent in the past than in the immediate present.
2 Varied forms of  dissent and protest  have always existed.  Violent forms featured in
warfare and in punishments are only too evident. Non-violent forms require conscious
recognition. That may be one reason why we have failed to recognise that the forms
adopted by Gandhi had some links with the past. As with all civilisation and multiple
cultures, we have had our share of intolerance and violence. That may be one of many




3 Let me briefly clarify what I mean by dissent. It is in essence the disagreement that a
person or persons may have with either others or  more publicly with the way the
institutions of society are organised and function. Kautilya and Manu constructed their
version  of  ideal  institutions  and  these  were  challenged  by  a  range  of  opinions.
Institutions are not modern but what is, is the right to question them. This right is not
confined to the elite as it was in the past but extends today to all citizens. In earlier
times it was embedded, argued over but did not become an issue of rights since such
rights were not universal.
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4 We  now  recognise  a  relationship  between  citizen  and  state  partly  because  of  the
historical  change  we  have  experienced  through  nationalism.  Coinciding  with  the
emergence of industrialisation and capitalism, and through the evolving of the middle-
class controlling the new technology, we have now entered the modern era.
5 This  phase  therefore  also  marks  an  alteration  of  governance  where  monarchical
systems are generally replaced by secular democracies. These involve representatives
from all sections of society who now have equal status. The maintenance of the secular,
the  democratic,  and  the  national  are  inter-dependent.  For  democracy,  the  right  to
dissent and the demand for social justice are core concepts. The freedom to express
dissent  fosters  democratic  citizenship,  registers  complaints  against  injustice  and
improves social conditions. Since it includes all citizens, its inclusiveness demands that
it be secular.
6 Citizens assert their freedom through claiming their rights and accepting their duties.
The state will only be respected if it honours these rights and its obligations towards all
citizens  as  recorded  in  the  constitution.  Many  countries  today  do  not  grasp  the
implications of this historical change. To convert nationalism into a method of control
fails to recognise that it is linked to democracy and therefore resists this control. In
India, the overwhelming form of nationalism was anti-colonial nationalism, common to
most  colonies.  This  implied  the  assertion  of  the  new  identity  of  the  free  citizen
emerging from the challenging of orthodoxies of various kinds. The construction of this
identity  seeks  legitimacy  from the  patterns  of  life  in  the  past.  So  history  becomes
crucial. As was common to most colonies, the colonial reading of the colony’s earlier
history that formulated its identity was from the perspective of the coloniser. This in
India was the two-nation theory. James Mill argued in 1818 that the history of India was
that  of  two  nations  –the  Hindu  and  the  Muslim–  and  that  the  two  had  been
permanently hostile  to  each other.  Colonial  scholarship founded itself  on this  idea,
loyally followed by both religious nationalisms –Hindu and Muslim. The concept of the
Islamic state and of the Hindu Rashtra, the latter based on the Hindutva version of




7 Anti-colonial  nationalism  projected  a  nation  of  Indian  citizens,  all  of  equal  status
irrespective  of  origins  and  identities,  all  coming  together  in  the  demand  for
independence. The nation too was to be a nation for all with no primary or exclusive
citizens as in the two so-called religious nationalisms.  This term that we all  use so
frequently,  is  something  of  an  oxymoron.  Nationalism  strictly  speaking  cannot  be
defined by a single identity. It is all-inclusive and secular in its demand for a nation-
state.  It  is  quite  distinct  from majoritarianism in  which a  pre-determined majority
identified  by  a  single  criterion,  negates  democracy  and  justice.  The  rule  of  that
particular majority is asserted. The important factor of dissent on issues affecting the
nation is not permitted. But dissent has a historical continuity even if its forms have
changed and has to be acknowledged.
8 I now propose to turn to anti-colonial nationalism as a major expression of dissent and
suggest that some of its forms seem to have a few echoes from the past. In our times,
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the most striking example of dissent is of course the satyagraha of Gandhi and from the
historical past I shall be looking at the ideas of the Shramanas and later the Bhakti sants.
9 I would like to begin on a personal note by speaking about how it all began for me.
There was one occasion a lifetime ago, when I very briefly met Gandhi and exchanged
half a sentence on a simple matter. In a curious way, it came to symbolise for me the
need to go beyond the obvious, to go to what for me is the context of thought and
action.
10 I was in school in Pune in the early 1940s. Gandhi, when not in jail would hold prayer
meetings that we as budding nationalists made a point to attend. One evening I took my
autograph album to the meeting and with much trepidation requested Gandhi to sign
in it.  (There were no mobile phones in those days or else I  might have asked for a
selfie). He signed in the book and when handing it back to me asked me why I was
wearing a silk salvar-kameez, adding that I should only wear khadi. I readily agreed and
assured him that I would do so. But what did khadi mean other than its being a kind of
textile,  and  in  some  way  symbolic  of  Gandhi’s  ideas?  This  question  remained
unanswered  until  many  years  later  when,  searching  for  the  context,  I  began  to
comprehend the meaning of satyagraha –and not just the concept but how it became
relevant to anti-colonial nationalism, and even more important for me, as to how and
why it did resonate with the many who participated in the national movement. Without
this resonance, it would have remained just a slogan. The events of the 1940s had their
own message. The Quit India call  resounded in every corner and was the subject of
much debate. The mutiny of the naval ratings of the Royal Indian Navy was about to
happen.  Independence was  imminent  and the form of  the future  was  enveloped in
discussion. One obvious question was related to the kind of society we aspired to –how
would a colony be transformed into a secular democracy? Another significant question
was the assertion of our identity as Indians –no longer subjects of the colonial power
but  free  citizens.  There  was  talk  that  as  free  citizens  we  would  now  have  a  new
relationship with the state –a state of our making. The constitution was in a sense the
covenant between the citizen and the state. It documented the rights and obligations of
each towards the other. Hovering over all these questions were those concerning the
methods that we had used to attain independence and whether they would continue.
We kept hearing that what marked our movement as distinctive was the concept of
satyagraha.
11 Over  the  years,  I  have  asked  myself  why  this  concept  became  such  a  bed-rock
specifically in Indian anti-colonial nationalism. As was to be expected, it failed to find a
place in the two religious nationalisms –the Hindu and the Muslim. These religious
nationalisms converted the two religions into political agencies –the Muslim League
supporting an Islamic state and the Hindutva version of Hinduism becoming the base
for  a  Hindu  Rashtra.  In  this,  the  chickens  of  the  colonial  interpretation  of  Indian
history and culture have come home to roost.
 
III. Religion
12 To try and understand the context, let me go back a little in time and briefly trace the
flow of some ideas that I would regard as foundational to Indian civilisation. These had
a noticeable presence in Indian society for two millennia.  This  might suggest  some
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worthwhile connections with more recent ideas. It stems in part from the way in which
we in modern times have projected the role of religion in India.
13 In the last two centuries, Indian religions have been reconstructed largely along the
lines suggested by colonial scholarship. This was seldom challenged and therefore came
to be accepted. The focus has been on belief, ritual and religious texts with little space
being given to analysing the social concerns of these religions. What form does it take
and  how  might  this  have  differed  from  the  cultural  articulation  of  other  major
religions: the discussion of Indian religions demands this space.
14 When  a  religious  teaching  acquires  a  following,  it  establishes  institutions  that  are
initially  places  of  worship  –chaityas,  viharas,  mandirs,  mathas,  masjids,  madrassas, 
gurdwaras,  churches.  Gradually as its  control  over society increases,  the institutions
that  it  establishes  take  up  social  functions  and  these  become  agencies  of  its
propagation.  Educational  institutions  are  probably  the  most  obvious.  At  this  point,
ideological support or opposition becomes a matter of asserting domination. This can
be met by acceptance from some and dissent and disagreement from others. The latter
can take the form of protest. We do not know enough about the reaction of sections of
society to religious ideas, and especially if the ideas become influential.
15 Religions in India have generally not been monolithic, and especially not so in their
practice. Religion is articulated more often in the form of a range of juxtaposed sects,
some  marginally  linked  with  others  and  some  distant.  In  pre-modern  times,  the
religion of a person was identified more often by sect or caste and less frequently by an
over-arching label.
16 The 19th century reading of Indian religion bonded together a large number of sects
and  included  them  under  a  few  labels.  Thus  Hinduism  included  Buddhists,  Jainas,
Charvakas, Sikhs and others, some of which were born out of opposition to Hindu belief
and  worship.  The  middle-class  interest  in  religion  was  confined  to  its  own  social
boundaries, virtually unconcerned with the religions of what we call Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Interest in the religion of these avarnas,
those outside castes,  was casual  and of  little  importance.  Hinduism emerged as the
religion of the largest number, of the majority, in the sub-continent. Minority religions
had smaller numbers. Included under the label of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, etc. was a range
of beliefs and rituals, not all of which were uniformly observed within the same label.
17 Religion  was  not  understood  in  terms  of  sects  and  their  inter-connections  but  as
conglomerations  of  sects,  treated  as  monolithic  religions.  The  search  was  for
uniformities. Nor was it recognised that religions everywhere have their adherents but
also  those  who  question  the  belief  and  practice.  In  some  religions,  a  serious
contradiction in belief and practice has been resolved by a change in its code and creed.
However, a characteristic difference in Indian religions is that opposed or divergent
opinions are not violently suppressed in each case.  Buddhism when it  could not be
suppressed was exiled. Dissenting opinions to this day can evolve into marginal sects
that can find an almost unnoticed place in the spectrum of religious sects. One of the
consequences of this is that the contrary opinion is neither assimilated nor rejected but
remains an articulation of dissent.
18 Sects shape the nature of Indian religions. Each incorporates a range of sects, some of
which are proximate to the orthodoxy and some are far removed from it. Belief can be
accommodative, going beyond those forms of religion where identity demands a strict
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adherence to code and creed. I am not suggesting that such an identity is absent, but
rather that it  has not been the dominant form of religion for the larger number of
people.  This may now be changing.  Hence the easy mixing of religious observances
until recently, when all religious festivals were open to everyone, barring of course the
Dalits.  This  militates  against  a  unified,  monolithic  religious  structure.  Why  this
happened  in  India  may  have  many  explanations  but  the  most  obvious  could  have
resulted from the interface of religion with caste and with region. Such a structure of
religion assumes the shading off from orthodoxy at the core and dissenting sects at the
periphery. Some degree of dissent is characteristic of Indian religion.
 
IV. Dissent
19 Dissent  took  various  forms.  It  is  described  in  the  early  pattern  of  philosophical
argument. Dissenting opinions are necessary if theories are to be tested and advanced.
The  presence  of  the  dissenter  was  acknowledged,  and  in  more  sophisticated
discussions, it has a definitive place in the argument. Indian philosophy recommends a
procedure. The argument has first to state as fully and correctly as possible the views of
the  opponent  –the  purvapaksha.  Then  follow  the  views  of  the  proponent  –the
pratipaksha.  After this comes the debate and a possible resolution or siddhanta.  This
would  have  been  the  pattern  in  the  many debates  between the  Buddhists  and  the
Brahmanas referred to in texts.
20 Since early times historical  references to dharma in India mention two parallel  and
distinctively  different  dharmas, that  of  the  Brahmanas and  that  of  the  Shramanas.
Scholars have given the collective name of Shramanism to the many heterodox sects
such as the Buddhists, Jainas, Ajivikas, and some include the Charvakas. These were the
dissident sects that were in disagreement with the fundamentals of Vedic Brahmanism
and later Hinduism. They denied the Vedic deities, the divine revelation of the texts,
and the ritual of sacrifice. Brahman texts refer to the Shramanas as the nastikas,  the
non-believers.
21 The Shramana dharmas focused on social ethics. This was expressed in their absolute
commitment to ahimsa/non-violence, to compassion, and to working towards the social
good. Social ethics were not absent in Brahmanism but became increasingly ambivalent
with the control of caste laws. As the Gita states, violence is legitimate for the kshatriya
since he is the ruler and can use it to protect society.
22 For the first few centuries up to the Christian era, Buddhist and Jaina sects had a well-
respected  social  presence and  received  royal  and  elite  patronage.  This  however
changed when in the post-Gupta period Brahmanism came to dominate the political
scene. By medieval times, Buddhism had been exiled from India and became a powerful
religion in Asia. Jainism was limited to western India and parts of the peninsula. In
colonial times almost all non-Muslim sects were labeled as Hindu, even those that were
not.
23 The dissenting ideas of the Shramanas were expressed in part by their opting out of
society. They created or joined Shramana sects, and lived in monasteries setting up a
lifestyle that was alternate to established society. As monks, they conformed to various
identities  according  to  their  sect.  The  monasteries  as  institutions  flourished  on
handsome royal  donations,  on  grants  from merchant  donors  and support  from lay
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followers.  These  lay  followers  were  those  for  whom  renunciation  may  have  been
unattainable but nevertheless was the ultimate ideal.
 
V. Renunciation
24 Renunciation should not be confused with asceticism. The true samnyasi undergoes his
funeral rituals declaring himself dead to family and social connections and goes away
to live in solitude seeking wisdom through meditation and searching for a release from
rebirth. It is a moot point whether Gandhi can properly be called an ascetic. To suggest
that he was influenced by the philosophy of the renouncers would seem to be more
accurate, and that is what I would like to argue.
25 Let me try and explain what I mean by the renouncers. There were two streams of
religious ideas and forms on the Indian landscape in the period from the 4th century
BC, a period of major debates.  The two are repeatedly referred to as Brahmana and
Shramana in various sources, and said to be distinctly different in thought and activity.
The Greek visitor to Mauryan India at that time, Megasthenes, in his observations of
India refers to two groups –the Brachmanes and the Sarmanes. The edicts of the Mauryan
Emperor Ashoka have many references to bahmanam-samanam, a compound term for
the sects. The grammarian of Sanskrit, Patanjali, when referring to dharma mentions
only the two, the Brahmanas and the Shramanas, and compares their relationship to that
between the snake and the mongoose.
26 The  early  Puranas demonstrate  this  antagonism  in  their  hostile  remarks  on  the
Shramanas.  In  the 11th century AD,  Al-Biruni  speaks at  length about the Brahmana
religion and also mentions those that oppose it as the Sammaniyas. Then came a series
of sects –the Bhakti sants of a range of Vaishnava and Shaiva persuasions, the Sufis, the
Sikhs, among many others of diverse opinions, whose views on the interface of religion
and society were not supportive of  orthodoxy.  They did however eventually evolve
their own orthodoxies.
27 Few founded renunciatory orders but their dissent was directed to what they found
confining both in religious belief and its interface with social norms. The dissent of the
renouncers, although it took a different form, was in diverse ways continued by the
Bhakti sants, especially in their concern about social ethics. The views of Kabir, Dadu
and Ravidas underlined the need for social  justice.  We tend to set this aside in the
single-minded focus on religious worship. Historically therefore, it is evident that there
was  a  duality  in  religious  beliefs  in  pre-modern  India,  with  some  sects  clearly
dissenting from established views.
28 As  part  of  the  religious  experience,  renunciation  became  a  parallel  stream  to  the
orthodox, ritual-based patterns of religious expression –until a time when it developed
its own. Religious institutions mushroomed through the patronage of the elite, as is
evident from the agraharas, mathas and rich temples of the late first millennium AD. But
where religion had a more accessible form, often through the teaching of a variety of
renouncers  and  Bhakti  teachers,  it  was  these  sects  that  were  closer  to  the  larger
population.  This  becomes apparent  from folk  literature and the mythology of  local
deities. The familiar figures are still present among us as sadhus, yogis, faqirs and more.
Renunciation of various kinds seems to represent something of a continuing counter-
culture from earlier times.
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29 Since renunciation questioned the dharma-shastra rules central to Brahmanism, it was
open to all. The alternate society did not arise out of a violent social revolution but
envisaged the social change that it advocated as coming from a process of osmosis. It
was essentially a way of stating and legitimising dissent by persuading people to its
ways of thinking, with an emphasis on social ethics and freedom in religious belief. This
was out of choice and not from the enforcing of a variant code. The act of opting out of
society and taking on the hardship of renunciation in order to search for release from
rebirth,  and to  ensure  the  social  good,  imbued renouncers  with  a  degree  of  moral
authority in the eyes of people at large. Social equality and justice were demands that
dissented  from  established  religion.  Dissent  is  not  a  necessary  component  of
renunciation, but in the act of renouncing it is present either more or less.
 
VI. Non-violent protest
30 Foremost  in  the  ethical  code  of  such  sects  was  abjuring  violence  of  any  kind.  The
concept  of  ahimsa as  physical  violence  is  variously  discussed  and  continues  to  be
discussed. Is non-violence tied to bodily needs that might discourage violence? What
was consumed as food therefore was important to some, for whom the diet had to be
vegetarian. Fasting was a form of bodily purification and control. This could sometimes
be taken to the point of its programming the moment of death, as in the Jaina notion of
sallekhana –the graduated fast  that ends with death.  But undertaking a fast  even to
death for personal reasons was not the same as a fast in support of social protest.
31 The  articulation  of  protest  took  diverse  forms  in  different  societies.  Unlike  China,
where peasant revolts of a violent kind were known, in India, peasant protest in earlier
times resorted to migrating away from the kingdom to a neighbouring kingdom where
land and facilities were available. We are told that rulers of the original kingdom feared
such migrations resulting in a loss of revenue. This was effective in rural areas where
migration meant cultivating new lands.
32 Urban protests took different forms, one that was included in the repertoire of Gandhi.
It was known by various names, one among which was dharna. Its success lay in its
being undertaken by a particular body of people –the charan, bhat, or bharot. These were
bards, regarded as repositories of knowledge crucial to legitimising the power of the
ruler.  This  is  another  instance  of  people  investing  authority  not  in  an  officially
designated person but someone viewed as respected and integral to society. Today with
social change, they no longer perform their earlier functions, but recognising their role
gives a glimpse of how societies functioned not so long ago.
33 These bards had some functions that were essential to power. They maintained the
descent  lists  –the  genealogies–  of  the  rulers  and  occasionally  of  the  important
functionaries, through which they became the keepers of the history of the dynasty.
They legitimised the dynasty through a claim to genealogical history. The bard had to
insist that the descent lists were accurate else he would lose face, as also would the
ruler. The status of those in authority was asserted by the charan through alluding to
the believed historical evidence of clan and caste. The charans had a low social status,
but since early times were inviolate, and were called upon to arbitrate in disputes.
34 Authority is  of  various kinds.  In some situations,  moral  authority takes precedence
over the political. It goes with the belief that a particular kind of person being what he
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is and does, has moral authority. The charan would take up the protest of the subjects of
a  raja,  once  he  was  convinced  of  its  legitimacy.  To  support  the  protest,  he  would
position himself at the threshold of the royal residence, refusing to go away, and go on
a hunger strike until there was a resolution of the conflict or alternatively the nearness
of  his  death  by  voluntary  starvation. It  was  effective  only  if  the  person  fasting
commanded moral authority and was respected by both rulers and subjects. His power
was intangible, but based on this respect. His protest was legitimate if it focused on a
demand for justice. If the charan lost his life owing to the fast, the ruler was doomed.
That the fast carried a severe threat was feared. To use the fast both as an expression of
dissent and as a moral threat was not unknown in earlier forms of registering protest.
The fast subsumed the protest and diverted it from becoming violent.
35 Can one see here parallels to the use of the fast by Gandhi? The British Raj may not
have admitted it publicly but each of his fasts was a matter of anxiety to their political
control, he being the leading nationalist. The title of mahatma in turn recognised his
moral  authority  with  the  people.  The  fast  was  a  protest  against  injustice  but  also
carried a grave threat should it have taken its toll. This was understood by all.
 
VII. Satyagraha
36 But let me turn to that which is of greater interest. Dissent to various degrees was at
the core of the renunciatory tradition. Can we then ask whether Gandhi’s satyagraha
drew from this tradition, either consciously or subconsciously? And more central to my
argument is  that this  feature may have encouraged the massive public  response to
satyagraha. Is this a link between the essence of Shramana renunciation and the central
focus of Gandhi’s satyagraha?
37 This concept drew from the ideas of the authors he read and wrote about and these
have been much discussed: Tolstoy, Thoreau, and Ruskin in particular. There has been
an interest in his conversations with Raichandbhai, with whom he discussed the Jaina
religion, as he would also have done with his mother who was a Jaina, not to mention
many others  in Gujarat.  My concern is  with trying to understand what it  was that
struck a public chord in this seemingly unusual form of protest.
38 I would like to suggest that apart from his obvious sources, he also drew instinctively
from the presence of dissenters that have shaped Indian thought and action almost
invisibly but most creatively, and throughout history. Much has been said about his
reading of the Gita and his ascetic ways. Perhaps the influence from the alternative
cultural patterns of the past may have had a deeper although less apparent imprint
than we have realised. The Gita after all was countering other points of view. Did the
form  of  and  justification  for  satyagraha delve  deeper  into  the  past  tradition  of
expressing dissent?
39 The parallels  are  noticeable.  To  be  an  effective  satyagrahi a  period  of  training  was
preferred, although there were exceptions. There is mention of some taking vows and
consenting  to  observe  certain  rules.  Once  accepted,  the  discipline  of  living  in  the
ashrama was reasonably strict. Satyagraha was not a monastic order, nevertheless it had
its own rules, relationships and identity. Gandhi himself was demanding and firm even
about rules relating to routine living.
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40 To  assert  a  greater  moral  force,  it  was  preferable  that  the  satyagrahi be  celibate,
although  this  was  not  insisted  upon.  Protest  included  the  non-violent  swadeshi
movement –the boycott of foreign goods, especially cloth. This was a part of the civil
disobedience  movement  that  had  much  broader  concerns.  Objections  to  mill-made
cloth  and  the  wearing  of  khadi,  was  not  intended  as  a  Luddite  movement,  but  as
registering another form of dissent and explaining why it was necessary.
41 Some symbols of renunciation also surface. Underlying satyagraha is the force of moral
authority  –soul  force,  as  it  came  to  be  known,  of  the  person  calling  for  civil
disobedience– in a sense echoing what also gave authority to renouncers of various
kinds,  and in  diverse  ways.  That  Gandhi  was  named  a  mahatma, an  honour  that
interestingly he did not reject, can be viewed as, in part, his recognition of his moral
authority.  Equally  important,  a  crucial  requirement  of  satyagraha was  to  refrain
completely  from  using  brute  force  or  violence.  Non-violence  faced  two  kinds  of
opposition:  the  colonial  power  that  continued  its  violence  against  nationalist
protestors; and those Indians in authority who were not convinced of its effectiveness
in directing protest.
42 The commitment to non-violence and truth drew in the idea of tolerance. All religions
were to be equally respected. This came from satyagraha not having a singular religious
identity, although one religion was perhaps more equal than others. However, there
was a moral right to break the law if it caused wide-spread suffering. But who had the
right  to  judge?  Was  Gandhi  assuming  the  right  strengthened  by  being  called  a
mahatma?  The  dilemma  becomes  more  acute  if  one  accepts  what  I  call  contingent
ahimsa  of  the Gita,  that  where evil  prevails  it  can be fought  with violence.  Yet  the
satyagrahi tried to persuade the other to his view in non-violent ways and through a
system where the means and the ends are not contradictory. Persuasion is a reminder
of the original semi-dialectical philosophical argument as is the non-violent resolution
of conflict.
43 A more complicated issue was present not only in the practice of satyagraha but also in
the functioning of different groups. This was the question of the equality of all castes
including the outcastes.  Did  the equal  status  of  all  castes  as  frequently  maintained
among dissenting sects apply to both the varna and avarna members of society or only
to the former? How was the hierarchy to be countered in practice? Gandhi tried but to
little effect. The actions of one’s previous life karma determine one’s birth in this life, as
many  sects  maintained.  But  if  these  activities  are  prescribed  in  the  dharma-shastra
codes, then the codes would have to be discarded if the hierarchy is to be annulled.
44 The Shramana sects claimed that the monasteries did not observe caste. On a wider
social scale,  it  was some of the Bhakti sants who opposed caste as is  evident in the
teachings of Ravidas. Gandhi tried to obviate the distinction by maintaining that the
demeaning jobs of the avarnas should be done by the varnas as well. But this was not
effective  in  challenging  caste  that  by  now  had  many  other  ramifications  needing
attention. Unlike the renouncer, the satyagrahi was not required to set aside his caste
identity.
45 That satyagraha had an appeal is evident from the large numbers that responded when
the call was given for civil disobedience. We have to ask what went into the making of
this form of defiance. Could there have been an echo of the persistence of dissent that
still surfaced when injustice was experienced? It galvanised national sentiment, but it
also diverted this sentiment away from violent revolution, when it came to channelling
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it into protest. This was true to type as such movements even in the past steered away
from violent revolution. In the colonial situation, satyagraha forced both the protestors
and the authority against whom they were protesting –be it over salt, or cloth, or the
freedom of a people– to give the protest visibility. It underlined a claim to status by the
colonised by fore-fronting moral authority against colonial power. This was outside the
experience of the coloniser.
 
VIII. Gandhi and the Bhagvad-Gita
46 Curiously  Gandhi,  in  his  readings,  lists  little  that  goes  back  to  the  texts  of  the
Shramanas. His formal interest in such sources seems marginal, especially compared to
his intensive study of the Bhagvad-Gita. However, that satyagraha could envelop dissent
rather than violent protest suggests that these ideas did have a presence, and could
continue. Given the complexities of thought, society and politics, in the first half of the
20th century in India, to suggest that a major player on the scene may have held on to
the  truth  of  some  forms  of  dissent  from  the  Indian  past,  and  used  them  almost
instinctively to recreate a new form of dissent, may not be pure speculation.
47 It would seem that Gandhi’s endorsement of the Gita was a seeming contradiction of the
insistence on non-violence in satyagraha. The translation he chose to read frequently –
apart from the Gujarati– was curiously the English translation by Edwin Arnold, The
Song  Celestial, published  in  1885.  Its  potential  as  being  the  single  sacred  book  of
Hinduism, the equivalent of the Bible and the Quran was being discussed. If treated as
such, it would have to be viewed as the location of the teachings of many sects.
48 The Gita and the additions to it are thought to date to around the turn of the Christian
era. It surfaced in a big way in the 19th century and rode the European Orientalist wave
that was searching for the wisdom of the East. The Theosophists adopted it as their
central  text  and  gave  it  wide  diffusion.  Inevitably  many  Indians  wrote  on  it  as  a
representative  text.  Many  saw  it  as  an  allegory,  and  this  excluded  questions  of
historicity. W. B. Yeats, T. S. Eliot and Christopher Isherwood, all flirted with its ideas.
It could be argued that it was attractive to Gandhi because it emphasised nishkama-
karma/non-attachment,  a  necessary  component  of  satyagraha.  Its  appropriation  by
many  nationalists  was  possible  because  it  could  be  used  to  endorse  even  violent
political action as the duty of those fighting for rightful demands and justice. If colonial
rule was evil, then violence against it was justified. This justification could be drawn
from  such  action  in  past  centuries,  except  of  course  that  it  would  seem  to  cast
something of a shadow on the validity of satyagraha.
49 What is perhaps curious is that the focus in relation to the question of violence and
political action should have been so centred on interpreting the Gita. It seems to me
that there is a far more challenging text in the twelfth book of the Shanti Parva of the
Mahabharata that focuses precisely on this subject and with less ambiguity. Subsequent
to the battle at Kurushetra, Yudhisthira was expected to take up the kingship, but he
refused initially to do so, rejecting this demand and in protest preferring to go to the
forest. His objection to ruling was because kingship involves many levels of violence
and he was averse to these.
50 He asked how any war can be called dharmic when it is the duty of the kshatriya to kill
others where need be? War is evil because it kills so many and this killing cannot be
justified.  His  grandfather  Bhishma  still  lying  on  a  bed  of  arrows  from  the  battle,
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justified killing in a war and by the ruler defending the realm. This is a fine example of
dissent explored through debate. Yudhisthira eventually agreed and I like to think he
did so with a very heavy heart.
51 The Gita’s position is one of contingent ahimsa, that is, that violence is resorted to when
conditions demand it. This was opposed by the Shraman for whom ahimsa was absolute.
Yudhisthira has a moral  and ethical  objection to violence.  The debate reflected the
discussions on violence at this time as suggested by the sources I have quoted, and was
probably enhanced by the views of the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka in support of ahimsa.
This has been argued by a number of scholars of the Mahabharata. Was the centrality of
ahimsa in this conversation a concession to Shramanic thought?
52 Buddhism  had  been  exiled  from  India  some  centuries  prior  to  the  20th.  But  other
Shramana  sects  such  as  those  of  the  Jainas  were  preaching  ahimsa.  Unlike  Nehru,
Gandhi had a perfunctory interest in Buddhism. Nor was he particularly interested in a
sequential  study  of  the  past.  History,  it  would  seem,  was  not  a  subject  of  great
intellectual interest for Gandhi.
53 That  there  were  violent  protests  and  intolerant  actions  as  part  of  our  past  is
undeniable. That there were also legitimate traditions of non-violent dissent has to be
conceded. The forms of the latter changed in conformity with a changing society and
we have to recognise the forms and how they were used and when. Gandhi created new
forms  of  dissent.  Yudhisthira’s  implications  of  political  violence  argued  that  when
religious  ideas  and  implications  become  agencies  of  political  mobilisation,  their
fundamental  purpose  changes  and  the  political  and  social  determine  thoughts  and
actions. The right to dissent has continued. In fact, it has been highlighted precisely by
the coming of the nation-state in our history. It remains open to the citizen immersed
in the ideology of secular democratic nationalism to articulate the new relationship of
citizen to state, by reiterating the rights of the citizen, by asserting the right to dissent.
INDEX
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1 Asianism (Ajiashugi アジア主義), a set of ideas defining Japan’s relations with Asia, has
been used as a concept to organise the narrative of modern Japanese history. This set of
ideas was deployed both to explain Japan’s exceptional past and chart its future as the
liberator of Asian countries from Western domination, set to help them develop into
modern states. Asianism is often invoked in contrast to the idea of “expelling Asia” but,
in fact, Japan was emphasizing both its equivalence with the West while marking its
difference  with  Asia.  It  was  only  by  “expelling  Asia”  that  it  was  possible  to  define
Asianism. Japan would remake Asia on an Asian universalism inspired by Japan’s past.
The basis of an Asian community, sometimes seen as united by ancient philosophies
and  traditions,  at  other  times  justified  because  of  Japan’s  advanced  level  of
development, was variously conceived and debated in Japan, but Asianism as a concept
provided legitimacy and became the organising principle for Japan’s colonial control in
Asia. It served the purpose of providing bonds of unity to hold a disparate and growing
colonial empire, underlining Japan’s uniqueness and providing a conceptual basis for
knowledge production to write a different past and declare a new future.1
2 There is  a vast,  and growing, body of literature on Asianism that has reshaped our
understanding of Japanese history, but does Asianism as a way of understanding the
motivations  of  intellectuals,  political  activists,  or  government  bureaucrats  obscure
more than it illuminates? Asianism as a concept forces us into framing questions which
lead  to  a  binary  position  based  on  imaginary  geographies  muting  and  distorting
ideological positions so that they fit into its template. In this paper, I take two very
different cases of Japanese interactions with Asia but situate them in the context of
their larger objectives. The first case alludes to the period before Asianism had cohered
- the experience of Buddhists in India -,  and the second relates to the period when
Asianism was the official  ideology.  I  look at  the travel  writings of  the poet Kaneko
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Mitsuharu 金子光晴 (1895-1975) in Southeast Asia and China to show the meaning of
his  experience  and  the  way  it  shaped  his  thinking.  I  use  these  two  very  different
periods  to  think  about  Japanese  interactions  within  Asia  and  illustrate  how  these
encounters shaped ideas about countries in Asia and its people. I argue that it is not
productive  to  conceive  of  these  ideas  and  interactions  within  the  framework  of
Asianism. These interactions show affinities as well as differences with the concept of
Asianism,  and  go  beyond  it  to  question  and  resist  Asianism  as  an  ideology.  The
tendency to use Japan and Asia as two well-defined poles for analysing the Japanese
past  obscures  the  ways  in  which  these  were  evolving  and  changing  sets  of ideas.
Asianism, as it became a concept, was deployed to read back and create a history where
the foundational text became a newspaper article written by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭
吉  (1835-1901),  and he in turn the iconic moderniser. The article,  “An Argument to
Expel  Asia”  (Datsu-A-ron 脱亜論 ) called  for  Japan  to  abandon  its  Asian  links  and
embrace a Western future.2
3 The writings of the 19th century exhibit a melange of ideas and reactions, sometimes
contradictory as they describe places and encounters with people and ideas. They do
not begin to exhibit the uniformity that would come later. These writings provide a
way of thinking about the ways in which Japanese conceptions of self and nation were
being framed not in cultural binaries of “Japanese” and the “other”, but shaped by a
desire to learn, assimilate and understand the new world they were encountering, both
outside and within. These views evolved and developed taking different trajectories but
were always located within the global geo-political power structure and the knowledge
that it produced.
 
I. The emergence of Asianism
4 The word Asianism (Ajiashugi アジア主義) was first used in 1916-17 by Kodera Kenkichi
小寺謙吉 (1877-1949) in The Argument for a Great Asia (Dai ajia ron). The basic premise of
Kodera’s Asianism was that similarities of culture, race, and geographical proximity
bound East Asia together. Asianism, as it emerges, is a geographical unity but of East
Asia  as  a  cultural  and  racial  unit  that  can  be  politically  unified  under  Japan’s
leadership.3
5 The political  project of confronting the Western dominated international order was
intellectually supported in different ways. The idea of a shared culture and a writing
system led many to publish their work in Chinese so that it could be read across East
Asia,  but  there  were  other  ways  to  define  this  unity.  Scholars  such  as Shinmei
Masamichi 新明正道  (1898-1984) and Kada Tetsuji  加田哲二  (1895-1964) based their
support for an East Asian Community (Tōa kyodōtai 東亜共同体) on theories of society
and social progress. They argued that a new intellectual order must be based on the
spirit of science (kagaku seishin 科学精神) and it was the responsibility of larger ethnic
groupings that had a historically progressive character to assist the progress of smaller
and  more  backward  ethnic  groups,  leaving  place  for  expanding  the  imagined
community.4
6 The discourse of Asianism gained traction precisely in this period when the colonised
were questioning their subordination and the Japanese ideas of Asianism carried an
appeal. Central to the definition of Japanese Asianism was the issue of modernity and
culture and how to overcome Western dominance. It provided a way to frame Japan’s
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position as a leading nation of the region and legitimise its control and domination.
Asianism provided a framework that allowed the incorporation of different territories
and people without claiming homogeneity but also allowed for commonalities unlike
the basis of Western colonial power. Japan’s colonies became “outer lands (gaichi 外
地)”, the outer territories only distinguished by the space they occupied. Yet even as
bonds of unity were declaimed, the Japanese language and names were imposed and
Japanese culture and political control overrode the rhetoric of sameness. 
7 Economic interests were also integral to the areas that Japan focused on when talking
of  Asianism.  In  the  1910s,  Japan’s  economic  and  business  interests  increased  in
Southeast Asia, and the Association of the Southern Sea (Nanyō kyōkai 南洋恊会) was
established. In 1919, the first use of Southeast Asia (Tōnan ajia 東南アジア) appeared in
a textbook. 
8 The government was still trying to allay Western fears of the “yellow peril”, but once
Japan had revised the unequal treaties and was recognised as an equal by the Western
powers,  it  proclaimed  an  Asian  Monroe  Doctrine.  Economic  interests  and  political
power  strengthened  the  organisational  and  ideological  consolidation  of  Asianism.
Kodera supported the ideas of Okawa Shumei who formed the All Asia Society (Zen ajia
kai  全アジア会)  in  1917.  Now the  government  played  a  greater  role  hosting  many
conferences bringing together leaders from Japan’s Asian world, the first in Nagasaki
(1926), followed by Shanghai (1927), Dairen (Dalian in Chinese, 1934), and the Greater
East Asia Conference (1943) in Tokyo which was called to counter the Atlantic Charter
(1941, U.S and Britain). 
9 These developments led to the New Greater East Asian Order (Tōa shinchitsujo 東亜新秩
序, 1938) which was expanded to include Southeast Asia in 1940. This idea of Greater
East Asia (Daitōa 大東亜) underlined Japan’s belief in its role as leader of Asia but with
the defeat in WWII this idea was marginalised for a while. 
 
II. Japan’s discovery of Asia
10 In the mid-19th century before Asianism had emerged, the intellectual environment
was very different from the early 20th century when Japan had ended the unequal
treaties  and become an  equal  to  the  Western  powers.  Japanese  thinking  about  the
region was a product of two strands of influence. One, the ideas and views of the world
that were learnt from Europe over a long period as knowledge of the outside world
filtered in through Dutch translations.  These revealed a new knowledge,  notably in
introducing Western military and medical ideas that played a powerful role in shaping
ideas about science and superiority of Western thought. But it was through the Dutch
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11 Here  we  can  see  how  Nishikawa  Joken  西川如見  (1648-1724),  astronomer  and
geographer, describes the countries of the world and their inhabitants using images
from Western literature. Writing about countries in Southeast Asia, he differentiated
between those who were part of the Chinese ecumene (who, for instance, ate rice and
used chopsticks), and those who were not.5 He could find affinity with those who were
part of the larger Chinese cultural sphere, but the wider world was now being viewed
through a Western lens.
12 The  Japanese  also  learnt  about  the  fast  changing  world  from the  Chinese.  Chinese
writings, and their reaction to the pressures of Western colonial expansion, brought
alive the immediacy of the dangers Japan faced. The colonisation of India, the Opium
wars and the Taiping rebellion in China were seen as warnings of what could happen to
Japan. The news of these battles spurred ideas of self-defence, changes in military and
social organisation and led to the end of the Tokugawa and the establishment of the
Meiji government to meet the challenge of preserving Japan. The fear of becoming a
“failed state” (bōkoku 亡国) exercised a powerful influence on both the political leaders
as well as the people at large, forcing a re-examination of what it meant to be Japanese
in relation to China and India (Tenjiku 天竺) within a world dominated by Western
powers.
 
III. Okakura Tenshin: a plural Asia
13 Okakura Kazukō 岡倉覚三 or Tenshin 天心 (1862-1913) was a cultural bureaucrat who
played a key role in shaping intellectual debates about the idea of Asia in Japan, and
about how Japan was perceived in the Western world. He linked Japan to its neighbours
in myriad ways and argued that building on these historical connections was a way to
create a modern, and culturally and politically strong nation. Later, Asianism would
extract the slogan, “Asia is One” from his more complex and contradictory writings. His
ideas were also used in ways that  he may not have intended.6 Here,  I  just  want to
indicate the main thrust of his approach to provide a context for the ways Buddhist
monks engaged with India. 
14 Okakura Tenshin’s writings were an early attempt at defining Asia in relation to Japan’s
past; Japan’s relationship with Asia became the key to understanding Japan’s history
and its present.7 Asia, for Okakura, was both the colonial order and the possibilities of
resistance to that order. Just as Japan’s past was linked to its relationship with Asia,
Japan’s successful transition to modernity pointed the way for the liberation of Asia.
15 Okakura is famous for his declaration that Asia is one, but he conceived it as composed
of three major components defined by religion: Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. The
unity of Asia was however broken by the Mongol conquest in the 13th century when,
according to Okakura, Buddhism was exterminated and Hinduism persecuted.8 This, he
argues,  was  a  terrible  blow as  Islam created  a  barrier  between  China  and  India,  a
barrier  greater  than  the  Himalayas  that  severed  the wonderful  world  of
communication.9 In China there was “no complete fusion of the Manchu and Chinese”10
and  India  was  divided,  so  that  “movements  against  the  Mohammedan  tyrants,  for
example the Mahrattas and Sikhs,  cannot crystallise  into ‘a  universal  expression of
patriotism’”.11
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16 How did he explain Japan’s strength and the reasons why it alone could represent Asia?
For him, Japan was historically in a unique position as Japan’s “Indo-Tartaric blood was
itself a heritage which qualified it to imbibe from two sources, and so mirrors the whole
of Asian consciousness.”12 Japan was Asia distilled.
17 Okakura also argued that Japan’s unique position derived from the Imperial house and
the  unbroken  lineage  from  the  first  emperor,  grandson  of  the  Sun  Goddess.  Two
elements, the Imperial house and a protected insularity, allowed Japan to preserve the
traditions of Asia, and made Japan into a “museum of Asiatic civilisation”.13 While in
other Asian countries traditions had been destroyed, Japan was able to preserve these
because of the “spirit of living Advaitism which welcomes the new without losing the
old”.14
18 “The task of Asia today”, he writes, “then becomes that of protecting and restoring
Asiatic  modes.  But  to  do  this  she  must  successfully  recognise  and  develop
consciousness of these modes.”15 Okakura defines these modes in the following manner:
for India, the religious life is the essence of nationality, China is a moral civilisation,
and Japan has the spiritual purity of the sword soul. He writes, “in our history lies the
secret  of  our  future”.16 Here  Okakura  is  essentialising  the  countries  much  like  the
Western colonial view. He sees Buddhism as uniting Asia but curiously does not engage
with what Buddhist monks were doing at that time.
 
IV. Buddhist networks and the rediscovery of Tenjiku
19 Shaku Sōen 尺初演 (1860-1919),  a Zen priest,  travelled to Ceylon in 1887,  where he
spent three years learning Theravada Buddhism. Unusually, he sought to bring back
Southern  Buddhism  which  was  largely  ignored  by  the  mainstream  of  Japanese
Buddhists. He served as a priest with the army during the Russo-Japanese war 1904-05,
and was an active supporter of the war. The war, while admired in Asia as showing that
the Western powers could be defeated, was criticized widely by Japanese intellectuals
as serving the interests of the elites.17 These Buddhist priests were part of a network
that included both Sri Lankans and Europeans, such as Col. Henry Olcott (1832-1907)
and Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933),  both of  whom made several  trips  to  Japan.
These  interactions,  as  well  as  those  between  European  scholars  of  Asia  and  of
Buddhism, were creating new links and shaping Buddhism. 18
20 Okakura does not refer to this literature and makes no mention of the debates within
the religious groups that were socially and politically important. This, despite the fact
that  Okakura  does  not  see  Buddhism  as  just  an  import from  China,  but  rather  a
religious-cultural  system  that  links  Japan  to  India,  and  other  parts  of  Asia.  It  was
transmitted, he writes, through “a loving world of communication, travellers, pilgrims,
and traders [who] carried the common culture back and forth.”19 
21 Okakura  was  both  a  key  figure  in  shaping  ideas  about  Asia  in  Japan  as  well  an
interpreter of Japan to the West. The contradictions, or the way his ideas about Japan
and Asia were used after his death, do not detract from the powerful impact they had
during  his  lifetime,  and  continue  to  have  today.  His  ideas  about  art,  culture  and
imaginings of a new Asia are different from the concept of Asianism as it emerged in
the post-WWI world. 
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22 The opening line of “The Ideals of the East” is “Asia is one”, but he goes on to argue
that Asia was two. Namely, the Asia that was subjugated by the West and the Asia that
had not been subjugated and preserved its culture and autonomy. It is the challenge
that new Asia faces, as he writes in the concluding sentence of the book: “If the victory
does not come from within, then there is only death from the power of the outside”.
23 It  is  in  this  international  and intellectual  environment  that  the  motivations  of  the
Buddhists who travelled to India to visit the sacred sites associated with the Buddha
can be understood.  They were not  tourists  or  travellers  searching for  the new and
exotic,  but  pilgrims.  Yet  they,  and  their  Buddhism,  were  being  shaped  by  modern
nationalism and so they saw themselves on the frontlines of the battle against Western
imperial  domination.  As  members  of  a  colonial  empire  they saw India,  as  a  “dying
nation”, materially weak, and because of that, spiritually emasculated. This thinking
re-enforced their  belief  in  the  superiority  of  their  Eastern  Buddhism,  which  had
provided the spiritual foundations to resist colonisation.
24 It may be thought that Buddhists had an interest in India due to Buddhism but in fact
only a few were interested in India and other parts of the Buddhist world, and usually
only to underline their difference. The earliest monk to visit India is a good example of
the nature  of  this  interest.  Kitabatake  Dōryū  北畠道流  (1820-1907),  a  monk of  the
Nishi-Honganji (西本願寺), the Jodō Shinshū (浄土真宗) sect of Buddhism, visited India
in 1883 and wrote a number of books about his trip.20 His trip is at a time when the idea
of  Asianism,  as  a  concept,  is  still  in  its  formative  stage.  Asia  as  the  world  of  the
colonised is a widely held idea and so countries in this region as defeated countries
serve as a cautionary example.
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Image 3. Kitabatake as Pilgrim
Illustration on Table of contents page in Gōzō Kitabatake Dōryū Kenshōkai 豪僧北畠道竜顕彰会
(Society to Honour the Great Monk Kitabatake Dōryū), ed., Gōzō Kitabatake Dōryū: denki 豪僧北畠道龍: 
伝記 [Biography of the great monk Kitabatake Dōryū], Denki sōsho 伝記叢書 [Biographical series] 148
(Tōkyō: Ōzorasha, 1956, 1994).
25 Kitabatake came to India after a long and distinguished career in the Nishi-Honganji
sect, where he was an influential reformer, establishing a militia of monks and peasants
in his domain. He then went on to learn German and study German legal texts in Kyoto.
He was an important member of the group of reformers who modernised the sect’s
institutions  and  practices.  He  established  the  Kitabatake  Law  Centre,  which  later
became the Meiji University.21 It was at this stage that temple authorities decided it was
best  to send Kitabatake out of  the country.  They lavishly funded his  European and
Indian tour as a means to get him out of the way.
26 Kitabatake travelled between 1881 and 1884 through Europe and the USA, dressed in
robes of his own design that resembled a priest’s cassock. On his way back, he spent a
month  in  India  and  landed  back  in  Japan  in  January  1884.  He  quickly  published  a
number of accounts of his pilgrimage to India testifying to the public interest in the
almost  imaginary  land  of  India  and  to  his  popularity  as  a  writer.22 His  books  and
pamphlets on India show him in the garb of a pilgrim, quite different from the image he
projected while in Europe and while travelling in India.
27 Even though he spent most of his time in Europe, his book was about India which he
describes as “the most dangerous place in the world” where wild animals and bandits
abound. The people are black, naked and uncivilised. But India had become popular in
the  Japanese  imagination,  and  Kitabatake  focused  his  books  on  India.  He  presents
himself as excavating the Buddha’s tomb and the image of him praying along with a
Japanese,  with  black  natives  in  the  background,  visually  establishes  his  superior
position as a Japanese Buddhist. 
90
 
Image 4. Kitabatake pays obeisance at the tomb of the Buddha
Image shows Kitabatake, linked to the Buddha by the radiance from the Buddha’s eyes, in Japanese
robes that have the same pattern as the Buddha’s attire, and his Japanese companion in European
clothes both standing, while behind them the very black natives, in loin cloths and turbans, on their
knees bow reverentially. See Akiyama Tomisaburo, ed. Sekai shuyū tabinikki: ichimei Shakamuni-butsu
funbo no yurai 世界周遊旅日記 :一名釈迦牟尼仏墳墓の由来 [A travel diary of a world tour: the history of
Shakyamuni’s tomb], 1884. http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/816789 
28 There was some interest in certain aspects of India, particularly in the Indian ruler
Ashoka who famously renounced war after seeing its horrors in the battle of Kalinga,
and became a Buddhist. The novelist Mori Ōgai 森鴎外 (1862-1922) wrote a biography
of Ashoka in 1909, and the Buddhists established Ashoka hospital in Tokyo.23 
29 Kitabatake,  a  trained  and  scholarly  monk,  had  spent his  time  in  Europe  meeting
scholars and learning about the places. He had studied German and may have learnt
English, but he knew no Indian languages and does not mention any meetings with
people  or  discussions  with  them.  He  projects  himself  as  an  intrepid  explorer  in  a
dangerous land excavating Buddhist sites. There is no sense of a common and shared
bond. The late Tokugawa and early Meiji view of India was focused on understanding
the colonisation of India by the British. The writings of the Chinese scholar Wei Yuan
魏源 (1794-1857), who became concerned with the threat posed by the Western powers
and is known for the compilation, the Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms, where
he  argued  for  ways  of  defending  China  from  the  Western  powers,  found  a  ready
audience in Japan. His chapter on India was translated into Japanese multiple times.
Wei  Yuan saw India as  a  defeated country,  and this  became a powerful  example,  a
warning of what Japan had to protect itself from, and not a model to emulate. The idea
of India as the “heavenly land” (tenjiku 天竺) was probably overturned by the end of the
16th century when the Portuguese came to Japan. Hideyoshi imagined that he would
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subjugate Korea, China and then conquer India but by the mid-19th century India had
been relegated in the dominant discourse to a negative example.
 
V. Building a New Japan and Asia
30 Ōtani Kōzui 大谷光瑞 (1876-1948), with whom Kitabatake had been working to reform
the temple sect, had also been to India and he worked with the architect Itō Chūta 伊東
忠太 (1867-1954), who had travelled across India, to build a new base in Kobe for the
sect,  away from the established headquarters in Kyoto,  so as  to get  away from the
orthodoxy fighting against changes.24 
 
Image 5. Nirakuso Villa
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Image 6. Nirakuso Garden
 
Image 7. Nirakuso Arabian Room
 
93
Image 8. Nirakuso Chinese Room
 
Image 9. Nirakuso Indian Room
Images 5-9: Villa Nirakusō and the Ōtani Explorer’s Re-Thinking of Modernism (Nirakuso to
Ōtanishinken tai Modernisumu saikō 二楽荘と大谷探検隊モダニズム再考), (Ashiya: Ashiyashiritsu
Bijutsu hakubutsukan, 1999). We are most grateful to Mr. Wada Hidetoshi, of the Ryūkoku Museum in
Kyoto, for kindly providing access to a good quality definition of images 7 to 9.
31 Itō’s architectural style at this time was influenced by his Asian travels. He used the so-
called Indo-Sarcenic style to design the Kobe headquarters. Ōtani, like Itō, favoured the
Mughal  style  of  architecture  then  being  used  by  the  British  in  India.  The  Kobe
headquarters was established to train a new modern priesthood and the building was a
fine example of a very British colonial building which represented the main elements of
Asia.  The  Indo-Sarcenic  style  of  building  was  to  add  Mughal  embellishments  to  a
Victorian  building.  Itō  further  added  Chinese  and  Japanese  elements  as  well.  The
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building  had  rooms  labelled  as  Indian,  Chinese,  and  Arab,  but  each  was  barely
distinguishable from the other. They were part of a common British colonial design.
Here  the  attempt  was  to  create  a  Japanese  architecture  using  Asian  architectural
embellishments.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Itō  Chūta  studied  Indian
architecture,  both  the  contemporary  and  historical,  unlike  Western  scholars  who
looked only at the past.
32 In these Indian experiences, there are different positions even within the overarching
Buddhist viewpoint. Shaku Sōen shows that there are priests who seek to learn what
they see as earlier Buddhist practices, directly from the Sinhalese, and not via the West.
Kitabatake, on the other hand uses India to project himself both as a pilgrim who is the
first Japanese Buddhist to visit the sites associated with the Buddha, but also as one
who opens the tomb and leads the “natives” in worship.25 Ōtani’s explorations were an
attempt to show Western Orientalists who had begun the Central Asian explorations
that Japan had the intellectual and financial resource, and as Buddhists, the obligation
and right  to  trace  the  routes  that  took  Buddhism to  Japan.  Itō  Chūta’s  diaries  are
replete  with  architectural  drawings,  sketches  of  places  and  people,  even  playful
caricatures showing how close his study and how detailed his records were. He was
impressed  with  the  sculpture  and  architecture  he  saw,  and  unlike  contemporary
Europeans  he  was  not  offended  by  the  “moral  depravity”  of  Khajuraho.  He  also
compared  what  he  saw  to  Greek  sculpture  showing  that  he  did  not  place  it  in  a
primitive  category,  but  recognised it  as  equivalent  to  the  best  in  the  world.  These
travels and examples served to influence his early architectural style when he returned
to Japan. 
33 However,  the  Kobe  mansion  for  Ōtani  and  the  Tsukiji  Honganji  remain  isolated
examples. His later buildings retain some playful elements from this time, such as the
imaginary animals that he uses, but he does not go on to evolve a distinctly Asian style
of architecture. Itō’s travels in India and Asia shaped his early architectural philosophy
and practice but he gradually moved to become the architect of Heian Jingu in Kyoto
and the Shinto shrines in the Japanese colonies. There is no connection between what
he sees in Asia and Japan.
 
VI. A poet looks at the Japanese empire
34 The poet Kaneko Mitsuharu 金子光晴  (1895-1975) came to maturity as the Japanese
empire was expanding but he was at odds with the prevailing trends. His intellectual
and poetic journey reflects his critical look at power and his opposition to war and
exploitation.  Kaneko writes  that  it  is  not  possible  to  understand his  emotional  life
without taking into account that he grew up between the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-
Japanese  wars,  a  period  of  rising  nationalism,  and that  he  turned against  what  he
perceived as mindless obedience. His writings about China, Southeast Asia and Europe
provide a complex view of how his ideas developed over time, and his questioning of
the reigning shibboleths led him to intellectually elaborate a politically critical position
against  Japanese  colonialism.  Even  as  Asianism  as  a  concept  had  become  the  lens
through which Asia was being seen in Japan, he articulated a different way of thinking
about  Japan’s  colonial  empire  and the  effect  it  had on the  people  of  the  colonised
countries.
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35 A precocious  child,  Kaneko developed an interest  in  Greek and Roman history and
classical Japan at a very early age. In school he studied science, French, and became a
much awarded painter. He was drawn to all things Western. The West appeared to be a
bright, unconstrained and quite separate world.26 However, he soon tired of the Marxist
educational approach of his school. He found the emphasis on cramming dispiriting,
and within a year he was even displeased with the French language. He then began to
turn to the “old world”, reading the Chinese Classics, particularly of the pre-Qin period,
even giving himself a Chinese name.27 He seriously thought of becoming a Confucian
scholar.  His  reading of  Laozi  and Zhuangzi,  as  well  as  Edo  fiction,  opened another
world.
36 On top of this serious engagement with classical and popular literature, Kaneko found
another  exciting world  in  the  writings  of  Walt  Whitman  (1819-1892)  and  Edward
Carpenter  (1844-1929). In  the  growing  nationalist  atmosphere,  their  writings,  in
particular Whitman’s poem, To a Common Prostitute, was a revelation and Carpenter’s
Towards Democracy introduced him to socialism. He was perhaps most moved by the
emphasis on equality that he found in these writers. He also began to read William
Blake  (1757-1827),  the  English  visionary  poet,  painter,  and  printmaker.  The  British
studio  potter  Bernard  Leach  (1887-1979)  had  introduced  Blake’s  writings  to  Yanagi
Soetsu (1889-1961) who wrote a book on him, bringing his work to the notice of the
Japanese world. 28
37 Kaneko’s first trip to Europe was immediately after the end of WWI. He spent time in
England  and  then  Belgium.  There  he  began  to  read  poets  like  Emile  Verhaeren
(1855-1916), from whom he learnt about structure and sustained rhythm, the French
Symbolists,  Charles  Baudelaire  (1821-1867)  and  other  European  writers.  When  he
finally  arrived  in  Paris  he  was  not  very  impressed,  finding  it  a  little  dilapidated
compared with what he called the glass capital of Brussels.29 He returned to Japan in
1921 at a time when anti-Chinese feelings were rife.
38 The Great Kantō earthquake of 1923 was a turning point for Kaneko who saw it not just
as a simple disaster, but one that showed him that “the new order which the Meiji had
erected  in  a  makeshift  fashion  was  gradually  stripped  of  its  finish  and  the
incompetence  of  the  groundwork  was  revealed”.  Opposition  movements  seemed  to
increase in strength, but according to Kaneko even the Socialists, who were quick to be
enraged  or  indignant,  did  not  think  things through.  He  felt  that  he  had  an
understanding of the past, so he was better placed to recognise the current evils.30 
39 In December 1928, he went on his second trip to Europe. He took a boat to Shanghai and
Singapore, and then travelled across Malaya and then back to Singapore from where he
went to Marseilles and Paris. During this period no one in Japan knew where he was:
rumours were that he was playing drums in a jazz band in India. He arrived in Paris
quite destitute and so took up whatever earned him some money: writing a doctoral
thesis, picture framing, packing cases for tourists, peddling, translating, and painting.
However, he stayed away from politics and notes that he was quite ignorant of the
rising tide of fascism either in Europe or Japan.
40 Kaneko returned to  Japan in  1932,  but  since  he  only  had the fare  to  Singapore he
stopped there and went into the hinterland of Malaya. He writes that he was enchanted
with his surroundings and even thought of settling down, that listening to the “sounds
of the swishing of the nipa palms, the cries of the large-billed birds, the wails of wild
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monkeys… were more dear to me than my native land”, but he received news of his
son’s illness and returned to a Japan where a virulent nationalism was taking hold.31
 
VII. The political education of Kaneko Mitsuharu
41 Kaneko went  to  China between August  1937 and January 1938 where he came into
contact with a large number of writers and activists, vagabonds and intellectuals, such
as  Nishida  Mitsugu  西田税  (1901-1937),  Lu  Xun  魯迅  (1881-1936),  Yu  Dafu  郁達夫
(1895-1945). Lu Xun seemed to have left a deep mark on Kaneko who writes that Lu Xun
showed him the importance of Taoism. China, Lu Xun said, was Daoist before it became
Confucian. Lu Xun, Kaneko writes, “skilfully whittled down China stroke by stroke and
held it out for me to see”.32 
42 In  September 1935,  Kaneko published a  powerful  critique of  war,  the  poem Sharks
(Same 鮫,  1937)  in  the  magazine  Bungei (文芸).  A  structurally  complex  poem  that
narrates the history of  East-West conflicts  as  viewed through the experience of  his
travels  in  Southeast  Asia:  the  sharks  can  be  war-headed  torpedoes  or  Japanese
colonialists. He ends the poem with the recognition of his powerlessness:
The seal that doesn’t like seals.
But he is still the seal that he is
except 
“a seal
looking the other way”. 33
43 In China, he saw the familiar problems of the practice of Japanese colonialism. This
experience confirmed his opposition to the war and to the idea of the “righteousness”
of the Japanese cause. He argued that it was the trade of militarists to go to war and
that  is  why  it  was  natural  for  them  to  lead  Japan  down  this  path,  but  equally  he
recognised that the ambitions of the militarists and policy makers were supported by
the Japanese public. 
44 Yu Dafu was in Japan at that time. He had come to take Guo Moruo (1892-1978) back to
China. Yu drew the cover for the book Shark. Kaneko’s other works “Foam” (Awa 泡)
was  an exposure  of  Japanese  army atrocities,  “Angels”  (Tenshi  天使),  a  rejection of
conscription,  and  pacifist  in  its  ideas,  “Family  Crests”  (Mon  紋),  May  1937,  was  an
analysis of the feudal nature of Japan.
45 During his trip to North China, Kaneko took the critical view that Japan’s aggression
could not be justified as a response to Western imperialism. He argued that war was a
trade for soldiers but there was popular support. Only when the people began to suffer
privation did they start  claiming they had always opposed these policies.  However,
while the war was going well,  “the great majority had pretty positive and frenzied
opinions and smothered their opponents”.34 Kaneko argued that the responsibility for
the war belonged to everyone,  but even today,  over seventy years after the end of
WWII, it is an idea still hard to accept.
46 Kaneko writes that he was surprised to find how submissive the people had become.
The Meiji people, he thought, were quite hot-headed : people would burn police boxes
to oppose a one sen rise in fares, but now, that is in the 1930s-40s, they succumbed so
tamely. Kaneko was impressed by the underlying strength of Meiji national education
which  had  inculcated  patriotism  in  primary  school.  To  understand  the  intellectual
origins of this nationalism, he turned to explore the writings that produced these ideas.
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Thinkers  such  as  Motoori  Norinaga  本居宣長  (1730-1801),  the  influential  National
School of Learning (kokugaku 国学) scholar who laid the basis for thinking about the
uniqueness of Japan because of its divinely descended emperor, Hirata Atsutane 平田篤
胤  (1776-1843)  and  key  figure  in  the  same  tradition,  and  Satō  Nobuhiro  佐藤信淵
(1769-1850), an early proponent of adopting Western science to Japanese philosophical
ideas.35
47 This reading, far from turning him into a nationalist, reinforced his anti-authoritarian
ideas. In 1940, he published A Travelogue of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (Marei Ran’in
kikō マレー蘭印紀行) which documented Southeast Asia not as a tropical paradise but
an area of abandoned rubber plantations, Japanese clubhouses and native labourers :
coolies, prostitutes and those subsisting at the lowest levels of society. Kaneko makes
quite  clear  his  opposition  to  the  Japanese  behaviour  in  these  colonies  and  their
treatment of the local population, and to war in general.
48 Writing  about  his  experiences  in  the  countryside  of  Malaya,  which  was  commonly
viewed as a tropical paradise of palm trees, he notes, “My eyes saw not the strange
scenes  of  the  south  but  the wretchedness  of  the  native  population  in  their  blood-
stained rags”. He writes he lived much like a native : “I had descended to the level of
the native population –I lived gorging curry with my fingers and eating sate by the
roadside”,  and this  experience on the margins of  colonial  life made him appreciate
their problems all  the more. His experience and his readings further sharpened his
social critique. Returning to Singapore, he read Lenin on imperialism and the writings
of Max Stirner, and wrote that the conditions that these writers discuss are those he
could  see  around  him,  that  there  were  “no  better  samples  of  men  worn  out  by
exploitation and forced labour than those before my eyes”.36
49 In the period after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, the Literary Patriotic Society was
planning  a  meeting  of  writers  from  the  Greater  East  Asia  Co-Prosperity  Sphere  in
preparation for a Great East Asian Conference to be held in Tokyo in 1943 that would
bring leaders from the Japanese territories to affirm their support for Japan and its
leadership.  Kaneko  found  himself  at  odds  with  the  Literary  Patriotic  Society  and
opposed the proposal that writers from the Co-Prosperity Sphere, when they came to
Japan, should bow to the imperial palace and read pamphlets about the world under
one roof (hakkō ichiu 八紘一宇), a key slogan of the Japanese militarists.37 Kaneko had
many differences because of his critical stance as his travels in China and Southeast
Asia had brought him into contact with the everyday violence of Japanese colonialism
and inspired his passionate critique. He withdrew from the organising committee in
December  1942.  Unlike  many  of  his  compatriots  who  were  shocked  when  the  war
ended, he writes that he “put on St Louis Blues on the gramophone and danced about in
the excess of our delight”.
 
Conclusion
50 The  discourse  of  Asianism  grew  out  of  arguments  developed  by  diverse  groups  of
people, but this diversity was reduced as it was appropriated by the Japanese state to
first assert its primacy in the region, and then justify its drive to build a colonial empire
and frame this objective as undertaken for the development of Asia. Ideas propounded
earlier were incorporated into this vision. The Buddhist monks’ discovery of India was
part of their enterprise to remake Japanese Buddhism for the modern world, to assert
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the importance of their doctrinal position even as a World Buddhism was beginning to
take shape. Kitabatake’s interlude in India was a moment when India as the land of the
Buddha  had  become  important,  but  in  his  trajectory  it  was  but  one  aspect  of  his
intellectual and religious project. 
51 Kitabatake’s thinking was shaped in the late Tokugawa environment where reform of
the state to meet the dangers of the West was an overriding concern. One major thrust
was to unify the domain cutting across status and class differences. Kitabatake was an
important  player  in  the  dominial  reforms  undertaken  in  Kii  (modern  Wakayama
prefecture).  Kitabatake  worked within  the  political  framework of  the  Bakufu  Court
alliance (kōbu gattai 公武合体 )  in  the 1860s, during the last  years  of  the Tokugawa
bakufu. In the early Meiji period, he was side-lined by the temple orthodoxy and struck
an independent path, first in setting up a law university and then, becoming a preacher
of gender equality and education as the basis for strengthening the state. His political
and intellectual trajectory does not fit into an incipient Asianism, but rather has to be
understood  as  developing  within  the  global  structures  of  power  where  Western
knowledge was dominant. Kitabatake learns from Western military practices, studies
German law, and together with his understanding of Buddhist doctrine crafts a message
directed beyond the followers of the sect to a national audience, combining a moral
vision with national goals.
52 Okakura Tenshin identified the contours of Japan’s history, art and culture as a product
of diverse Asian influences and this rich amalgam provided the basis for its future. He
saw Japan as an inextricable part of  developments on the Asian continent,  yet also
different. The difference can sometimes be read as superiority, but his ideas were not
always framed as an assertion of Japan’s leadership. The main thrust of his arguments
was an attempt to explore the past to extract a way of thinking about Japan and Asia’s
future that was not expressed through Western modes of consciousness. This marked
the appeal and originality of his writing. Aware of the domination of the West both
through  military  power  but  also  its  control  over  knowledge,  he  understood  the
necessity of the nation-state as the basis for creating an alternative to the Western
state. This was also his limitation and, after his death, his ideas were used to justify
Japan’s Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a distortion of the fundamental direction
of his thinking.
53 Kaneko  Mitsuharu’s  thinking,  as  I  have  argued,  was  formed  in  confrontation  with
events as he engaged with the increasingly aggressive nationalism of the 1930s and
1940s through his reading supported by his observations of life of the colonised in the
colonies.  As  he  read  and  travelled,  he  discovered  new  worlds,  and  questioned
established ideas and government policies. His complete dismissal of Japanese success
as a mark of failure, of frustration (zetsubō 絶望), grows out of a total rejection of the
basis  for  Japan’s  “success”  –based as  it  was  on  the  exploitative  nature  of  Japanese
colonialism.
54 It is always difficult to define an idea that has a history, as Nietzsche pointed out, it
should be seen as a process. Asianism as state doctrine became a way to legitimise and
sanction practices of domination and control. The social norms so created were widely
accepted,  but there were questioning voices.  I  locate these voices within the larger
tradition of resistance and argue that placing them outside the idea of Asianism shows
a more complex picture of the ways state violence, physical as well as epistemic, was
resisted in Japan. 
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NOTES
1. All Japanese publications are from Tokyo unless otherwise stated.
2. See “An Argument to Expel Asia” (Datsu-A-ron), Jiji shinpō 時事新報, March 16, 1885
https://khasegawa.wordpress.com/syllabi/modern-japanese-history/japanese-empire-and-
colonial-expansion/datsu-a-ron-脱亜論/
The essay was written anonymously but is usually attributed to Fukuzawa Yukichi. His views of
Asia  were  more  complex  than the  often  quoted  article  suggests.  In  two of  his  books,  Pocket
Almanac of the World (Bankoku ichiran 掌中万国一覧) and Countries of the World (Sekai kunizukushi 世
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界國盡),  he  divides  the  world  geographically,  racially,  culturally and  politically.  Racially  his
classification, while it reflects European reading, does not follow the usual divisions. The white
race lives in Europe, Western Asia, North Africa and America; the yellow people in China, Finland,
and Lapland and the red people are found in North and South America. The blacks who have yet
to understand the meaning of “civilisation and progress” (kaika shinpo開化進歩) are to be found
in Africa, south of the Sahara, and as slaves in the United States. The Pacific Islands, the African
coast and the East Indies are, he writes, populated by brown people. Western views were shaping
a racial division of the world but here they are being incorporated within existing Japanese ideas.
See  for  instance,  Fukuzawa  Yukichi,  Countries  of  the  World ( Sekai  kunizukushi),  (Tokyo:  Nihon
Kindai Bungakkan,1968).
3. See Saaler, Sven and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, eds., Pan Asianism A Documentary History, Vol.1.
1850-1920 and Vol.2 1920-Present, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2011).
4. Government patronage provided resources to create the basis for the institutional structure to
support this new knowledge production: 1877 New Asia Society (Shin’asha 新亜社), 1880 Revive
Asia Society (Kōakai 興亜会), established by Ōkubo Toshimichi and others, 1883 Asia Association
(Ajia  kyōkai 亜細亜協会),  1881  Black  Ocean Society  (Gen’yōsha玄洋社),  1898  East  Asia  Culture
Association (Higashi Ajia dōbunkai 東亜同文会), which merged in 1898 with the East Asia Society
(Tōakai 東亜会)  and  Konoe  Fumimaro  近衛文麿  as  its  head,  and  1901  Black  Dragon  Society
(Kokuryūkai 黒龍会) under the leadership of Uchida Ryōhei (内田良平, 1874-1937).
See also for the idea of race Tessa Morris Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan Time, Space, and Nation, (New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.100. 
5. See Nishikawa Joken, Yonjyuni koku jinbutsu enzetsu (Tokyo iinsei kabushigaisha,1898). Tonkin,
for instance uses Chinese characters.  India has a hot climate and the people live in extreme
poverty, look poorly fed and minimally clothed: http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/761120.
6. See my Okakura Tenshin: “Asia is One”, in Saaler, Pan-Asianism, vol. 1, pp. 93-100.
7. Okakura’s major writings were The Awakening of the East (written in 1901 in English but first
published in 1938 in a Japanese translation as Risō no saiken (理想の再建), Kawade Shobō, 1938,
and in the original English by Seibunkaku in 1940), The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the
Arts of Japan (written 1901, published 1903), The Awakening of Japan (1905) and The Book of Tea
(1906). The  notes  for  the  Awakening  of  the  East were  written  while  Okakura  was  in  India,
(December 1901- October 1902). See, Okakura Tenshin zenshu in 8 vols. and a supplement (Tokyo: 
Heibonsha, 1979-1981), vol.1 p. 480.
8. The Awakening of Japan (New York: Century,1904), p.7.
9. Awakening, p.12.
10. Awakening, pp.15 and 17.
11. Awakening, p.18.
12. The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Arts of Japan (London: J. Murray,1903), p.14.
13. Ideals, p.16.
14. Ideals, p.16.
15. Ideals, pp.131 and 235 where Okakura defines advaita as the state of not being two, meaning
that all reality though it appears manifold is one so that “all truth must be discoverable in any
single  differentiation,  the  whole  universe  involved in  every  detail.  All  thus  becomes  equally
precious.” 
16. Ideals, p.131.
17. See my unpublished paper,  “Colonial  Pilgrims:  Japanese Buddhists  and the Dilemma of  a
United Asia”, 20th International Association of Historians of Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, November 14-17, 2008.
18. For Kitabatake Dōryū’s journey to India, see Nishikawa Hensho and Nagaoka Senshin, Tenjiku
koroji shoken, (Tokyo: Aranami Heijiro, 1886). 
19. Ideals, p.89.
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20. See my “Monks in Modern Dress: The Dilemma of Being Japanese and Asian”, in Kyunghee
Pyun and Aida Yuen Wong, eds., Fashion, Identity, and Power in Modern Asia, Palgrave Macmillan,
2018, pp. 309-337.
21. The Meiji University website says that it was founded in January 1881 by a group of young
lawyers, Tatsuo Kishimoto, Kozo Miyagi and Misao Yashiro. It does say, however, that they had
lectured in Dōryū’s academy, but when students who were dissatisfied with his policies turned to
them, they established a new school. http://www.meiji.ac.jp/cip/english/about/history.html
22. Master Kitabatake Dōryū’s India Travels (Kitabatake Dōryū shi Indo kikō), a one page account that
publicised his pilgrimage to the Buddha’s tomb to a wide audience, and A Travel diary of a world
tour: The History of Shakyamuni’s Tomb (Sekai shūyū tabinikki: Ichimei Shakamuni-butsu funbo no yurai
世界周遊旅日記 :一名釈迦牟尼仏墳墓の由来  (Tokyo:  Kyuyunsha,  1884),  p. 23.  http://
dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/816789, and this was followed by a more comprehensive account, 北
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Japan, a country without
revolution? Uses of kakumei and




Introduction: political violence in the land of the
emperors
1 As  any  country  in  the  world,  Japan in  the  course  of  its  history  experienced  many
phenomena  of  internal  wars,  on  different  scales  and  of  different  natures.  The
construction  of  fortified  villages  in  the  Yayoi  period,  the  political  struggles  of  the
Yamato  kingdom,  the  revolts  against  the  imperial  regime in  the  Heian  period,  the
battles between warrior clans in the 12th century or political anarchy in the 15th and
16th centuries are some examples1. Modern Japan experienced a major political change
with the coup initiated in 1868 by the Satsuma and Chōshū clans of southwest Japan
against  the  Tokugawa  shogunate.  The  victory  of  Satsuma  and  Chōshū  and  the
establishment  of  the  imperial  regime in  1889  meant  the  creation of  an ideology,  a
discourse  legitimising  the  imperial  regime  based  on  a  false  historical  fact  –the
supposedly unbroken line of divine emperors starting with the fictitious Jinmu2. The
creation of the imperial  regime meant also a general  revision of  the Japanese past,
starting  with  the  coup of  1868  itself.  During  all  its  existence,  the  management  of
Japanese history was a central problem for the regime. As was shown by Mitani Hiroshi,
in 1940 the imperial regime published a large compilation of sources entitled “History
of the restoration” (Ishinshi).  This work established a vision of  the birth of  modern
Japan that became the classical  narrative to describe it,  even outside Japan.  In this
narrative, the opening up of 1853 led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate by a
restorationist  movement  (the  “reverence  for  the  emperor  and  expulsion  of  the
barbarians”  (sonnō  jōi)  movement).  The  victorious  restorationist  movement  started
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radical reforms in the name of “opening to civilisation” (bunmei kaika) and “enrich the
country,  strengthen  the  army”  (fukoku  kyōhei)3.  This  narrative  gave  a  central  and
positive role to the oligarchs of Satsuma and Chōshū, and simultaneously helped draw a
linear discourse leading to the establishment of the imperial regime in 1889. In the year
the historian Tsuda Sōkichi published the History of the restoration, the regime put him
on trial for having criticised the myths establishing the imperial ideology. Tsuda was
expelled from the university, four of his books were banned, and two years later he was
sentenced to jail for three months4.
2 Ironically,  modern  historical  studies  were  born  at  the  same  time  as  the  imperial
regime: in 1887, Ludwig Reiss (1861-1928), a disciple of Leopold von Ranke, was invited
to Japan to introduce the new historiographical methods, and the year 1889 saw the
establishing of a National history department in the Tokyo Imperial  University,  the
creation  of  the  Society  for  historical  studies  (Shigakkai)  and  of  a  related  academic
review (Shigaku zasshi). From this beginning until the fascist period, Japanese historians
had to  confront  the imperial  ideology:  before  Tsuda,  Kume Kunitake was  forced to
resign in 1892 for asserting that Shinto myths were not historical facts. Of course, this
does not mean that historical studies were entirely under control5, but a red line did
exist.
3 The goal of the present article will be to complete previous researches by focusing on
the phenomenon of revolution in the use of history during the Meiji era (1868-1912). By
establishing an unbroken line of divine sovereigns, the imperial ideology proposed a
vision of Japanese history allowing no place to revolution. That is why the 1868 coup
was considered as a “restoration” (ishin).  We shall discuss here the use of the word
“revolution” (kakumei)6 to show that revolution was the central problem in the writing
of history because the interest for revolution itself was often linked with a political
agenda, or at least a will to challenge the official ideology. That is why the discourse on
historians often came from non-professional historians who used the free space left by
the belated creation of professional historical studies. The political agenda was on one
side state-sponsored history promoting the imperial regime, and on the other side pro-
revolution democratic views coming from the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement
(Jiyū minken ndo) between 1874 and 1890, and after 1890 from the modern nationalists of
the Min’yūsha (“Society of the People’s Friends”). The latter challenged the former on
every single issue that had to do with the importance of revolution.
4 This  article  will  explore  three  aspects  of  Japanese  and  European  histories  where
kakumei have been discussed vis-à-vis the imperial ideology. The first part will outline
the definition of Meiji restoration in the context of the creation of the new regime. The
two other parts will discuss the aspects challenging the official view of history. The
second part details the historical events which put into question the legitimacy of the
actual imperial family, that is to say, the coup led by the (real) first emperor Tenmu
against his nephew Ōtomo in 672, and the war between the two imperial courts from
1334 to 1392. The third and last part will discuss the role of revolution in European
history, especially the French revolution, to show that a counter narrative existed in
Meiji  Japan,  highlighting  revolution  as  a  model  to  establish  democracy  against  the
empire centered project of the government.
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I. The controversy on the civil war of 1868
I.a. The ideological use of the 1868 civil war and history
5 The first event to appear as revolution in the debate on history in the Meiji era was the
event that directly gave birth to modern Japan, the civil war of 1868-1869 (Boshin war).
It is remarkable that the authors of this military seizure of power gave a central role to
history. One of the reasons of such importance given to history was that the gigantic
work (397 volumes) sponsored by the Mito clan, the History of Great Japan (Dai Nihonshi,
started in the mid-17th century and still  unfinished in 1868) which emerged in the
wave of  the  kokugaku (“Studies  of  the country”),  contributed to  the  anti-Tokugawa
discourse.  Even  before  the  radical  transformations  for  which  the  new  Meiji
government, the Dajōkan, became famous, the very first initiative was to provide an
official interpretation of the recent events and to describe the coup not as a revolution
but  as  a  restoration  (the  so-called  “Meiji  restoration”,  Meiji  ishin),  more  precisely
a“restoration of imperial power” (ōsei fukko). On May 3rd 1869, the emperor made a
declaration calling for the establishment of an official history in continuity with the six
historical  chronicles  (Rikkokushi)7 written  on  imperial  order,  namely,  the  Kojiki,  the
Nihon  shoki and  the  four  other  chronicles  compiled  until  901 8.  The  government
established  the  Compilation  of  History  Bureau  (Shūshikyoku)  just  after  the  imperial
declaration of 1869, reemploying the scholars specialised in the tradition of Chinese
historiography as well as the kokugaku. This Bureau was one of the seiin which was the
highest organ of the Dajōkan, the Meiji government9. As for the civil war, in June 1872,
the  new  government  ordered the  compilation  of  all  sources  related  to  the  recent
events, under its direct control. Due to many troubles, this work went on for 17 years
resulting in two books entitled “Chronicle of the restoration” (Fukkoki) and “External
Chronicle of the restoration” (Fukkoki gaiki,  dedicated specifically to the battles)10.  A
shorter version was published under the title Meiji shiyō from 1876 to 1885. The Fukkoki
and Fukko gaiki were published by the Compilation of History Bureau whose scholars
were  also  put  to  task  to  establish  an official  history  giving  priority  to  the  sources
related to the ancient emperors. The Rikkokushi were republished in the 1870s and the
compilation of the Dai Nihonshi was completed in 1906. A Chronological History of Great
Japan (Dai Nihon hennenshi) was also planned as an official history to complement the
Rikkokushi and Dai Nihonshi. A selective compilation of sources gave birth to the first
histories  by  professional  historians  prefiguring  the  vision  of  1940.  In  the  work  of
Shigeno Yasutsugu, the word kakumei (revolution) was completely absent11.
6 This  active  promotion  of  an  official  version  of  the  civil  war  came  along  with  the
establishment of symbols that became later important institutions of the new imperial
regime: in 1869, a Shintō sanctuary, the Shōkonsha, was created in Tōkyō in memory of
the warriors killed during the Boshin war, and was later to be renamed the Yasukuni
shrine.
 
I.b. Challenging the state-sponsored history: the earliest
professional historians and the democrats
7 The elaboration of this Satsuma-Chōshū centered view of the civil war was challenged
very soon, first by the vanquished and later by the democrats. Fukkoki and Fukko gaiki
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were enormous compilations, yet they did not include documents related to characters
on the defeated side. This is why warrior families close to the Tokugawa shogun, such
as the Echizen clan, started to compile their own history of the events, long before the
Boshin war12. During the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, some men close to
this democratic movement tried to challenge the official interpretation of the Boshin
war. In 1888, the politician and journalist Shimada Saburō published Background to the
opening of the country (Kaikoku shimatsu), in which he presented a positive biography of Ii
Naosuke, a shogunate official who had repressed the pro-restoration warriors. The year
before,  the  journalist  Noguchi  Katsuichi  had  launched the  publication  of  Unofficial
Sources of the Restoration (Yashidai ishin shiryō, 1887-1896). In the 1890s some journalists,
partly  from  the  Min’yūsha  circle,  published  their  own  histories  of  the  civil  war:
Takekoshi  Yosaburō’s  History  of  the  New  Japan ( Shin  Nihon  shi 1890-91),  Fukuchi
Gen.ichirō’s On the Decline of the Shogunate (Bakumatsu suibōron, 1892) and Politicians of the
End of the Shogunate (Bakumatsu seijika, 1898), and Tokutomi Sohō’s Yoshida Shōin (1893).
The common point of these writings was to strive towards a more objective history of
the civil war by moving away from the Chōshū-Satsuma centered vision of the official
history13. Thus, Tokutomi had no qualms about presenting Yoshida Shōin, the master of
the Meiji  government leaders,  as  a  revolutionary (kakumeika)14.  Similarly,  Takekoshi
Yosaburō also described the civil war as a revolution. In fact, Takekoshi based his work
on a distinction between three types of revolution: the restorationist revolution (fukko
teki  kakumei),  the  idealistic  revolution  (risō  tankyū  teki  kakumei),  and  the  anarchist
revolution  (ransei/anarkikaru15teki  kakumei).  Takekoshi  defined  the  restorationist
revolution as a revolution claiming freedom which existed in the past, like the English
revolution  which  took  the  Magna  Carta  as  a  model.  His  definition  had  therefore
nothing to do with the prevailing interpretation of “restoration”. According to him, the
French and American Revolutions were the models of the idealistic revolutions in the
sense  that  they  sought  freedom  for  the  future.  In  his  mind,  the  overthrow  of  the
Tokugawa shogunate in 1868 was clearly an anarchist revolution because there was
neither a retrospect as a restorationist revolution would imply, nor a quest for an ideal
as claimed in the idealistic revolution16. Such a position was clearly a declaration of war
against the government-sponsored history. A similar point of view can be found in the
writings of Okada Rei’un (1870-1912), a journalist and thinker who was close to Kōtoku
Shūsui  and,  like  Kōtoku,  had  close  contacts  with  the  Chinese  Republicans.  Okada
wanted to start a second revolution to overthrow the Meiji oligarchs. In 1909, he wrote
one  of  the  first  histories  of  the  Freedom  and  People’s  Rights  Movement  which  he
depicted as a revolution. To him, the Meiji restoration was a revolution like the Taika
reform of 645. In both cases, revolution occurred by contact with foreign cultures. In
645, Japan adopted the Chinese and Indian cultures and became part of Asia. In 1868,
Japan adopted Western culture based on liberty and equality, and became part of the
world.  Consequently  Okada  considered  the  Meiji  restoration  as  a  movement  of  the
people/nation,  not  different  from  the  case  of  Italy  and  Germany.  He  saw  no
contradiction  in  the  fact  that  Meiji  was  an  imperial  restoration  since  for  him  the
Japanese emperor was not separate from his people, being the chief of the Japanese
family. Okada thus shared a similar view with the official ideology. The main problem
lay with the real governors of Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate and the subsequent Meiji
government against whom the people stood up in revolution, as did the Westerners
against their sovereigns17. For Okada, the real Meiji restoration was not the civil war of
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1868  led  by  the  leaders  of  the  government,  but  the  Freedom  and  People’s  Rights
Movement.
8 With the death of the last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu in 1913 and the new wave of
liberalism, fresh publications by non academic historians challenged the official view of
Meiji  restoration  by  paying  attention  to  the  historical  sources  from  the  Tokugawa
side18.
 
II. Revolution in imperial history: the murder of King
Ōtomo (672) by the first emperor Tenmu and the two
courts war (1337-1392).
II.a. The troubled creation of the imperial regime in 672
9 It is often said that the Japanese imperial dynasty is the longest living dynasty in the
world, starting with emperor Jinmu in 660 BC. This is not true since Jinmu and the
subsequent emperors never existed. It is an invention of the Meiji government, based
on  the  ideology  of  the  first  emperors  themselves.  Tenmu  established  the  imperial
regime in 672 AD by killing his nephew Ōtomo and annihilating the kingdom of Yamato.
Tenmu, together with his wife and successor Jitō, created a new regime inspired by the
Chinese model, chose Nihon as the name of the country and ordered the compilation of
the  Kojiki and Nihon  shoki following the  pattern of  the  Chinese  chronicles,  so  as  to
redefine the past for the benefit of the regime. Before Tenmu, the kings of Yamato
seem to have reigned according to the principle of primus inter pares, surrounded by
powerful families. In order to get a strong position in the young centralised state, the
emperors  altered  the  old  myths  so  that  they  could  be  the  only  humans  of  divine
ancestry hailing from the Sun goddess Amaterasu. What connected them to Jinmu19
now brought  them and all  the  kings  of  Yamato  under  a  single  dynasty,  regardless
whether the kingdom of Yamato had been ruled by one or several dynasties20. This was
also done to conceal the fact that the first emperor Tenmu (672-686) came to power by
rebelling and murdering his nephew Ōtomo. The reign of Ōtomo seems to have been
short (only nine months) and Tenmu challenged the decision of his brother king Tenchi
who chose his son instead of him. Both the Kojiki and the Nihon shoki make no mention
of Ōtomo, transforming what is now called the “turmoil of the year jinshin” (jinshin no
ran)21 into a taboo from the very start. The taboo turned out to be short-lived as well as
the imperial  power itself,  since alternative histories  in the Nara and Heian periods
claimed that prince Ōtomo did reign. In the Edo period, the Mito school, which was the
first to write a history of the country (Dai Nihonshi), chose to incorporate Ōtomo in the
list of the emperors starting with Jinmu. It is interesting to note that just after starting
the process to create a history of the 1868 civil  war,  the Meiji  government in 1870
ordered to officialise the history as devised by the Mito school and to make Ōtomo
emperor under the name of Kōbun. Such a decision was supposed to end the taboo
surrounding the story of Ōtomo.
10 But historians and democrats did not necessarily comply with this decision, at least
during the Meiji period. Following the new methods of historical studies established in
universities,  Hirade Kōjirō  of  the  Tokyo Imperial  University  conducted research on
Ōtomo in 1897 with an article in the review Shigaku zasshi where he questioned the
legitimacy  of  Ōtomo  as  emperor.  More  exactly,  he  analysed  the  historical  process
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through  which  the  Mito  school  decided  to  present  Ōtomo  as  emperor,  taking  into
account  historical  sources  after  the  Nihon  shoki,  which also  presented Ōtomo as  an
emperor22. Kita Sadakichi, later known for the controversy on the two imperial courts,
also produced a study on king Ōtomo. He suggested in 1904 that there did exist an
emperor, but it was a girl23. These studies directly challenged the official decision of
1870, but none of the historians have been sanctioned like Kume Kunitake for having
said that Shintō legends are fictions.
11 A year earlier, the journalist and liberal activist Takekoshi Yosaburō wrote a general
book of  national  history.  He  started  with  Jinmu but  described the  jinshin war  as  a
‘conservative reaction’. To him, ethically speaking, it was the war of an uncle against
his nephew; politically speaking, it was a conservative reaction but with progressive
results24. Takekoshi and Hirade were among the very few historians to pay attention to
the jinshin war during the Meiji era. Perhaps this was because the debate soon shifted to
the war between the two imperial courts in the 14th century.
 
II.b. The taboo of the two courts war in modern Japan
12 The medieval history of Japan has been particularly traumatic for the emperors: with
the  establishment  of  bakufu (warrior  government)  from  1185  to  1192,  they  lost  all
power and gradually fell into great poverty. The attempt of Emperor Godaigo to restore
imperial regime in 1333 was completely unrealistic and the warrior Ashikaga Takauji
manipulated the emperor to seize power from the Hōjō family. Takauji even supported
another branch of the imperial family to secure legitimacy and from 1336 till 1392 two
imperial courts coexisted in Japan. The victory of the Northern Dynasty, supported by
Ashikaga, meant the victory of the illegitimate lineage. The emperors of present Japan
come from the same line of ancestors. This is why the Dai Nihonshi as early as the Edo
period claimed the legitimacy of the Southern lineage.
13 After  the  1869  imperial  declaration,  the  Meiji  government  also  included this  event
quite early in its commemoration strategy. In the same year, the government created
new Shintō shrines in honour of the warriors who fought for the Southern court such
as Kamakuragū in the city of Kamakura (the ancient capital of the first warrior family
who came in power). In 1877, the official line of emperors saw the Southern emperors
replace the Northern emperors, as in the Dai Nihon shi. In Taisei kiyō, published by some
leaders of the Meiji government in 1883, the Northern emperors received the rank of tei
(the very same word used for the Chinese emperor)  and were no longer tennō  (the
Japanese word for “emperor”,  reserved only for the Japanese sovereign).  In 1900,  a
statue of Kusunoki Masashige, the most famous warrior who fought for the Southern
court, was erected in front of the imperial palace25.
14 This attempt by the state to establish an official view of Japanese history was soon to be
challenged, both within and without. The outside attack came as early as 1909 from the
journalist and politician Yamaji Aizan. Yamaji defended the criticism of Yoshino and
Kume26,  and took an opposite  position to  the negative portrait  of  Ashikaga Takauji
inherited from the Mito school.  He presented Ashikaga as a hero of warriors,  more
precisely as the leader of a conservative faction (hoshutō) who opposed the revolution
led by emperor Godaigo27. As to the inside attacks, they came from the first professional
historians. The Compilation of History Bureau was soon divided into scholars still loyal
to Chinese historiography and those more interested in source criticism. Among the
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latter was Shigeno Yasutsugu (1827-1910)28. He was educated in Confucian orthodoxy
and was responsible for the historical chronicles of the Shimazu clan, namely, Satsuma.
When his clan won the civil war in 1868 against the Tokugawa shogun, Shigeno worked
for  the  Compilation  of  History  Bureau  and  became  the  most  prominent  modern
historian. Before the arrival of Ludwig Reiss, it was probably with Shigeno’s support
that the Compilation of History Bureau invited in 1879 an exiled Hungarian diplomat, a
self-made historian at the University of London, George Zerffi (1820-1892), to write a
history of European historiography. His book, The Science of History (771 pages), despite
not being translated into Japanese,  contributed largely to transform the method of
Shigeno and his counterparts29. Shigeno with Kume Kunitake and Hoshino Hisashi were
transferred from the Shūshikyoku and made the first professors of history at the Tokyo
Imperial  University in 1888.  They thus became colleagues of  Reiss.  Shigeno worked
closely with him to create modern historical  studies  and was the first  president of
Shigakkai.
15 Despite his  support for the Satsuma-Chōshū  centered view of  the Meiji  restoration,
Shigeno Yasutsugu challenged the government over the two courts period. In 1890, he
claimed that there was no historical evidence for the existence of Kojima Takanori who
was celebrated as an imperial hero by the government (on the basis of the medieval
Taiheiki, “Chronicle of Grand Pacification”) and even upgraded as a deity. In the same
year, Kume Kunitake even questioned the historical veracity of Taiheiki as a whole30.
16 In 1911 the historian Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939) provoked a larger debate on the events.
Unlike  Yamaji  Aizan,  Kita  was  not  specifically  opposed  to  the  government.  After
graduating  in  history  in  1909  at  the  Tokyo  Imperial  University,  he  contributed  to
legitimise the annexation of Korea and supported the theory of common ancestries
between Koreans and Japanese (Nissen dōsoron)31. In 1910, he was appointed as editor of
history textbooks by the government. He gave lectures on the Two courts period to
teachers and claimed that it was impossible to decide which line was legitimate. On
January 19th 1911, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō attacked historians on this matter in
the newspaper Yomiuri shinbun. A great debate in the Parliament ensued (Nanbokuchō
seijun mondai) which resulted in Kita’s discharge from office. The same government also
planned the repression of the first Japanese socialists and anarchists. Kōtoku Shūsui
and others were accused of plotting the murder of the emperor and were executed on
January 24th the same year32.
17 The impact of this debate and the trial of the Japanese anarchists lasted until the end of
the imperial regime. Inoue Tetsujirō, the principal ideologue of the imperial regime,
writes in his Outlines of National Morals (1912) that history should focus only on morals
in order to maintain national unity. He saw the controversy of Ashikaga as a plot of
“anarchists”33.  A  historian  such  as  Tanaka  Yoshinari  cautiously  claimed  that  the
question of legitimacy between the two courts was to be avoided in academic research,
but  Ashikaga  Takauji  was  depicted  positively  in  Nanbokuchō  jidaishi (History  of  the
Northern and Southern courts  period)34.  With the  rise  of  fascism,  Ashikaga Takauji
again became a subject  of  debate.  In  1934,  the Minister  of  Commerce and Industry
Nakajima Kumakichi was forced to resign under the pressure of fascist organisations
who made use of his 1921 writings about Ashikaga Takauji arguing that Takauji’s case
should be re-examined35. This episode turned out to be one of the causes of the call for
a  “clarification  of  the  national  essence”  (kokutai  meichō  undō)  in  1935,  which
111
contributed  to  the  rise  of  the  wartime  system  dominated  by  the  military  and  by
fascism.
 
III. Revolution and harmony as matters of Japanese
national identity
III.a. Revolution as model? Civilian historiography and the French
revolution
18 Since the Meiji era was a period of discovery of the past and recent history of the world,
revolution as a historical phenomenon was obviously not limited to Japanese history.
The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, which began in 1874 with the demand for
a constitution and a parliament and saw the birth of political parties, also meant the
discovery of European political philosophy and history, including the revolutions. The
French  revolution  was  especially  attractive.  Among  the  writings  published  by  the
partisans  of  the  Movement,  there  is  an  astonishing  wealth  of  translations  and
presentations of revolutions, primarily the French revolution36. These documents can
be divided into two groups: (i) the publications by Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901), one of
the main intellectual figures of the Movement who translated Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
On social contract and many French republican texts (ii) other publications.
19 The translations published by Nakae Chōmin and his disciples clearly show a will to
promote not only Rousseau but more generally the French revolution:
Official texts:
– The 1776 American Declaration of independence.
– The declaration of 22 May 1790 (Declaration of peace to the world).
– The Montagnard Constitution of 1793.
Political and literary texts:
– Harny De Guerville, La liberté conquise, ou le despotisme renversé37.
– La Marseillaise.
– Mirabeau, Essay on despotism.
Philosophical and law texts:
– Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments.
– Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit (last chapter:
“On the future progress of the Human Spirit”).
Historical chronicles:
– Philippe Buchez, A Parliamentary History of the French Revolution.
– Victor  Duruy,  History  of  France.  Chōmin  referred  to  it  to  write  History  of  the  two
centuries before the French Revolution.
– Madame Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, Popular History of the Revolution. Chōmin used
it to introduce the 1789 Cahiers de doléances.
– Amédée  Le  Faure,  Socialism  during  the  French  Revolution.  Chōmin  consulted  it  to
translate the Manifesto of the Equals.
20 The list shows how the Japanese saw a model in the French (as well as the American)
revolutions and how their own Movement could be a new revolution. It goes without
saying that kakumei had a positive meaning during the period among the followers of
the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement.
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21 Chōmin and his  disciples  were  among the  few Japanese  able  to  translate  from the
French.  Nevertheless,  other  minkenka people  translated French works  from English.
This  proves  to  what  degree  the  Freedom  and People’s  Rights  Movement  gave
importance to the French Revolution and wanted to associate their own movement
with kakumei. Most of the translations, such as those of Chōmin, were published around
the year 1882, the climax of the Movement and of the revolts against the government:
a) Translations:
François Mignet, Kawatsu Sukeyuki trans., Futsukoku kakumeishi (History of the French
Revolution, 1824, 1878 and 1889).
Adolphe Thiers,  Kusama Jifuku trans.,  Futsukoku kakumei  zenshi (Histoire des  années
précédant la Révolution française [Histoire de la Révolution française, 1823-27]), 1884.
Unknown author, Watanabe Sōhō trans, Bankoku kakumei shi (History of the revolutions
throughout the world), 1890.
b) Single works (often based on European books):
Suzuki Gorō ed., Futsukoku kakumei genrinron (On the causes of the French revolution),
1882. Nariai Hisao, Ōbei minken shiryaku (Short history of the rights of the people in
Europe and the United States), 1882.
Ida Saneyuki, Seiyō  ensetsu kihan: minken to jiyū (Models of discourse in the West: the
rights of the people and freedom), 1882.
Hisamatsu Yoshinori, Taisai kakumei shikan. Furansu kakumei no bu (General History of
the Revolutions in the West. The French Revolution), 1882.
Takagi  Shūho  ed.,  Tsūzoku  Futsukoku  kakumeishi (Popular  history  of  the  French
revolution), 1887.
22 These texts often introduced the English and French revolutions as revolutions for the
“rights of the people” (minken), suggesting similarity with their own movement38.
23 This appeal of the French Revolution was so strong that the Meiji government, seeking
inspiration from Germany to establish an authoritarian constitution, felt  obliged to
publish translations against Rousseau and propounded a negative view of the French
revolution based mainly on German works39.
 
III.b. Japanese harmony versus Chinese revolution
24 The repression of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement and the establishment of
the imperial regime had as corollary the negation of revolution: the proof of the divine
status of the imperial regime was found in history itself, in the absence of revolution,
which made possible a single and unbroken lineage. Revolution was therefore eluded in
Japanese history and in its stead the main value proclaimed was harmony (wa).
25 Some intellectuals were precursors in integrating the idea of harmony as the core of
Japanese,  or  more  largely,  Asian  identity.  The  art  critic  Okakura  Kakuzō  (Tenshin)
wrote  in  1903  The  Ideals  of  the  East  with  Special  Reference  to  the  Art  of  Japan  (later
translated into Japanese). Okakura presented a history of Asia in which he included
India, China and Japan. He characterised the Asiatic nature by gentleness, moral ethics,
harmony, beauty and communalism. Harmony was of primary importance in Okakura’s
way of thinking because in it lay the reason why Japan was in possession of the best of
Asia, since the Japanese spirit had the ability of assimilating from abroad what was
harmonious with its own nature.
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26 Okakura’s discourse contributed to the rise of harmony as a key concept of Japanese
and Chinese national  identities.  Two other factors played an important role in this
change. First,  studies on Chinese history developed in the academic world with the
establishment of “Oriental history studies” (Tōyō shigaku). In 1904, the first department
of Chinese history studies was created in the Faculty of letters at the Tokyo Imperial
University.  This  department  was  reformed  in  1910  as  the  Oriental  history  studies
department while the Historical studies department was divided the same year into
National history and Western history.
27 The second factor happened a year later: the 1911 Revolution in China provoked a huge
shock in Japan because it destroyed a multi-secular regime and the elites also feared
that the same could happen in Japan since Marxism and anarchism attracted more and
more Japanese. In fact, in the same year, Kōtoku Shūsui, the disciple of Nakae Chōmin
and founder of the first Socialist party, was executed by the government.
28 Such  characterisation,  however,  was  far  from  commonly  shared.  Naitō  Konan  for
example, in his book On China (Shinaron, 1914), refused to see any possibility of China as
a  potential  democracy  and  republic40.  Far  from  seeing  revolution  as  the  national
essence of China, Naitō considered that the 1911 Revolution was the product of contacts
with  the  West through  the  Chinese  students  sent  there.  On  the  other  hand,  Naitō
admitted a strong egalitarianism in Chinese society, an element that gave rise to the
Taiping rebellion41.  As  was  shown by Matsumoto Sannosuke,  Shiratori  Kurakichi  or
Yano Jin’ichi also considered republicanism as a novelty for China42.
 
Epilogue: after Meiji, the growing tension between
revolution and harmony
29 Between the 1920s and 1940s the characterisation of China and Europe by revolution
and of Japan by harmony became such a topos that it is impossible to synthesise here all
the texts involved during this period. The earliest examples of the characterisation of
China  as  revolutionary  can  be  found  in  the  1910s,  just  after  the  1911  Revolution,
regardless  of  the  political  camps.  The  liberal  Kayahara  Kazan interpreted  the  1911
Revolution  as  a  new form of  the  Chinese  republicanism (kyōwashugi)  which  can  be
found in the Chinese classics43. Kayahara referred on this point explicitly to Shiratori
Kurakichi44.
30 The success of the Soviet revolution added fear for the future of the imperial regime.
The tendency to characterise China as  a  land of  revolution increased alongside the
characterisation  of  Japan  as  a  land  of  harmony.  For  example,  Yasuoka  Masahiro
(1898-1983) used his own interpretation of the word kakumei to characterise China and
the West  as  lands of  revolution,  contrasting them with Japan as  a  land of  political
stability45.  Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (1895-1984),  professor of history at the Tokyo Imperial
University,  provides another interesting example.  After a trip he made in the early
1930s to England, France and Germany conducting research on the French Revolution,
he published a book in which he compared European and Chinese revolutions with the
Japanese  Meiji  restoration46.  Hiraizumi  made  a  distinction  between  revolution  and
restoration, defining the former as the destruction of a state aimed at the creation of a
new  one47.  To  him,  the  best  illustration  according  to  this  definition  was  China.
Hiraizumi  even considered that  the  English  revolution of  1688  did  not  fit  with  his
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criteria  because it  was not  a  radical  change of  state48.  On the contrary,  the French
revolution  could  be  compared  to  the  Chinese  ekisei  kakumei because  it  “completely
destroyed the organisation of the state, ignoring its history and traditions” to create a
new  state49.  Such  an  interpretation  was  negative  because  Hiraizumi  interpreted
revolution in general as a “fit of madness” (hakkyō). He explicitly quoted Paul Bourget,
a  French  conservative  historian  and  member  of  the  Académie  française,  and  his
negative view of the French revolution: it had destroyed the feudal organisation that
was foundational of France to replace it with a centralised government which cut off
the French from their past50. Hiraizumi also quoted Edmund Burke, writing pages after
pages to persuade the reader that the Meiji restoration was not a revolution, despite all
appearances: it was a great change, or a reform, but not a revolution because it did not
cut  off  people  from  their  past.  Quite  to the  contrary,  the  Meiji  restoration  had
reestablished the “correct form of Japan, its natural form” (Nihonkoku no tadashii sugata,
honnen no sugata)51.
31 Needless to say, such discourse on China and revolution was not homogeneous. Pan-
Asianists and Marxists were willingly prepared to see revolution in Japan because they
wanted to accomplish a new revolution each for their own reasons. On the right, Ōkawa
Shūmei described the Meiji restoration as a revolution and saw it as a model for the
Shōwa restoration52. The same can be said about Kita Ikki, who even went to China to
witness the Chinese revolution with his own eyes53. On the left, Marxist historians such
as Hattori Shisō or Wani Gorō analysed the Meiji restoration as a bourgeois revolution54.
32 Due to the political crisis in the 1930s, the efforts of the government to define Japanese
identity  as  harmony,  loyalty  and  cohesiveness  culminated.  Starting  with  the
propaganda of the “Harmony of the five races” (gozoku kyōwa) to justify the creation of
the  Manchurian  State,  the  government  published  in  1937  the  True  Meaning  of  the
National  Essence ( Kokutai  no  hongi)  in  which  harmony  (wa)  was  for  the  first  time
highlighted as part of national identity55. Right-wing commentators of the text relayed
the  message56.  The  post-war  conservative  emphasis  on  harmony  cannot  been
understood  without  this  tension  and  debate  in  the  Meiji  era  about  history  and
revolution.
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Historiography of the Nanking
Massacre (1937–1938) in Japan and
the People’s Republic of China:
evolution and characteristics
Arnaud Nanta
Given what had happened in and around Shanghai, as the battle to seize Nanking
approached,  I  once  again stressed  the  need  to  all  our  troops  for  them  to
scrupulously respect military codes of conduct and customs, as previously noted.
Despite  this,  our  Army  committed  acts  of  violence  and  pillaging  during  the
occupation of the city, many tarnishing the prestige of the Imperial Japanese Army.
In  order  to  explain  these  acts,  we  must  first  consider  the  terrible  exhaustion
occasioned by the difficult battles fought since disembarking in Shanghai, which
generated deep animosity among our soldiers.  Added to this  were the logistical
failures and supply shortages suffered by our Army while facing lightning attacks
from a constantly moving enemy. These, in my opinion, were the causes. Be that as
it may, neither I nor my officers can escape our responsibility for having failed to
correctly supervise [our troops].
General Matsui Iwane, commander-in-chief in Nanking, China Incident Diary
(Shina jihen nisshi 支那事変日誌, written in prison in 1946).1
1 The Nanking (Nanjing) Massacre, in what was then the capital of the Republic of China
while  this  regime was  still  located  on  the  mainland (1912–1949),  took  place  at  the
beginning  of  the  Second  Sino-Japanese  War  (1937–1945),  itself  both  a  part  of  and
prelude to World War II. It followed on from the Battle of Shanghai, which saw forces
from the Chinese National Revolutionary Army clash with troops from the Imperial
Japanese  Army  and  Navy,  between  13  August  and  late  October  1937.  The  final
withdrawal of the Chinese came about on 13 November. The Battle of Shanghai was one
of  the  bloodiest  confrontations  in  the  East  Asian  theatre  of  World  War  II,  ranking
alongside the Battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945. As well as being a crushing defeat
for the nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975), which
lost some 250,000 men, it was a decisive element in their later defeat by Communist
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forces in 1949.2 They put up fierce resistance to Japan’s Central China Area Army (Naka-
Shina  hōmen-gun  中支那方面軍),  composed  of  the  Shanghai  Expeditionary  Army
(Shanhai haken-gun 上海派遣軍) and the 10th Army (Daijū gun 第十軍), commanded
throughout  by  General  Matsui  Iwane  松井石根  (1878–1948).3 This  resistance,  in
addition to the war crimes committed by both sides, pushed the Japanese troops to
pursue the nationalist forces as they retreated towards the capital. What ensued was
the Battle of Nanking (4 to 13 December), known in Chinese as the Battle to Defend
Nanking, followed by the fall of the city and the massacre of soldiers and civilians from
early December 1937 to February 1938. In Japan this massacre is commonly referred to
as the “Nanking Incident”, as it was during the post-war trials. Similarly, the Second
Sino-Japanese War was known as the “China Incident”.4
2 The aim of this paper is not to trace the history and chronology of what took place, nor
to produce a definitive account of the events or a conclusive death toll. The Nanking
Massacre  was  both  exceptional  and  one  of  a  long  list  of  war  atrocities  committed
during the twentieth century. In this sense, it can be compared to situations elsewhere,
like the Einsatzgruppen,  the Nazi killing units in Eastern Europe. Nanking is another
example of “a war that did not follow the rules of classic conflict, against an enemy
without uniforms, hidden in the midst of a civilian population indistinguishable from
the partisans.”5 It is this dual configuration –the association of the “mopping up” of a
city of enemy troops and the terror unleashed against an unarmed population– that
enabled the sacking of the city and uncontrolled military violence against civilians. The
situation was further exacerbated by factors relating to structural logistical failures
within the Japanese army, notably a lack of supervision.
3 The  objective  here  is  to  trace  the  genesis  of  historical  research  on  the  Nanking
Massacre in Japan and China, in connection with the historiography of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in  both countries  and with echoes  from Taiwan.  Several  periods  and
landmark works can be distinguished within this body of research. And yet widespread
misconceptions in Europe and the United States mean that the collective imagination
tends  to  picture  a  revisionist  Japan  with  China  as  victim.  In  reality,  differing
assessments of China now exist due to its political regime. The aim of this paper is to
show that the Japanese historiography of Nanking is not only the most advanced in the
world,  it  is  also  extremely  high  quality  and  has  made  significant  contributions  to
international scholarship. The world of politics and academia are two very different
things. Furthermore, since the 1970s and 1980s Japanese historical research on Nanking
has  developed  in  parallel  with  the  military  historiography  of  Taiwan,  which  was
directly concerned, since it was the nationalist troops of the Kuomintang who fought
and were massacred by Imperial Japan in Shanghai and Nanking. They then retreated
to Taiwan after their defeat by the Communists in 1949. Finally, since the mid-1990s
Japanese research has progressed thanks to increased engagement with scholarship
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Nanking Massacre and Second Sino-
Japanese War are not only historiographical issues; they are also political and memorial
issues involving not two but three countries: Japan, the PRC and the Republic of China
(Taiwan). Just as Japan has Yasukuni Shrine (1879) to commemorate its war dead and
China has the Memorial Hall for Compatriots Killed in the Nanking Massacre (1985),
Taipei has erected a National Revolutionary Martyrs’ Shrine (Zhonglie ci 忠烈祠, 1969),
in reality dedicated more to the Second Sino-Japanese War than the Revolution of 1911.
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4 In the West, researchers have not seriously investigated Nanking and lack awareness of
the results of international research. The best English-language work available on the
subject consists primarily of contributions from Japanese researchers.6 Yet Japanese
research, drawing on Chinese scholarship, has continued apace since the late 1990s,
despite the exact details of the events remaining elusive. Finally, just as with European
scholarship on the Shoah since the late 1970s, negationist publications have continually
played  an  important  role  in  Japan  by  stimulating  historical  research  there.  These
publications will be a key focus of this paper.
5 I will begin with a general overview of the types of sources and documents available for
this historiography. As well as being a crucial element in itself, such a review will help
us understand how research on Nanking has taken shape since the end of the 1960s.
Section two presents Japanese “militant” research conducted between the end of the
1960s and the late 1970s. Section three describes the links between the historiography
of the Nanking Massacre and the military historiography,  from the late 1970s until
shortly  after  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  massacre  in  1987.  Finally,  section  four
analyses the increase in scholarship from the PRC since 1992 and the tensions between
memory and Japanese conservative reaction that accompanied the fiftieth anniversary
of the end of the war in 1995.
 
I. Corpora of sources
6 In the autumn of 2015, as Taiwan was holding a major exhibition at the National Chiang
Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the
ROC’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, featuring a heavy focus on the
Nanking  Massacre,  the  UNESCO  headquarters  in  Paris  saw  a  clash  between  the
organisation and the Japanese Minister of Education, Hase Hiroshi 馳浩  (1961–). The
cause  was  the  inclusion  in  UNESCO’s  Memory  of  the  World  Register  of  documents
relating to the Nanking Massacre. The debate served to remind Europe and the rest of
the world that the Asia-Pacific War was still a contentious issue in the Far East. By the
end of the year, Japan threatened to withdraw its funding of UNESCO, to which it was de
facto the largest contributor (since the United States had suspended its  payment of
membership  contributions  before  withdrawing completely  from the  organisation in
October  2017).  This  attempt  to  force  UNESCO’s  hand  is  reminiscent  of  the  tactics
employed  by  Japan  with  the  League  of  Nations  in  1932  following  its  invasion  of
Manchuria. Yet the documents listed on the UNESCO register are not new and all are
recognised by historians. The majority of the records, documents and witness accounts
listed by UNESCO had already been presented at the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (IMTFE) held in Tokyo between 1946 and 1948.
7 Analysis in the broadest sense of the Nanking Massacre developed along two parallel
lines corresponding to two separate periods. The first (in the 1940s and 1950s) consists
of what can be described as official research focusing on state documents and court
records. Primary sources and secondary documents from immediately after the event
tend to blend together to form, along with military sources, the main corpora on the
Nanking Massacre. The second body of work (from the 1970s to 1990s) is more scholarly
in nature and corresponds to a true historiography of the Nanking Massacre, which is
the  subject  of  this  paper.  Research  on  Nanking  has  been  accompanied  in  the
background by intense journalistic activity, helping to bring the issue back into the
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spotlight, forcing the state apparatus and judicial system to address the problem and
then motivating historical  research after the 1970s.  The following list  is  merely for
classification purposes and is  not  intended to be an exhaustive presentation of  the
documents available.
8 Primary sources contemporaneous with the Nanking Massacre consist chronologically
of the following four elements:
Documentary records  of  the  International  Committee  for  the Nanking Safety  Zone.  This
collection of texts includes letter exchanges between the committee and Japanese officers,
compiled in 1939 by Hsü Shuhsi (Xu Shuxi) 徐淑希 (1892–1982) for the government of the
Republic of China.7 This “slim volume […] is still the best source on what happened to the
people of Nanking between December 1937 and February 1938”.8 It also clearly shows that
Chiang Kai-shek did concern himself with the Nanking Massacre at the time of the events.
This corpus includes notes and records written by members of the committee, such as the
Diaries of John Rabe (1882–1950), published in Germany in 1997.9
Statistics compiled by the Republic of China’s Red Swastika Society (Hong wanzi hui 紅卍字
會) and the Chongshantang 崇善堂, which disposed of the vast majority of corpses. Their
combined figures (155,337 bodies) can be taken as a minimum death toll. These statistics
were submitted to the IMTFE but not presented.10
International press coverage of the event by foreign correspondents in Nanking, notably
Frank Durdin (1907–1998) for the New York Times and Archibald Steele (1903–1992) for the
Chicago Daily News, in addition to a book by Harold J. Timperley (1898–1954), a Manchester
Guardian journalist  stationed  in  Shanghai:  What  War  Means:  The  Japanese  Terror  in  China,
published in 1938.
Japanese military sources,  specifically the archives of  the Central  China Area Army, and
military  documents  from  the  Chinese  National  Revolutionary  Army  –which  since  1949
correspond  de  facto to  the  Taiwanese  archives.  Contrary  to  popular  belief,  a  precise
administrative  description  of  the  events  in  Nanking  was  made  to  Imperial  General
Headquarters in Tokyo. It is known that the Japanese authorities (army and military police)
destroyed military documents between 14 and 20 August 1945. However, Japanese historians
estimate that around one third of the field reports written by the seventy or so units that
made up the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army survived.11 They are kept at
the Japanese Ministry of Defence, in the archives of the Bōei kenkyūjo 防衛研究所 (National
Institute  for  Defence  Studies),  the  equivalent  of  France’s  IRSEM  (Institute  for  Strategic
Research at the Military School).
In addition to these first four sets of sources, a corpus of visual documents exists in the form
of photographs and films. The most famous example is a video shot by American missionary
John  Magee  (1884–1953),  who  revealed  documentary  footage  of  the  massacre  in  1938.
Nevertheless,  these  documents  provide a  visual  illustration of  the massacre  rather  than
enabling analysis of the event.
The Nanking Massacre first became a state and judicial  matter during the IMTFE, which
focused essentially on crimes against peace, in other words, on Japan’s responsibility for
starting and waging war (Class A war crimes). Class B war crimes were, in fact, also tried in
the case of Matsui,  although he was judged for his actions in starting the war,  since he
extended the fighting from Shanghai to Nanking. The IMTFE made abundant use of sources
and documents from corpora 1 to 3. Class B war crimes in general were tried by the Republic
of  China  (Nationalist  China)  and  then,  after  1949,  by  the  People’s  Republic  of  China.
Accordingly, three further sets of sources and documents can be distinguished:
The sections of the IMTFE transcript of proceedings relating to Nanking.
The proceedings of the Nanking War Crimes Tribunal or Nanking Trials (1946–48, including








A corpus of testimonies by Chinese survivors, compiled by PRC authorities during the 1950s
and listed by UNESCO in 2015.
These various corpora were compiled by Japan between the 1970s and 1990s and by the PRC
in the 1980s. The four most important compilations –created by historians and described in
parts 2 and 3 of this paper– are as follows (see part 4 for those established by the PRC):
Volumes 8 and 9 of the series Nicchū  sensō  shishiryō  日中戦争史資料  (Historical Materials
from the Sino-Japanese War): Nankin jiken 南京事件 (The Nanking Incident), parts I and II,
edited by Hora Tomio 洞富雄 and published in 1973 by Kawade shobō. These two volumes
were republished independently in 1985.12 Volume 1 contains all portions of the Proceedings
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (original Japanese version) relating to the
Nanking Massacre; volume 2 is a compilation of Japanese translations of contemporary press
articles from the Manchester Guardian and New York Times, as well as documents issued by the
International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, taken from the previously mentioned
compilation by Hsü Shuhsi.
The  Chinese  publication  Qin  Hua  Rijun  Nanjing  datusha  dang’an 侵华日军南京大屠杀档案
(Documents  on  the  Nanking  Massacre  Committed by  the  Japanese  Army  of  Invasion),
published in Nanking in 1987 and edited by the Second Historical Archives of China. This
work presents documents from the Nanking War Crimes Tribunal.13
The  two-volume  Japanese-language  compilation  Nankin  jiken  shiryōshū 南京事件資料集
(Collection  of  Documents  on  the  Nanking  Incident),  edited  by  the  Nankin  jiken  chōsa
kenkyūkai 南京事件調査研究会 (Nanking Incident Research Group) and published by Aoki
shoten in 1992.14
The three-volume Nankin  senshi 南京戦史  (History  of  the  Battle  of  Nanking)  and Nankin
senshi shiryōshū 南京戦史資料集  (Collection of Documents on the History of the Battle of
Nanking), published between 1989 and 1993 by the Nankin senshi henshū iinkai 南京戦史編
集委員会  (Battle  of  Nanking  Editorial  Committee),  which  is  overseen  by  the  Japanese
military  organisation  Kaikōsha  偕行社.  This  corpus  consists  of  military  sources  of  the
utmost importance.15
9 Ultimately, despite its limitations, the literature available on the Nanking Massacre is
quite  considerable.  Other  sources  and  documents,  in  particular  the  testimonies  by
individuals and military units, are covered in part 4. The documentation available on
the massacre is extremely varied in nature. These materials must be compared and
cross-referenced in order to obtain as accurate a picture as possible of the events.
10 The  following  section  looks  at  the  genesis  of  historical  research  on  the  Nanking
Massacre.
 
II. Early historical research and its negation: the
Vietnam War era
11 Before  we  begin  looking  at  the  genealogy  of  the  historiography  of  Nanking,  it  is
important to make a general comment about the political configuration of East Asia.
While  democracy was  restored to  Japan by the Constitution of  1946,  in  1949 China
became the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the authoritarian Republic of China
relocated to Taiwan. The nature of these three political regimes determines to a certain
degree  the  historiography produced  in  each  country.  This  does  not  mean that  the
historiography  of  the  PRC  should  be  rejected;  quite  the  opposite  in  fact  when
conducting a historiographical analysis. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Japanese








running until the creation of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1977. This is
somewhat surprising, given, as we shall see, that the historiography produced during
this  period  was  based  solely  on  documentation  known  to  exist  since  the  war  or
produced during  the  IMTFE,  and  thus  available.  The  progress  of  Japanese  research
compared to that of the PRC in the 1970s can only be explained by the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Finally, many high-quality Chinese studies have been
published overseas, in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan.
12 Historical research on the Asia-Pacific War began immediately after the conflict ended.
Initially it was conducted by a short-lived war investigation committee established at
the behest of Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō 幣原喜重郎 (1872–1951) in 1945 to 1946.
16 Then in 1953, the Rekishigaku kenkyūkai 歴史学研究会 (Historical Science Society of
Japan)  published  a  collective  work  on  world  history  featuring  a  chapter  by  Inoue
Kiyoshi 井上清 (1913–2001) on “Japanese Imperialism and Asia”.17 Last but not least, in
1955, historians Tōyama Shigeki 遠山茂樹 (1922–2001), Fujiwara Akira 藤原彰 (1922–
2003) and Imai Seiichi 今井清一 (1924–) collectively published their Shōwa-shi 昭和史
(History  of  the  Shōwa  Era).18 Inoue  and  Tōyama,  both  Marxist  historians  and
progressive academics, were renowned scholars of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Japan.  This  seminal  work  from  1955  was  the  first  to  attempt  a  critical  review  of
Japanese policies during the 1930s and 1940s. Its publication came just one year after La
France de Vichy by Robert Aron (1898–1975). Another notable event from 1955 was the
Japanese government’s creation of a War History Office within the National Institute
for Defence Studies (Bōei kenshūjo senshi-shitsu 防衛研修所戦史室,  known today as
Bōei kenkyūjo senshi kenkyū  sentā  防衛研究所戦史研究センター),  itself part of the
Japanese Defence Agency (elevated to the Ministry of Defence in 2007). Its mission was
to assemble the documents and archives of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in
order to write a history –in other words a state narrative– of the Asia-Pacific War. The
same thing occurred in the Republic of China in Taiwan, as we shall see later. The role
of this “official” research institute regarding the documentation is problematic. In a
context  where  most  of  Japan’s  military  archives  were  burned  in  August  1945,  the
documents that did survive were either seized or concealed. Access to the collection
has been considered an issue.
13 The studies of the Nanking Massacre which began to appear in the late 1960s were
incorporated  into  the  wider  historiography  of  the  Second Sino-Japanese  War,
indicating a growing receptiveness to the subject within the field of history. After the
previously  mentioned  publications  from  the  1950s,  the  25-volume  Japanese  History,
published by Iwanami in 1963, focused heavily on the question of militarism and the
Asia-Pacific War in its four volumes devoted to modern history. A lengthy chapter by
historian Imai Seiichi on the “Supremacy of the Military and the Sino-Japanese War”
mentions  the  Battle  of  Shanghai  and  the  Nanking  Massacre.19 In  contrast,  another
important  series,  also  entitled  Japanese  History,  published  in  ten  volumes  by  the
University of Tokyo in 1970 and also featuring the participation of eminent historians,
makes no mention of the massacre.20 The issue was not yet given equal weight by all.
Could  it  be  that  it  seemed  premature  to  the  academic  establishment  to  mention
Nanking in 1970?
14 The Nanking Massacre came to wider attention thanks to a series of articles written by
an investigative journalist, Honda Katsuichi 本多勝一 (1932–). Two factors helped the
subject gain prominence: the Vietnam War and the establishment of diplomatic ties
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between Japan and the PRC in 1972, when the two nations signed a joint communiqué
in which Japan recognised its war crimes. As a war correspondent in Vietnam from
1966 to 1967, Honda had documented the atrocities committed by American troops,
devoting a book to the subject in 1968. The violence of the Vietnam War moved him to
describe  the  Second  Sino-Japanese  War  from  the  victims’  perspective.  The
investigations he conducted in China in 1971 formed the basis of a series of articles
published in the newspaper The Asahi. These were then presented in book form in 1972
as Chūgoku no tabi 中国の旅 (Travels in China) and subsequently appeared in English
translation.21 Given that Honda limited himself to presenting first-person testimonies,
his book cannot be considered a work of  historical  analysis.  Furthermore,  only one
chapter,  comprised of  four  personal  accounts,  is  devoted to  Nanking.  Nevertheless,
Chūgoku no tabi sparked controversy in Japan and stimulated historical research on the
events.
15 The first effect of Honda’s articles in The Asahi was an outpouring of Japanese personal
testimonies on the Nanking Massacre in newspapers and magazines between 1971 and
1975. The second was the appearance of a counter-discourse questioning the veracity of
these testimonies or even denying the massacre itself. The first rebuttal of the Nanking
Massacre famously appeared in April 1972 in a series of articles by Suzuki Akira 鈴木明
on the  “Illusion of  the  ‘Nanking Massacre’”  (“Nankin daigyakusatsu”  no maboroshi
「南京大虐殺」の幻), published in the conservative magazine Shokun! 諸君！.22 These
articles, published in a book of the same name in 1973, specifically criticised Honda’s
recording of testimonies relating to Nanking, and one incident in particular: the killing
“contest” conducted by two Japanese army officers, which was reported in the Japanese
press  in  December  1937  and  has  come  to  be  seen  as  emblematic  of  the  Nanking
Massacre.23 Suzuki’s criticism centred on his assertion that the witnesses had fabricated
their memories based on unsubstantiated journalistic accounts. He acknowledged that
the massacre had taken place but considered it  impossible to establish the truth of
what had actually occurred, describing it as “unknowable” (maboroshi 幻).  The term
would prove to be long-lasting. The controversy over Honda’s book raged on in the
pages of  Shokun!,  with the same arguments being espoused this  time by Yamamoto
Shichihei 山本七平, a former soldier who asserted that the infamous 100-man killing
contest was a fabrication by journalists.
16 Amid this controversy over Honda’s book, historians were also helping to bring the
issue of  Nanking to public consciousness.  In 1967,  for example,  Hora Tomio 洞富雄
(1906–2000) published a chapter entitled the “Nanking Atrocity” (Nankin atoroshitī 南
京アトロシティイ) in a book he wrote on modern war.24 He followed this up in 1972 by
producing the world’s first academic treatment of the massacre: Nankin jiken 南京事件
(The Nanking Incident).25 Hora was a professor at Waseda University specialising in
modern  and  contemporary  Japanese  history.  The  following  year,  an  extensive
compilation of original documents relating to the war appeared in the form of the nine-
volume  Nicchū  sensō  shishiryō 日中戦争史資料  series  (Historical  Materials  from  the
Sino-Japanese War),  published between 1973 and 1991.26 The two volumes edited by
Hora,  entitled The Nanking Incident,  presented the sources he had used for his  1972
book: namely, the letters compiled by Hsü in 1939, contemporary press articles and all
sections of the IMTFE proceedings relating to Matsui and Nanking.
17 Hora’s Nankin jiken was an extensive reworking of his 1967 chapter on the massacre.
Approximately one half focuses on the beginning of the “north China events”, in other
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words, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and on the Battle of Shanghai. The second half
attempts to make a systematic analysis of the available documentation and propose a
death  toll  for  the  Nanking  Massacre.27 The  categories  proposed  by  Hora  were
subsequently adopted by other researchers, namely: the “mopping up” operations to
clear the city of concealed enemy troops, the search for plain-clothed soldiers, rape,
arson,  and  the  Japanese  army’s  penetration  into  the  Nanking  Safety  Zone.  When
calculating the number of Chinese Nationalist soldiers defending the city (100,000),28
Hora based his estimate on Japanese military records, while for the death toll he used
as  a  minimum  the  figures  provided  by  the  Chinese  burial  organisations  (155,337
bodies),  as  well  as  estimates  by  members  of  the  International  Committee  for  the
Nanking Safety Zone and a report prepared by the Nanking state prosecutor which was
submitted to the IMTFE (200,000 deaths).29 Hora also discussed the figures proposed by
the Kuomintang at  the Nanking War Crimes Tribunal  for  B-class  criminals,30 where
estimates such as 295,52531 and then 340,000 deaths32 were suggested. In short, Hora’s
study examined documents known to exist since the IMTFE and did not attempt, at this
stage, a detailed reconstruction of the events on the ground. Nevertheless, Hora’s book
set out the main challenges that would face later historians: determining both the size
of the population in the area subjected to Japanese brutality (Nanking and its suburbs)
and the number of Chinese Nationalist troops garrisoned in the city; and estimating the
number of civilian and military deaths based on the sources and documents mentioned
in the first part of this paper and on projections of the civilian population and size of
the Chinese garrison.
18 The  advances  made  in  research  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  were  driven  by
controversies  featuring  an  initially  minimalist  school  which  gradually  became
negationist.  This  paper  will  merely  present  some  of  the  main  publications  and
protagonists.  In  1972,  Yamamoto  continued  his  writings  by  publishing  a  series  of
articles  in  Shokun!  entitled  “Watashi  no  naka  no  nihon-gun 私の中の日本軍”  (“My
Japanese Army”), released in book format in 1975.33 The title brings to mind La vraie
bataille d’Alger (The Real Battle of Algiers), published in 1971 by French army general
Jacques Massu (1908–2002), which, like Yamamoto’s book, aimed to assert the primacy
of one individual’s testimony over the work of historians. In reality, this rejection of
scholarly discourse primarily led to competition between witnesses.34 In “My Japanese
Army”, Yamamoto denied that the Nanking Massacre had taken place, arguing that it
was impossible. Hora retaliated in 1975 with Nankin daigyakusatsu: “maboroshi” ka kōsaku
hihan 南京大虐殺：「まぼろし」化工作批判  (A  Criticism  of  Efforts  to  Portray  the
Nanking  Massacre  as  an  “Illusion”).  Henceforth,  the  controversy  pitting  historians
against authors from the minimalist and negationist camps took on an ultra-factualist
dimension.  In  other  words,  the  dispute  came  to  focalise  on  criticising  evidence,
whereby  the  invalidation  of  specific  elements  was  seen  as  disproving  the  entire
massacre. Faced with this situation, historians chose to respond point by point, thereby
unwittingly fanning the flames of controversy indefinitely while also giving it the false
appearance of a “debate”.  This rhetorical trap was criticised shortly after by Pierre
Vidal-Naquet (1930–2006) with regard to Holocaust deniers.35
19 Alongside this controversy, the Nanking debate was gaining particular prominence in
Japan due to the junior high school history textbook trials, in which court proceedings
were instituted against the Ministry of Education in 1965 by Ienaga Saburō 家永三郎
(1913–2002), a professor at Tokyo University of Education. Having notably written a
history of the Pacific War, Ienaga wanted textbooks to include the war waged against
126
the  Republic  of  China.  The  Sugimoto  Decision  of  1970,  named after  the  judge  who
awarded it, ruled in favour of Ienaga and enabled the Nanking Massacre to appear in
senior  high  school  textbooks  in  1974  and  junior  high  school  textbooks  in  1975.36
Pressure from the Ministry of Education mounted in around 1980, while Prime Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曽根康弘  (1918–2019), in office from 1982 to 1987, would soon
evoke a need for a “general review of the war”. The draft textbook Ienaga submitted for
approval in 1980 contained a clear mention of the Nanking Massacre, albeit without
figures. He was made to tone down his account of the events. The ministry ordered him
to make further alterations between 1983 and 1984. In the meantime, in the summer of
1982,  the  history  textbook  issue  had  become  an  international  diplomatic  affair
involving China and South Korea after the Ministry of Education ordered the removal
of the term “war of aggression”.37 Ultimately, Nakasone was forced to broker dialogue
and conciliation.
 
III. Research on military history and the new
historiography
20 A second period of research began in the latter half of the 1970s, running until the
fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  massacre  in  1987.  This  period  saw  the  appearance  of  a
historiography of Nanking based on military archives. Quite logically, the centrality of
Japanese military records and archives within the corpora of documents on Nanking
consolidated  the  dominance  of  the  Japanese  historiography.  Research  began  at  an
official  level  as  the  Japanese  and  Taiwanese  governments  progressed  with  their
narrations  of  the  military  history  of  the  Second  Sino-Japanese  War  by  publishing
extensive historical series and documentary compilations.
21 Between 1966 and 1980, Japan’s National Institute for Defence Studies published Senshi
sōsho 戦史叢書 (War History Series), a collection of 102 thematic volumes on Japan’s
pre-war military system and the Asia-Pacific War. Although this is yet another example
of a history written from the state’s perspective, it lacks the militarist narratives that
characterised official histories before 1945. Ultimately, it offers a non-critical narrative,
simply describing the events  and compiling the primary materials  available.  It  is  a
purely military historiography based on the archives of the various army corps and
former ministries. The Senshi sōsho collection includes the ten-volume series Daihon’ei
Rikugunbu 大本榮陸軍部 (Imperial General Headquarters, Army Department). The first
volume,  published  in  1967,  examines  Japanese  command  from  the  late  nineteenth
century onwards as well as the decisions made from 1937 to 1940 regarding the war in
China.  Another notable series within the Senshi  sōsho collection is  the three-volume
Shina jihen Rikugun sakusen 支那事変陸軍作戦 (Army Strategy in the China Incident),
published in 1975 and 1976.38 Volume one examines the fall of Nanking in the context of
the Second Sino-Japanese War and attempts to set out the reasons behind the attack on
the Chinese capital using archived documents. Despite this, it makes no mention of the
massacre.
22 At around the same time, between 1981 and 1988, the Commission for the History of the
Party,  Central  Committee  of  the  Nationalist  Party,  Republic  of  China  (Dangshi
weiyuanhui Zhonghua minguodang zhongyang weiyuanhui 黨史委員會中華民國黨中
央委員會), in Taiwan, published a seven-part series edited by the historian Qin Xiaoyi
秦孝儀 (1921–2007) entitled Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian 中華民國重要史
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料初編 (Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China). Its focus was the War
of Resistance Against Japan.39 Just like Senshi sōsho, this official Taiwanese publication,
overseen by a historian close to Chiang Kai-shek, was a purely military history blending
documentary compilation  and  critical  analysis.  Although  it  describes  the  fall  of
Nanking, the massacre is not mentioned in the section covering autumn 1937. Finally,
in the People’s Republic of China, the works published on the eve of 1970 by the History
Department of Renmin University (founded by the Communist Party of China) illustrate
that research there was not as advanced as Taiwanese and Japanese publications from
the same period.40
23 In parallel with these official publications, Japanese academics in the field of military
history began to turn their  attention to the Nanking Massacre.  At  the dawn of  the
1980s, books from the minimalist and negationist camps had carved a broader space for
themselves in Japan, creating a context in which negationist publications were able to
take centre stage. One notable example is Tanaka Masaaki 田中正明 (1911–2006), who
branded the Nanking Massacre a “fiction” (kyokō 虚構) invented by the Allies between
1946  and  1948.  Back  in  1963,  Tanaka  had  published  a  text  lauding  Indian  judge
Radhabinod Pal (1886–1967), who defended Japan and the “Great East Asia War” at the
IMTFE.  During  the  war,  Tanaka  served  as  personal  secretary  to  General  Matsui,
commander of  operations in Nanking.  His  numerous publications include three key
works published in 1984, 1985 and 1987: an analysis of the Field Diary of General Matsui
Iwane (Matsui Iwane taishō jinchū nisshi 松井石根大将陣中日記), a republication of that
diary the following year, and Nankin jiken no sōkatsu – gyakusatsu hitei jūgo no ronkyo 南京
事件の総括：虐殺否定十五の論拠 (Summary of the Nanking Incident: 15 Arguments
that Refute the Massacre),41 partially translated into English as What Really Happened in
Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth in 2000.42 The growth of Nanking denial in
Japan between 1975 and 1987 was thus more or less synchronous with the controversies
that  erupted  in  France  in  1978,  leading  to  the  introduction  of  the  anti-negationist
Gayssot Act in 1990. Tanaka’s republication of Matsui’s field diary sparked controversy
when historians and several newspapers, including The Asahi,  dissected the text and
proved  that  Tanaka  had  tampered  with  the  original.  Matsui’s  field  diary  was
reproduced once again in 1989 in a compilation by the military organisation Kaikōsha
(see below in this paper). At the same time, in 1985, the city of Nanking opened its
Memorial Hall for Compatriots Killed in the Nanking Massacre.43
24 This flood of publications sparked a reaction from Japanese scholars. Among historians
of the war or of the military system, Yoshida Yutaka 吉田裕  (1954–), a professor at
Hitotsubashi University and former pupil of Fujiwara Akira, turned his attention to the
Nanking Massacre. As previously noted, Fujiwara was a specialist in Japanese political
and military history and co-wrote Shōwa-shi in 1955. He also published a book on the
Nanking Massacre in 1985. The following year, in 1986, Yoshida took up the mantle by
publishing  the  first  detailed  account  of  the  Japanese  army’s  operations  during  the
Nanking  Massacre:  Tennō  no  guntai  to  Nankin  jiken 天皇の軍隊と南京事件  (The
Emperor’s  Army and the Nanking Incident).44 In  terms of  its  method and choice of
documents analysed, this book differs significantly from Hora’s work, which focused on
sources dating from after the events and on witness accounts.  In contrast,  Yoshida
drew  on  primary  sources  emanating  from  troops  on  the  ground  as  well  as  on
monographs published by former soldiers.
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25 Yoshida highlighted the treatment  of  soldiers  captured in  Nanking.  Essentially,  the
Japanese army had a policy of not taking prisoners and –like France during the so-
called “Algerian events”– Japan did not consider itself to be at war and thus did not feel
bound by any international treaties during what it termed the “China incident”. The
monographs  published by  soldiers  did  not  deny that  small-scale  killings  had taken
place, but justified them as legitimate defence in response to prisoner “uprisings”. Field
documents show that military command at division level ordered troops to “dispose” of
prisoners.  The term shobun 処分,  meaning “to dispose of”,  was used to order their
elimination.45 Finally,  Yoshida  analysed  the  structural  causes  leading  to  the
slaughtering of civilians, in particular the absence of a genuine military police force in
the Central  China Area Army,  which was accompanied by just  102 members  of  the
Kenpeitai 憲兵隊 (Gendarmerie/Japanese military police). No member of the Kenpeitai
–in the capacity of military police– was present during the fall of Nanking, and just
seventeen police officers accompanied General Matsui when he entered the city on 17
December.46 In other words, the army was unsupervised, entrusted to the command of
each unit  leader.  This  approach to  historical  inquiry,  which involved analysing the
structural causes rather than focusing solely on the massacre itself, subsequently came
to be widely adopted by historians.
26 Another  book  on  military  history  was  published  in  1986,  this  time  hailing  from  a
different school of thought within the field: Nankin jiken – gyakusatsu no kōzō 南京事件
「虐殺」の構造 (The Nanking Incident – Structure of a “Massacre”), by Hata Ikuhiko
秦郁彦 (1932–), a former researcher at the National Institute for Defence Studies who
also worked on the aforementioned Senshi  sōsho collection. 47 Hata specialises  in  the
history of the Japanese army and has published numerous works since 1961 on the
Second Sino-Japanese War.48 He is  well  regarded in the English-speaking world and
served as a visiting professor at Princeton University in 1978. He also wrote the chapter
on Japan’s continental expansion from 1905 to 1941 in volume 6 of The Cambridge History
of Japan, which focuses on the twentieth century (1988). Nankin jiken – gyakusatsu no kōzō
was epoch-making. Like Yoshida, Hata analysed the structural causes of the massacre
and highlighted the logistical failings of the Imperial Japanese Army, which was unable
to control large numbers of POWs and so did not. However, while Hata, like Yoshida,
stressed the need for a structural approach to investigating the massacre, he ignored
the  question  of  Japanese  anti-Chinese  sentiments.  Aside  from this  omission,  Hata’s
book was also criticised for its estimated death toll, since Hata simply reworked the
figure calculated in the immediate aftermath of the event by sociologist Lewis S.  C.
Smythe (1901–1978), from the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. In
his report, which in reality concerned only civilians, Smythe put the number of deaths
at  40,000,  from which Hata  subtracted a  third then added in  soldiers.49 Hata  never
adjusted his initial estimate, even in the revised and expanded version of his book in
2007, despite the appearance of new sources used by historians on the POWs killed by
various units. Given Hata’s attempts to limit the scope of the massacre and provide an
“intermediate” thesis on the events, his work on Nanking has subsequently come to be
seen as the Trojan horse of the revisionist camp.50
27 Fujiwara Akira resumed the work of Yoshida and Hata the following year, in 1987, when
he published Nihon gunji-shi 日本軍事史 (A Military History of Japan), divided into two
volumes on pre- and post-1945.51 At the time, Fujiwara was a professor at Hitotsubashi
University alongside Yoshida, and a member of the Science Council of Japan (Nihon
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gakujutsu kaigi 日本学術会議). He had already studied Japanese military history in the
1960s before concentrating on the links between the modern emperor system (tennō-sei
天皇制) and Japanese imperialism in Asia, leading him to co-write a book on the subject
with Yoshida in 1984. Nihon gunji-shi does not focus solely on the military machine or
military techniques but instead attempts to meticulously reconstruct  the history of
Japan’s military from the 1870s onwards,  replacing it  in  the context  of  the wars  it
fought in Asia and the Pacific.  In other words,  it  provides a history of  the military
machine analysed in the context of contemporary imperialism.
28 Nihon gunji-shi contains a chapter on the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945.
It  concludes  that  there  was  a  loss  of  military  discipline  and  a  loosening  of  moral
standards among the troops after the Battle of Shanghai and in general as the war in
China escalated.52 Fujiwara offers a detailed description of the Nanking Massacre.53 This
description –which he expanded on in a 1988 publication– places the massacre in the
context of the wider history of the modern Japanese army.54 The massacre is no longer
treated as an isolated event but as the result of a specific set of conditions, which the
historian is duty bound to explain. Fujiwara’s conclusion, as a leading scholar on the
military and political history of modern Japan, illustrates the general framework of
thought applied to Nanking by Japanese historical scholarship on the eve of the fiftieth
anniversary of the massacre in 1987.
The Japanese army unlawfully executed a large number of prisoners and repeatedly
committed acts of great cruelty against civilians, who were the victims of rape and
murder as the army advanced and during the operations conducted from Shanghai
and Hangzhou to Nanking, then during the taking of Nanking and the weeks that
followed. These acts were reported all over the world as the Nanking atrocities and
were one of the main charges against Japan during the Tokyo Trial. This affair is an
established historical fact in China, where the city of Nanking has a memorial. In
Japan,  however,  some claim that  a  massacre  did  not  take  place,  arguing,  in  an
attempt  to  evade  our  responsibility  for  the  war  and  influence  the  Ministry  of
Education’s history textbook authorisation process, that the figures put forward by
China are exaggerated. Yet the reality of this massacre cannot be doubted. It has
been proven by numerous studies […] There were no less than 200,000 victims –
Chinese civilians and soldiers– in Nanking.55
29 Finally, the late 1970s and 1980s saw the appearance of research conducted by two
scholarly societies: the Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee (Nankin senshi henshū
iinkai 南京戦史編集委員会),  part of the military organisation Kaikōsha 偕行社,  and
the Nanking Incident Research Group (Nankin jiken chōsa kenkyūkai 南京事件調査研
究会), founded in 1984 and linked to researchers from Hitotsubashi University (a group
that included Fujiwara, Yoshida and Hora). At the same time, research was also growing
into issues such as war crimes in general, biological and chemical weapons testing and
the history of the IMTFE –the main sticking point for conservative critics. One notable
scholar in this development was Awaya Kentarō 粟屋憲太郎 (1944–), another former
pupil of Fujiwara’s and a specialist in the history of the IMTFE.56 Awaya also edited the
volumes on gas weapons in the archive series Jūgo nen sensō gokuhi shiryōshū 十五年戦争




IV. From the fiftieth anniversary of the Nanking
Massacre in 1987 to the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s
defeat in 1995: Sino-Japanese research and
conservative reaction
30 The years surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of Nanking in 1987 saw research into
the massacre accelerate. This momentum continued until a few years after the fiftieth
anniversary of  Japan’s  defeat in 1995.  The response to this  second anniversary was
particularly contentious in Japan due to a coalition being in power, led by the Socialist
Party and Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi 村山富市  (1924–). In 1995, Murayama
issued a landmark statement regarding the war in China and Japanese colonial rule.
After the studies published in the run-up to the fiftieth anniversary of Nanking in 1987,
the  period from 1987 to  the  1995 and 1997 anniversaries  was  characterised by the
appearance of compilations of sources and documents.
31 Following the republication in 1985 of the corpus originally edited by Hora in 1973, the
PRC’s national archives launched a drive to compile historical sources in preparation
for commemorations of  the fiftieth anniversary of  victory in the War of  Resistance
Against Japan. Consequently, in 1987 the Second Historical Archives of China (Di er lishi
danganguan 第二历史档案馆) published the series Qin Hua Rijun Nanjing datusha dang’an
侵华日军南京大屠杀档案  (Documents  on  the  Nanking  Massacre  Committed  by  the
Japanese Army of Invasion).57 This corpus is the result of official research comparable
to  the  military  history  collections  published  by  the  Japanese  and  Taiwanese
governments in the 1970s.  The Second Historical Archives of China oversaw several
other documentary compilations on the war.58
32 The baton was then passed back to Japan, which published two collections between
1989 and 1993, one compiled by the Nanking Incident Research Group (which included
researchers from Hitotsubashi University) and the other by the Kaikōsha-led Battle of
Nanking  Editorial  Committee,  both  mentioned  earlier  in  this  paper.59 This  second
corpus –focusing on military sources– also features Chinese documents translated into
Japanese, including a report by Tang Shengzhi 唐生智 (1889–1970) on “The Defence of
Nanking”.60 Tang  led  the  Chinese  troops  during  the  battle  to  defend  Nanking  but
eventually fled the city, abandoning his men and the general population. The collection
also contains translations of telegram exchanges between Tang and Chiang Kai-shek.
These documents are either from corpora compiled while the Republic of China was
still  located on the mainland (1912–1949)  or from corpora compiled in 1987 by the
national archives of the PRC.61 The collection also includes a summary volume entitled
The History  of  the  Battle  of  Nanking.  Kaikōsha is  not a  scholarly group but a  military
organisation created before WWII. Membership is open to retired personnel from the
army and air force, with a counterpart –Suikōkai 水交会– existing for navy veterans.
This explains how Kaikōsha was able to bring together such valuable military sources.
The group was revived in 1952 and returned to its original pre-war name –its current
name– in 1957. Kaikōsha had traditionally denied the Nanking Massacre, adopting a
stance similar to those who defended the “illusion” or “unknowable” (maboroshi) thesis,
in other words, a negationist stance. Nevertheless, The History of the Battle of Nanking,
which was the culmination of Kaikōsha’s work, now acknowledged the reality of the
massacre,  albeit  with  a  death  toll  limited  to  16,000  people.  In  some  ways,  this
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“intermediate” stance marked an important step forward for an organisation formally
affiliated with the Imperial Japanese Army.
33 No less vital are the numerous memoirs and war diaries published during this same
period, written by former servicemen present in Nanking. Several different categories
can be distinguished.  One of  the most important is  certainly the diary of  Nakajima
Kesago 中島今朝吾 (1881–1945), who commanded the 16th Division, an infantry unit
originally from Kyoto. The 16th Division played a central role in the attack on Nanking
and the fall of the city, as well as in the execution of POWs.62 In his war diary published
in 1984, Nakajima admitted having ordered the systematic killing of tens of thousands
of  Chinese  prisoners.  This  text  was  later  included  in  the  Kaikōsha  compilation.63
Nakajima described the events of 13 December 1937 in a passage heavily debated by
historians. It mentions the “cleaning up” (seisō 清掃) of the city and “mopping up” (sōtō
掃蕩/掃討) of remaining troops, plus the capturing of soldiers as they tried to flee to
the suburbs.
Most  of  the  defeated  enemy  fled  into  the  wooded  and  rural  areas  within  the
operational sector of the 16th Division, while others fled from Zhenjiang Fortress
[east of Nanking]. The prisoners were everywhere, making it difficult to dispose of
them.
Given the general policy of not taking captives, we had to deal with them one by
one. When large masses of 1,000, 5,000 or even 10,000 people arrive, it is impossible
to disarm them. And while the situation seemed safe because they had lost the will
to fight and followed us in tight groups, if there had been a disturbance, it would
have been very difficult to deal with them. We therefore obtained more troops by
truck, dispatched to supervise and transport the prisoners. The evening of the 13th
saw the movement of a large number of trucks […].
According to information obtained later, Sasaki Unit disposed of [shori 処理] 15,000
captives; the commander of the company defending Taiping Gate disposed of 1,300;
and  some  7,000  to  8,000  captives  were  gathered  near  Xianhe  Gate,  with  more
continuing to come there to surrender.
To dispose of these 7,000 to 8,000, a large ditch would have been necessary. Since
this was impossible to find, the prisoners were divided into groups of 100 or 200 and
then transported to appropriate locations so they could be disposed of.64
34 Other accounts were violently criticised by Kaikōsha, for example during a controversy
surrounding the former soldier Sone Kazuo 曽根一夫 in December 1988, once again in
the pages of Shokun!.65 Itakura Yoshiaki 板倉由明 (1932–1999) proved that the account
published by Sone –who served in an artillery unit during the fall of Nanking and so
was not on the frontline– was in reality a reconstruction of other accounts told to his
veterans association, so disgusted was Sone by the stories of his fellow soldiers. The
controversy generated much media coverage for Sone’s book. Itakura was a member of
the  Battle  of  Nanking  Editorial  Committee  (led  by  Kaikōsha)  and  had  studied  the
massacre since 1981. The committee was working at the time on the compilation of
Nakajima’s  war diary.  Itakura was also one of  the men responsible for highlighting
Tanaka Masaaki’s falsification of the war diary of General Matsui. Other memoirs by
conscripts who fought at the Battle of Nanking made a deep impact. These included the
accounts by soldiers from the 16th and 20th Divisions, both infantry units from Kyoto.
The publisher Aoki shoten, which was closely linked to the Hitotsubashi Group led by
Fujiwara, Yoshida and Hora, published three testimonials by former soldiers in 1987,
1988 and 1989, followed in 1989 by a collection of documents from the 16th Division.66
These documents provided the perspective of conscripts rather than superior officers,
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in  contrast  to  the  corpus  compiled  by  Kaikōsha.  The  death  of  the  Shōwa Emperor
(Hirohito) that same year, in 1989, seemed truly to mark a change of era.
35 Despite this, major differences appeared between these two research groups. Members
of the Kaikōsha-led Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee, such as Itakura, considered
the massacre  to  have  been on a  smaller  scale  than that  suggested  by  Yoshida  and
Fujiwara.67 One of the main arguments for this reduction in the scale of the event was
the  estimated  total  population  of  Nanking,  which  certain  critics  believed  to  be
exaggerated. The variations in the conclusions of Japanese historians stem in large part
from the figures adopted for the civilian population and the National Revolutionary
Army, as noted previously regarding Hora’s work. These estimations are also frequently
harnessed by negationists.68
36 In addition to the aforementioned compilations of documents and archives, in 1992 the
Hitotsubashi  Group  published  an  important  reference  work  entitled  Nankin
daigyakusatsu no kenkyū 南京大虐殺の研究 (Studies on the Nanking Massacre), edited
by Fujiwara, Hora and the journalist Honda.69 This publication provides an overview of
the  evolution  of  Japanese  research  over  a  twenty-year  period  from  1972  to  1992,
encompassing all the relevant themes and topics: the Japanese advance from Shanghai
to Nanking, the Battle of Nanking, international law, the organisation of the National
Revolutionary Army within Nanking, the execution of Chinese prisoners, negationism,
and finally, the mass rapes. The chapter on the Nationalist army, written by Kasahara
Tokushi (see below in this paper), was one of the first systematic Japanese studies of the
issue and drew heavily on Chinese sources and studies, unlike previous works.70
37 The People’s Republic of China experienced a similar acceleration of research in the
run-up to the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan,
with some 400 books published on the subject in 1995. Notable examples include an
examination of Japanese war crimes overseen by the History Research Office of the
Chinese Communist Party; a chronological catalogue of Japanese war crimes published
by the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Zhongguo
shehuikexueyuan  Jindaishi  yanjiusuo  中国社会科学院近代史研究所);  and  a
compilation of documents on Japanese war crimes by province, published by the same
institute.71 In  1995,  historian Bu Ping 步平,  then vice  president  of  the Heilongjiang
Academy of Social Sciences and future director of the Modern History Institute of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, published in Japan a Japanese-language study on
the use of chemical warfare by Japan.72 Bu is one of the PRC’s most active scholars on
the use of biological and chemical weapons by the Imperial Japanese Army and the
traces they left in China.
38 In Japan, preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end in 1995 as well as
Prime Minister Murayama’s statement led to a systemisation of negationist discourse.73
The Liberal  Democratic  Party,  the  opposition party  at  the  time,  set  up the  History
Examination  Committee  (Rekishi  kentō  iinkai  歴史検討委員会)  with  a  view  to
producing a conservative history of the Asia-Pacific War. Supporters of the commission
included  future  prime minister  Abe  Shinzō  安倍晋三  (1954–).  The  final  report  was
published in 1995 under the title Daitōa sensō no sōkatsu 大東亜戦争の総括 (Summary of
the  Greater  East  Asian  War).  It  called  for  a  “national  movement”  to  produce  new
history textbooks. The person in charge of the section on the Nanking Massacre was
none other than Tanaka Masaaki, General Matsui’s former secretary. Tanaka labelled
the  massacre  a  “fiction”  (kyokō  虚構)  in  a  chapter  that  can  only  be  described  as
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negationist.74 Once again, the views of an eyewitness “who saw nothing” was used to
counter  the work of  historians.  The result  of  the  History Examination Committee’s
meetings was the creation in 1997 of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform
and, that same year, Nippon kaigi 日本会議 (Japan Conference), an organisation that
aims to unite “real conservatives” behind the scenes of the Japanese government and
restore Japan’s pre-1945 order.75 The early 2000s subsequently saw renewed interest in
Yasukuni Shrine commemorating the war dead.76
39 Neither these political setbacks nor the history textbook revisions after 2010 hampered
scholarship on Nanking. Indeed, several particularly important studies were published
in China and Japan during this period. The situation in the People’s Republic of China
had changed significantly since the early 1980s thanks to the general change of context
owing to the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1977, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences had been established and this was followed by the era of Deng Xiaoping 鄧小
平  (1904–1997),  who  as  China’s  de  facto leader  from  1978  to  1992  orchestrated  the
country’s radical transformation. Despite these changes, research in China remained
politicised  and,  most  importantly,  dependent  on  the  official  military  history
compilations  produced  by  the  Japanese  and  Taiwanese  governments.  One  notable
Chinese study was produced by Sun Zhaiwei 孫宅巍 (1940–), a researcher at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, who in 1990 published an estimated population size for
Nanking on the eve of the fall of the city, based on the archives available in China.77 The
question of how many people were living in Nanking at the time of the massacre had
been an essential element since Hora’s work in the 1970s, but Hora himself had been
unable  to  provide  a  detailed  estimate.  Sun  then  co-edited  a  book  on  the  Nanking
Massacre in 1997,  providing an overview of  Chinese research during the 1980s and
1990s.78
40 The year 1997 saw a wealth of publications from various sources. Sun published his
influential  Nanjing  baowei  zhanshi 南京保衛戰史  (History  of  the  Battle  to  Defend
Nanking), this time in Taiwan.79 As in the case of Bu Ping, the most important and most
neutral Chinese studies were published overseas.80 Sun’s Nanjing baowei zhanshi analyses
the fall of the Chinese capital from the perspective of the Nationalist troops, with Sun
following  up  his  1990  estimate  of  the  population  of  Nanking  with  a  study  of  the
composition of Chiang Kai-shek’s army at the time of the battle to defend the city, as
the imperial army closed in.81 As we have seen, this question of the size of the Chinese
garrison force is  as  important  as  that  of  the population.  On both these points,  the
publications by Chinese scholars supplemented the detailed calculations of Japanese
historians, who subsequently used them in their work. This can be seen in the writings
of historian Kasahara Tokushi 笠原十九司 (1944–), who in 1997 published Nankin jiken
南京事件  (The Nanking Incident).82 A specialist in modern Chinese history, Kasahara
combined all  of  the approaches adopted by researchers to date –personal accounts,
IMTFE  documents,  military  histories  and  sources,  population  estimates  by  Chinese
scholars–  to  produce  a  summary  of  research  from the  previous  three  decades.  His
Nankin jiken is the best-known study of the massacre in Japan, alongside Hata’s Nankin
jiken –  gyakusatsu no kōzō,  published in 1986.  However,  the conclusions of  these two
historians  differ  significantly.  Kasahara  suggested  a  death  toll  of  130,000  –mostly
soldiers– basing his estimate on the figures produced by Sun Zhaiwei, while Hata in his
2007 revised edition continued to rely on Smythe’s original estimate of 40,000. Finally,
an important new source, the Diaries of John Rabe, was published in Germany in 1997
after  being  rediscovered  by  Chinese-American  journalist  Iris  Chang  (1968–2004).83
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Chang helped bring the Nanking Massacre to public attention outside East Asia with her
1997 book The Rape of Nanking.
41 All  of  these studies and publications came under fire from the two aforementioned
conservative  organisations  founded  in  1997  (Japanese  Society  for  History  Textbook
Reform and Nippon kaigi).  Since then,  an outright denialist  school  has been led by
Higashinakano Shūdō 東中野修道 (1947–), a jurist specialising in East German law and
with close links to the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, with whom he co-
published two books. In 1998, Higashinakano published “Nankin gyakutsatsu” no tettei
kenshō  (published in English as The Nanking Massacre:  Fact  Versus Fiction:  A Historian’s
Quest for the Truth), which specifically attacked Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking.84 The
English  translation  was  widely  disseminated  free  of  charge  to  research  institutes
overseas during the second half of the 2000s.85 In 1998, Kobayashi Yoshinori 小林よし
のり  (1953–), a far-right activist who had defected from the left, published a manga
entitled Sensō-ron 戦争論 (On War), in which he adopted the same stance on the Second
Sino-Japanese  War  in  general  and  on  Nanking  in  particular,  namely  that  it  was  a
“fabrication” by the Allies.86 The rhetoric of these two authors was characteristic of the
negationist school; it aimed to reject the validity of all the evidence accumulated to
date, despite its growth in volume since the 1990s.
 
Epilogue: the internationalisation of research
42 Research on the Nanking Massacre, stimulated by increased awareness among scholars
and with the aid of journalists, has undergone several phases since its beginnings in the
latter half  of  the 1960s.  The result  is  some fifty years of  accumulated research and
studies of which I have presented just some of the key works. The research conducted
by Hora Tomio in the early 1970s initially focused on documents and evidence collected
for  the  IMTFE,  in  which  survivor  accounts  and  the  records  of  Chinese  burial
organisations were key. In contrast, from the second half of the 1970s through to 1992,
military historiography came to dominate, harnessing military sources of a different
nature to the evidence presented at the IMTFE between 1946 and 1948. Finally, a period
situated between the fiftieth (1987) and sixtieth (1997) anniversaries of the massacre,
with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII (1995) in between, saw an increase in
testimonies  and  a  proliferation  of  sources  and  documentary  compilations  –notably
military– as well as advances in Chinese research made in collaboration with Japanese
academics.
43 On  the  eve  of  the  new  millennium,  historical  research  had  reached  a  state  of
completion following thirty years –since Hora’s 1967 publication– of scholarship and
exchanges  between  historians  from  Japan,  China  and  also  Taiwan  (in  the  field  of
military  history).  As  previously  noted,  the  period  from  1986  to  1997  had  seen  an
explosion of studies, discoveries and publications of source materials. All of the most
important  studies,  based  on  key  sources,  date  from this  period.  Yoshida,  Hata  and
Kasahara subsequently refined their work by publishing studies on specific points, or
by revising their original publications, as Hata did in 2007 with an expanded version of
his  1986  opus.  Despite  this,  it  seemed  reasonable  to  suppose  that  no  major  new
advances would come out of the field after 2000. Scholarship has continued to grow in
other directions instead.
135
44 Firstly,  although the  main  corpora  of  sources  were  published in  around 1990,  new
materials have continued to come to light. This is attested by the provision of access in
2005 to certain documents for research purposes, like the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek,
held at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.87 Similarly, access to documents
has  been  partially  improved  thanks  to  institutions  making  certain  resources  and
studies available online, as the National Institute for Defence Studies has attempted to
do in Japan. Another example is  the creation in 2001 of the Japan Centre for Asian
Historical  Records,  reflecting  Prime  Minister  Murayama’s  1995  pledge  to  provide
internet access to archives.88
45 Secondly, there has been a growth in collaborative research since 1997, either in the
form of  individual  projects  or  governmental  ones.  While Japanese research outputs
were stabilising somewhere between Hata and Kasahara, Chinese scholarship, in the
wake of Sun Zhaiwei and Bu Ping, began to assert itself in the East Asian historical
debate. In 2006, Yang Tianshi 楊天石 (1936–), a historian from the Chinese Academy of
Social  Sciences,  co-published with Hatano Sumio 波多野澄雄  (1947–),  a  historian of
international relations, a study on the military history of the Kuomintang specifically
focused on the Battle to Defend Nanking.89 Two years later, Yang then published a study
in Hong Kong on Chiang Kai-shek and the beginnings of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
90 Such publications have helped improve global knowledge of the conflict. Academic
exchange has also occurred in the form of a series of international symposia held in
nine  countries  across  Asia,  Europe  and  North  America  in  2007  and  2008.91 The
internationalisation of scholarship on Nanking can also be seen at the linguistic level.
While Japanese researchers initially worked almost exclusively on Japanese-language
documents and sources between 1967 and 1992, this has not been the case since the
1990s, when the Japanese historiography of the Second Sino-Japanese War came to be
dominated by scholars  fluent in Chinese.  This  is  evident in a  special  edition of  the
journal  Gunji  shigaku 軍事史学  (Journal  of  Military  History),  published  in  2017  to
commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese
War.92 The same is true of Chinese historians studying the imperial army using Japanese
documentation.93 This internationalisation has also seen the United States gradually
enter the debate and conduct research on Nanking, in parallel with a spike in interest
in the subject of  “comfort women”.  Following on from Iris  Chang’s famous book in
1997,  scholars  like  Bob  Wakabayashi  have  turned  their  attention  to  the  Nanking
Massacre, initially from the angle of negationism, then widening their focus through
projects combining American and Japanese historians.94 Around the same time, in 2006,
Yoshida  Takashi,  a  historian  specialising  in  nationalism  at  Western  Michigan
University, published a book examining how perceptions of the Nanking Massacre have
evolved in public memory in Japan, China and the United States.95
46 Finally, closer international ties have been established at the political level. Abe Shinzō,
during his first term as prime minister in 2006 to 2007, requested that a Japan-China
Joint History Research Committee be established in order to resolve the issue of their
shared past. The committee was led on the Chinese side by historian Bu Ping, and on
the Japanese side by Kitaoka Shin’ichi 北岡伸一 (1948–), a historian of Manchukuo with
more conservative leanings. The many and frequently difficult meetings gave rise to a
report published in 2014 in both languages, with the section on the beginnings of the
Second Sino-Japanese War written by Hatano Sumio and, on the Chinese side, Rong
Weimu 荣維木 (1952–) from the Institute of Modern History at the Chinese Academy of
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Social Sciences.96 This report is a model of its kind and gives a detailed presentation of
the various stances and respective arguments over five decades of research, without
attempting to find a consensus. It was published at a time when Abe had been back into
power since 2012 and it is not known what he or the Liberal Democratic Party thought
of it.  The results of the work by the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee
illustrate the disparities between the political and academic worlds, which are the only
explanation for the persistence of the debate on Nanking at the political level.
47 The question of the Nanking Massacre continues to grow today. Initially driven by the
victims’ families or by small groups of researchers, it subsequently became the main
hobbyhorse  of  Japanese  neo-conservatives  before  finally  becoming  a  source  of
intergovernmental friction after 1997 with the rise of the PRC. This notwithstanding,
from a European perspective, the subject raises questions regarding knowledge of the
history of the Second Sino-Japanese War. As such, it is vital we promote awareness of
the results of historical scholarship in East Asia.
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NOTES
1. Nankin senshi henshū iinkai (ed.) 1989, documentation vol. 1, p. 48–49.
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3. Matsui  commanded  the  Central  China  Area  Army  continuously  from  30  October  to  its
disbanding on 14 February 1938. He had his headquarters in Suzhou from 5 to 15 December 1937,
in other words during the Battle of Nanking, when the massacres in the suburbs, the killing of
military  POWs and “mopping-up”  operations  took  place  (see  elsewhere  in  this  paper).  After
holding a victory parade to celebrate the capturing of the city on 17 December, Matsui left for
Shanghai on 22 December. He was also commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army until 2
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8. Brook 1999, p. 4.
9. Rabe 1998 (English translation).
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Mao’s specific brand of political
violence
Michel Bonnin
1 I  thank Anne Cheng for  giving me the opportunity  to  exchange with distinguished
Asian scholars on a topic which I often broached with my students, especially during
those last years of my teaching on the Cultural Revolution at the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, but on which I have never written a specific paper. 
2 When Anne asked me if I would like to speak about political violence, I immediately
thought that Mao Zedong was a perfect choice to illustrate the topic, since political
violence was central to Maoism, both theoretically and practically.  Not only was he
convinced  of  its  absolute  necessity,  but  he  had  an  exceptional  talent  for  creating
situations in which all forms of violence could emerge, proliferate and develop to the
full. In this paper, I can only give an overview of the topic. I shall first briefly present
the different types and the main examples of Maoist violence as they appeared all along
the  political  life  of  this  eternal  revolutionary.  I  shall  give  more  details  about  the
Cultural Revolution and will then try to determine the specificity of Maoist violence,
reflect  on its  role  in  Mao’s  political  system and finally  ask whether this  specificity
makes him more or less criminal than other dictators of the 20th century. 
 
I. “Revolution is not a dinner party”
3 As a communist revolutionary, Mao considered violence as necessary for the toppling
of what he called the half-capitalist,  half-feudal system in his country.  The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) founded in 1921 tried to imitate the Soviet Party, but it had to
fight 28 years before gaining power in 1949. During that time, it was not able to foment
a  revolution among workers  in  the  cities,  but  had to  retreat  in  rural  mountainous
regions  to  create  rural  Red zones  and fight  against  the  attacks  of  the  Kuomintang
(KMT) army led by Chiang Kai-shek. Finally, thanks to the Japanese invasion, the KMT
had to make an alliance with the CCP, which survived and prospered during the war
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and, after it was over, was able, with the help of the Soviet Union, to defeat the KMT
and take power.
4 Mao became the leader of the Party during the difficult period of the Long March. He
was able to stabilise his position in the Red zone of Yan’an by using a mix of political
violence against potential rivals (denounced as traitors) and political indoctrination to
convince the rank and file that he was a saviour and that they had to obey him, lest
they become “counter-revolutionaries”. Mao at that time was very much inspired by
Stalin, but the methods he used were not entirely those of Stalin. They were influenced
by the examples of mass violence that Mao had observed in February 1927 during the
Peasant Movement in his native province of Hunan. In the Report he later presented to
the Central Committee of the Party, you can find a highly positive description of the
collective humiliation, beatings and killings of landlords and other “class enemies” that
he  had observed and a  passionate  plea  for  supporting  this  kind of  “revolutionary”
actions. The most famous sentence in this report, which became a Maoist maxim and
was  chanted  frenetically  by  the  Red  Guards  during  the  Cultural  Revolution  was:
“Revolution is not a dinner party”. 
 
II. After 1949: government through movements
5 After  the  revolution  of  1949,  Mao  copied  the  Soviet  system  and  inherited  all  the
Stalinist organs of repression: secret police, Party controlled judiciary, labour camps,
etc. He also had a Propaganda Department which transmitted to the cadres and the
population his latest directives and a bureaucracy in charge of their implementation.
But,  in  the  “socialist  transformation”  of  the  country,  he  relied  mainly  on  “mass
movements”.  Those  so-called  “mass  movements”  are  not  to  be  confused  with
spontaneous social movements. All  of them were organised and manipulated by the
Party,  which  sent  special  “work  groups”  to  the  grassroots,  when  the  local  Party
committee  was  considered  as  an  insufficient  force  to  lead  the  movements.  Those
movements were all directed at “enemies of the people”, which were to be denounced
first by the local or sent down authorities, but also by the rest of the population. The
participation of the masses was important to justify the movement, to isolate those
targeted and to give the false impression that it was spontaneous. In each case, it was
considered essential that the “enemies” reflect on themselves and present an apology
before  receiving  their  punishment.  These  self-confessions  were  generally  obtained
under duress, ranging from endless harassment and detention to downright physical
torture. 
6 The first  mass movement after the establishment of  the People’s  Republic  of  China
(PRC) was the Land Reform. One of the rationales of the Revolution was to liberate the
peasants from the landlords and rich peasants, so that ordinary peasants should have
enough land to  sustain  themselves.  In  the  history  of  China,  peasant  rebellions  had
rarely  been  directed  against  other  peasants,  including  the  landlords.  They  were
directed against the state (whatever its form), because it imposed taxes. So, the land
reform had to be set up and manipulated by scores of Party members, who were sent to
the countryside. Very often, they had to force the peasants to take part, organising
rehearsals and promising advantages to the most zealous activists. But after some time,
existing resentment against  the formerly rich and powerful,  as  well  as  the hope of
obtaining part of their land were enough to guarantee participation and even zeal. In
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fact,  the methods used during the land reform were largely  based on the methods
lauded by Mao in his Report of 1927. The result was violent, with probably two million
dead or more, and the creation of a new pariah class in the countryside which would be
systematically  discriminated  against  until  Mao’s  death.  It  included  not  only  those
members  of  the  “four  black  categories”  who had survived,  but  also  their  children.
Featuring in  this  group were  quite  a  number  of  people  who should not  have been
included but were victims of misunderstandings or personal revenge by some activists.
Through the land reform, the Party had sealed a blood pact with the peasantry.  In
exchange of their participation, the activists became local leaders of the Party and most
peasants obtained more land to cultivate. Unfortunately for them, the land was taken
back by the authorities after a few years and became the property of collective entities
controlled by the Party, the cooperatives and later people’s communes.
7 Other mass movements of the 1950s and 1960s were more or less organised on the same
model, but after the consolidation of the Party structure, the Party committees were
more active and the participation of the masses, although important, was less violent,
the worst violence being the privilege of the official organs of repression. A special
attention, however, should be given to the most lethal “mass movement” orchestrated
by  Mao,  and  probably  by  anyone  ever  in  world  history:  the  Great  Leap  Forward
launched in 1958. Paradoxically this movement was not, at the start, targeting physical
enemies,  but  was  a  huge  mobilisation  of  the  whole  population,  especially  in  the
countryside, to make agriculture and industry leap forward. The problem is that the
whole rural society was reorganised along Mao’s fanciful ideas in order to extract from
the peasants an amount of labour never witnessed before. The extremely optimistic
economic  targets  fixed  by  Mao  as  well  as  the  ways  to  attain  them  were  totally
unscientific, and the result was an incredible waste of resources and human labour,
which triggered the biggest famine in the history of humanity (at least 35 million dead).
Mao had pressured all provincial cadres to accept those ridiculous targets. The problem
could have been much less severe if Mao had accepted at the Lushan Plenum in 1959 to
change his policy. But, confronted to the reality of the famine by a private letter from
the Minister of Defense, Peng Dehuai, he denied it and accused those who pleaded for a
change of orientation of being rightists. For the peasants dying of hunger, there was no
way out, since they were prohibited to leave their villages, contrary to what had always
been the surviving practice in history. And, since Mao needed to find scapegoats for the
catastrophe that he had brought to his country, he declared that “class enemies” had
infiltrated the local rural cadres, and had sabotaged the Great Leap. This is why among
the 35 million dead or so, about two million did not die of hunger and exhaustion like
the  others  but  were  local  cadres  executed  as  “counter-revolutionaries”,  generally
because they had alerted the higher authorities about the terrible plight of their fellow
peasants. The Great Leap, then, shows that Utopia, when it is imposed by a dictator
through violent means, can be even more dangerous than political violence launched
against specific enemies.
 
III. The Cultural Revolution: the richest period for
political violence
8 Although the  Cultural  Revolution (officially  the  period  from 1966  to  1976)  was  not
quantitatively as lethal as the Great Leap Forward, it is qualitatively the richest period
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as regards political violence, especially during the years 1966-1971. This revolution was
a kind of unidentified political object, which was planned and launched by Mao Zedong.
It was a purge, but not only a purge. It was also an attempt at transforming the system
established  after  1949  and  also  the  minds  of  the  young  people  through  a  staged
“revolution”,  with  the  assumed  risk  of  civil  war.  Altogether,  it  was  an  attempt  at
securing the revolutionary character of the regime in order to guarantee Mao’s role in
history even after his death. 
9 It  began with a spectacular form of political  violence,  that of  the Red Guards,  high
school and university students encouraged by Mao to fight his “enemies”, starting with
the  old  culture  represented by  their  teachers,  school  principals  and all  established
intellectuals, professors, writers and artists. The model proposed to them was that of
the Hunan Peasant Movement as described in Mao’s Report already mentioned. At that
time (May to October 1966), only students of “good” class backgrounds were allowed to
take part, and among them the children of leaders or cadres of the Party and the Army
were considered as natural leaders. The violence and the cruelty that they exhibited in
the way they treated people as well  as all  kinds of monuments and works of art is
incredible.  The first  teacher who was killed by her students on August 5,  1966 was
beaten and tortured for long hours by girls aged about 13 to 15 years. Some of the Red
Guards in this school were daughters of high leaders. The collective fanaticism of these
young people was encouraged by Mao who “reviewed” twelve million of them in eight
mass meetings organised on Tiananmen Square during the first few months. Quite a
number  of  famous  writers  and  artists  were  killed  or  committed  suicide  to  evade
unbearable humiliations and tortures, and many other less known teachers and people
of bad “class origin” (whose names and addresses were provided by the police to the
Red Guards) met the same fate. The cruelty of those urban and educated young people
of the higher strata has been a topic of discussion for Chinese intellectuals and foreign
scholars.  It  shows  without  doubt  that  human  morality  is  quite  dependent  upon  a
civilised environment and formal social and legal restrictions. When those are absent,
collective violence can become uncontrollable, especially when those who would refuse
to participate could very well become themselves victims of it. 
10 But,  for  Mao,  terrorising  intellectuals  and  people  of  bad  class  origins  was  but  an
appetiser.  There  were  more  important  targets,  namely  most  of  the  Party  leaders,
especially those linked with Liu Shaoqi, Number 2 of the Party, as well as the whole
bureaucracy accused of being revisionist. To attack them, Mao could not rely on the
first  Red  Guards  who  happened  to  be  the  children  of  the  new  targets.  He  then
encouraged  the  emergence  of  a  new  breed  of  Red  Guards  called  the  Rebels  who
specialised in attacking political leaders. At the end of the year, celebrating his 73rd
birthday with the group of  close affiliates whom he had suddenly promoted to the
higher positions, he proposed a toast to the coming “nationwide all-round civil war”.
And indeed, this is what happened the next year. 
11 I cannot describe here all the forms of political violence that erupted in 1967 and 1968.
But briefly, the scenario was that of young rebels attacking all official institutions and
trying to “seize power” as ordered by Mao, and entering into bloody fighting because
different  groups  claimed the  same powers.  Generally,  it  ended  by  a  fight  to  death
between two rival groups, hating each other and embroiled in endless revenge actions.
Since all of them claimed to represent Mao’s revolutionary line, Mao decided to let the
Army intervene to support the Left against the Right. But who was left and who was
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right? The army leaders made a choice and repressed all those who did not obey them.
But  Mao  did  not  want  the  revolution  to  be  transformed  into  a  simple  military
dictatorship. It happened also that different army units supported rival groups. The
danger was then that the army itself would be embroiled in violent infighting. Mao
then prohibited the army from using their weapons. As a result, the enemies of the
military local leaders attacked the army, stole their weapons and used them against
their  enemies  among  the  rebels  and  even  against  the  army  itself.  Armed  fighting
between rival rebel groups cost many lives of young people, all of them, on both sides,
convinced that they were giving their lives for Chairman Mao. Some army leaders had
to go into hiding to save their lives. In Wuhan, there was a rebellion of the army against
a leader sent by the Central Group of the Cultural Revolution representing Mao himself.
Although this  was  repressed,  the  situation  became so  chaotic  that  Mao  decided  to
authorise  the  army  to  use  their  weapons  and  restore  order.  This  was  done  very
violently by the army leaders and by the Party leaders who had been able to retain
their posts. 
12 A new mass movement, the Cleansing of the class ranks, was launched to get rid of the
Rebels who had thought that they were fighting Mao’s enemies and were now killed by
them with Mao’s benediction. The number of rebels killed by the army and the local
militias was higher than the number of the victims of the Red Guards and Rebels.
13 It is in this last period that the Cultural Revolution reached the countryside on a large
scale. In some southern provinces, the new movement gave rise to horrible collective
massacres and in some places even to a resurgence of cannibalism motivated by hatred
and a desire to “absorb” the strength of the enemy through his or her body parts like
the heart, the liver and the sexual organs. The victims were all  children of the bad
classes, who were the natural targets to obey Mao’s order to “cleanse the class ranks”.
They were killed in broad daylight  and generally  under the leadership of  the local
militia, by people who had been their neighbours and had lived peacefully with them
for  about  eighteen  years  after  the  violence  of  the  Land  Reform.  In  the  cases  of
cannibalism, the meat was often shared collectively in a festive way. One cannibal later
interviewed by a Chinese journalist said that Chairman Mao had said that if we do not
kill the class enemies, they will kill us. He expressed absolutely no regret, felt justified
and discussed his preference for roasted human meat compared to boiled meat. 
14 It is interesting to note that this last period of the most extreme violence corresponded
with the period when Mao’s cult reached the level of quasi-religion. It  seemed that
China had gone back to a primitive stage of human civilisation when rationality was
absent and replaced by blind worship of a pitiless god giving protection only to those
who practiced human sacrifices for him.
 
IV. The necessity of the enemy
15 After this very limited overview of political violence under Mao, I would like to stress
two points. First, political violence was central to Maoism. It was necessary not only
militarily to topple the existing power, but also symbolically to destroy radically the
image  of  the  dominant  people  of  the  old  regime.  Hence  Mao’s  insistence  on  the
necessary  humiliation  of  the  class  enemies  and  the  necessity  to  force  them  to
acknowledge their crimes. It was also necessary to maintain the revolutionary purity of
the regime, to prevent its decay, to “cleanse” it.  What is striking in Mao’s brand of
150
communism  is  the  fact  that  he  refused  to  turn  the  page  of  the  revolution  and  to
concentrate on economic development and state-building. He felt that his own personal
power  and  his  place  in  history  were  insolubly  linked  to  the  transformation  of  his
country  and  of  his  people  according  to  his  will.  He  could  not  accept  to  become  a
manager, a position for which he had no talent, especially compared to other leaders
like Liu Shaoqi or Deng Xiaoping. And to remain a revolutionary, he needed enemies
and political violence. Hence the notion of “continuous revolution” which he defended
during the  Cultural  Revolution.  To  continue revolution,  he  needed of  course  “class
enemies” and that is why he promoted the idea of the existence of capitalists at the top
of  the  Party  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  society,  even  though  there  was  no  possible
economic  or  social  basis  for  the  supposed “bourgeoisie”.  So,  if  continuous  political
violence was a necessity for Mao, this violence was also quite specific. Mao’s special
brand of leadership among the communist leaders of the world was his outstanding
technique of manipulation of the masses for which he had developed a special know-
how during the twenty years of fighting in remote mountainous regions. 
16 It is significant that Carl Schmitt, the once pro-Nazi political thinker, whose main idea
was that the primary question of politics was to define the enemy, was ecstatic about
Mao. In his “Theory of the Partisan”, written in 1963, he presents Mao as the model of
the partisan, for whom hostility is absolute to a point that even Clausewitz would not
have been able to imagine. Schmitt’s knowledge of Chinese history was, however, very
limited (for example, he did not know that the civil war had nothing to do with guerilla
warfare, but was a war between two regular armies), and his vision of Mao was very
much influenced by the French general Raoul Salan, who had tried to account for the
French defeat of Dien Bien Phu by highlighting the use of Mao’s guerilla warfare tactics
by  the  Vietnamese  revolutionary  army.  Still,  it  is  true  that  Mao had spent  his  life
reflecting on the way to defeat enemies through all sorts of means.
 
V. The question of responsibility
17 Finally,  I  would  like  to  raise  an  often  overlooked  question:  What  is  the  personal
responsibility  of  Mao  Zedong  in  the  appalling  violence  of  post-1949  and  especially
post-1966 China? Sometimes, there is a tendency to exonerate him under the pretext
that  he  did  not  order  directly  all  the  evil  actions  perpetrated  at  that  time.  The
responsibility, then, was that of the people who perpetrated them. This, in my view, is
an erroneous conception, and I would argue that, in fact, Mao can be considered as
more criminal than his fellow tyrants of the 20th century: Stalin and Hitler. There are
two reasons to justify my argument. Both are closely linked:
Instead of entrusting specialised institutions with the task of implementing his repressive
orders against all kinds of enemies, Mao enrolled the population at large in this task through
so-called mass movements in which ordinary people were to denounce verbally, and in some
cases, attack physically the enemies designated rather vaguely by himself. The consequence
was  that  many  more  people  became  perpetrators  than  in  the  institutional  model,  and
victims were also  more numerous than if  they had been clearly  chosen by Mao and by
repressive organs, because the people entrusted with the repressive tasks (ordinary people,
activists, or local cadres) were eager to show their zeal, either to advance their career or
simply  to  avoid  being  themselves  considered  as  suspect.  They  had  then  an  inevitable
tendency to be over-zealous.
1. 
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As a result, not only more people perpetrated evil, and even criminal actions, but the social
traumas were  more difficult,  in  fact  impossible,  to  cure.  In  the  Maoist  model,  in  which
former perpetrators often became victims in the next round, hatred and hopes for revenge
became predominant  in  the  society.  Grievances  of  almost  everyone  against  everyone  in
neighbourhoods,  work  units  and  even  families  were  too  complicated  to  allow  for
acknowledgement of past wrong doings and reconciliation.
18 If we take the example of the Cultural Revolution, we can see that, as a result of Mao’s
fake revolution, most of the population was engulfed in a maelstrom of violence where
many  had  to  play  the  part  that  was  written  down  for  them  by  Mao,  either  as
perpetrators, victims or, very often, both alternately. Many urban young people were
first  transformed into  fascist  thugs  beating  and  killing  the  intellectual  elite  of  the
country, and later into guerrilla fighters killing each other in senseless factional armed
struggles, before being imprisoned and/or massacred by army people and militias. In
many villages and small towns, rural people were engulfed in collective massacres that
were a form of genocide of the “bad class” survivors. The traumas left by this period
have  never  been  healed,  and  this  is  not  only  because  the  leaders  were  afraid  of
damaging the legitimacy of the Party,  but also because many people could not face
their own past or were afraid of opening the pandora’s box of pent-up hatred. 
19 As  for  the  question  of  the  sharing  of  responsibility  between  Mao  and  the  other
participants of  the Cultural  Revolution,  Mao’s responsibility is  largely predominant,
even if no one can be exonerated of his or her individual evil actions. Since some time
already,  a  few  former  Red  Guards  have  expressed  remorse  and  asked  for  the
forgiveness of their victims. This was first done privately, but later publicly. And there
were open discussions about the topic. Those who were against confessing wrongdoings
and expressing remorse argued that it was meaningless to express remorse when the
leaders of the time and the present leaders never expressed any. Indeed, some victims
were privately rehabilitated at the beginning of the 1980s, but that was all. There was
no apology from the Party, which tried very hard to prevent study and discussion of
this period.
20 The responsibility  of  young people who had been raised from childhood in a  blind
worship of Mao and in the hatred of “class enemies” cannot be compared to that of the
half-god dictator who organised all the violence. But, of course, Red Guards who have
unjustly harmed people should express remorse. In its process of civilisation, humanity
can only rely on individual  responsibility  and absolute moral  principles.  But,  many
historical events show that human moral progress is fragile and can be reverted if a
civilised environment is not protected. Recently, two researchers have argued that the
Red  Guard  movement  was  a  Stanford  Prison Experiment  in  real-life  size.  In  this
psychology experiment, Professor Zimbardo divided ordinary students into prisoners
and prison officers. The experiment had to be called off after a few days because it
could have ended badly as a result of an excessive identification of the students with
the role they were attributed. It showed that in specific circumstances, ordinary people
could  behave  badly  as  a  result  of  the  power  given  to  them.  This  reinforces  the
argument  against  Mao,  because  it  shows  the  importance  of  the  context  on  human
behaviour. During the Cultural Revolution, the responsibility of the totalitarian system
(and then of its Great Helmsman and of those who supported him) was clearly essential.
That is why the Gao brothers’ statue of Mao kneeling and begging for forgiveness from
the  Chinese  people  is  extremely  symbolic.  Even  if  it  is  shocking  for  the  immense
2. 
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majority of the Chinese, from a historical point of view it seems much more reasonable
than Mao’s portrait hanging at the top of the Tian’anmen rostrum or his statues still
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